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The study of a law enforcement response to a national movement is a homeland security 
issue. How America polices its population establishes the benchmark for how it treats the 
world and is worthy of exploration. What can the experiences of four major U.S. cities, in 
their response to the Occupy Movement, tell us about using emergent strategies for 
policing protest in the twenty-first century?  
In the fall of 2011, the Occupy Movement protests swept across the United States 
in a matter of weeks. Activists demonstrated against income inequality and the state of 
the economy, and they established camps in major urban areas, occupying public spaces.  
I conducted case studies of New York City; Oakland, California; Portland, 
Oregon; and Dallas, Texas, and analyzed the results. That analysis revealed common 
themes, including a lack of negotiated management, restricting access to traditionally 
open public spaces by the police and the use of emergent practice in the complex 
adaptive environment of demonstrations. From this analysis, I am able to provide 
strategic recommendations for city and police leaders in dealing with protests in the 
twenty-first century utilizing a sense-making framework that will assist leaders in 
strategic planning for protests for large and small cities alike. 
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Policing protest has undergone significant evolutionary changes in the United States 
since the 1950s. Scholars have theorized that the methods have shifted from a posture of 
escalated force in the 1950s and 1960s to negotiated management in the 1990s, to 
strategic incapacitation in the 2000s.1  
The study of a law enforcement response to a national movement is a homeland 
security issue. How America polices its population establishes the benchmark for how it 
treats the world and is worthy of exploration. What can the experiences of four major 
U.S. cities, in their response to the Occupy Movement, tell us about using emergent 
strategies for policing protest in the twenty-first century?2 
In the fall of 2011, the Occupy Movement protests swept across the United States 
in a matter of weeks. Activists demonstrated against income inequality and the state of 
the economy. In addition, activists established camps in major urban areas, occupying 
public spaces.   
A. CASE STUDIES 
I examined four large cities (New York; Oakland, California; Portland Oregon; 
and Dallas, Texas) and their responses to the Occupy Movement protests of 2011. 
Additionally, I employed the Cynefin framework as an analysis method and illustrate the 
how doing so helps provide a new way of approaching protest for the future.3  To gather 
and analyze the available data, I conducted the case studies and built theories from the 
relevant data. In addition, I developed the typology for studying the four cities and 
1 Patrick F. Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Protest Since 
the 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 7 (July 2011): 636–652. 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x. 
2 Gary T. Marx, Menachem Amir, and Stanley Einstein, “Police and Democracy,” in Policing, 
Security and Democracy: Theory and Practice, vol. 2, http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/dempol.html.  
3 The Cynefin framework is introduced by Kurtz and Snowden. It provides a “sense-making model” 
for dealing with situations with varying levels of complexity. Cynthia F Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The 
New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 
42, no. 3 (2003): 469. 
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analyzed the similarities and differences. In conducting my research, I have developed a 
new method of analysis that I called “social media video analysis,” which is comparing 
protester video with mainstream media and police accounts of demonstrations to better 
understand the myriad dynamics involved in policing the various events.  
Occupy Wall Street was the original Occupy protest, and it spawned additional 
“occupations” in other cities across the country and around the world. I illustrate how a 
slow response and by protesters apparently unexpected decision to camp overnight 
quickly turned into a national movement that stretched on for months. Conversely, I 
describe how a lack of cohesive leadership and a militarized posture by police 
contributed to a chaotic response that resulted in several injuries to protesters and police, 
lawsuits, and reportedly one of the most violent responses to protesters of the entire 
Occupy Movement.4  I then illustrate the experiences of Portland, Oregon and Dallas, 
Texas who had generally positive experiences in dealing with their Occupy contingents 
because they employed emergent responses to the complex adaptive environment of the 
movement.   
B. ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the cases revealed eight themes, which were consistent in each 
case study. For example, in each case studied, there was a lack of traditional negotiated 
management by police. Following the 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle, 
scholars contend there has been a movement away from negotiated management as the 
primary philosophy for policing protest. 5  Furthermore, I identified the presence or 
absence of cohesive government leadership. For example, Oakland stood as the example 
where the absence of cohesive leadership contributed to their chaotic response.  
Various media outlets raised the issue of the timing of the evictions and whether 
or not there was a conspiracy on the part of the federal, state, and local government 
4 Eoin Reynolds, “Occupy Oakland Protesters Awarded $1m over Police Violence during Arrests,” 
The Guardian, July 3, 2013, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/occupy-
oakland-protesters-1m-police. 
5 Patrick F. Gillham, “Securitizing America,” 636–652.  
 xvi 
                                                        
agencies after the Police Executive Research Forum facilitated conference calls between 
involved cities. However, in each city, the universal degradation of camp conditions 
became an issue cited by the city governments as a primary contributing issue on which 
they based their decisions to evict their Occupy contingents. The issue of spatial control 
of common public areas by police and how the government uses this tactic to control the 
expression of dissent by its populace is addressed in each of the cases. I found that police 
militarization and tactics were an issue that, while represented in the cases, is an area in 
need of additional study. Social media use by activists and, to a lesser degree by police, 
was a defining characteristic of the Occupy Movement. Finally, analyzing the cases using 
the Cynefin framework, as introduced by Kurtz, Snowden, and later Boone, proved to be 
a helpful means of categorizing the responses and for creating the strategies that I 
recommend.6  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS   
The Occupy Movement illustrated that the interconnectedness of modern protest 
necessitates a change in the very way that police leaders should plan for a response to 
future protests. While there are tactics that may help, for example analysis indicated that 
a robust use of social media will assist cities in their efforts toward more effective 
communication. However, tactics are not the issue; strategic planning—and even before 
that—strategic thinking and framing need to be considered and addressed. As technology 
evolves and our daily lives and attendant expectations are changed by the adoption and 
evolution of that technology, police leadership cannot afford to look at past incidents as 
indicators of future ways to respond. 
Going forward, city leaders should consider what the benefits are for applying 
simple solutions to emerging situations. Furthermore, they should address the areas 
where they find that they are not in agreement in advance of the next protest. Now is the 
time to have the “what if…” discussion and to “red team” their current standard operating 
6 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 68. 
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procedures for those “un-standard” situations.7  This thesis provides both a preliminary 
planning matrix as well as a leader’s framework for policing protest to aid in strategically 
planning for twenty-first century protests.   
7 Red-teaming refers to taking an opposing position to one’s own and trying to identify weaknesses or 
problems with that position or approach, sometimes called “playing devil’s advocate.”  
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 I. INTRODUCTION  
Figure 1 is a timeline of the significant events of all four Occupy Movement protests examined in this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.  Occupy Movement Calendar 2011
1 
 A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What can the experiences of four major U.S. cities, in their responses to the 
Occupy Movement, tell us about using emergent strategies for policing protest in the 
twenty-first century?  
B. PROBLEM SPACE  
The arrest of a single protestor or even multiple protesters at an event is certainly 
a law enforcement concern and may even be a civil liberties concern, but it does not 
necessarily rise to the level of a homeland security concern. In keeping with that, the way 
that individual civilian American law enforcement agencies deal with protesters is not 
itself a homeland security issue. However, the study of law enforcement response to a 
national movement is a homeland security issue. How America polices its population 
establishes the benchmark for how it treats the world and is worthy of exploration. When 
a police department arrests over 700 protesters in one demonstration and similar 
demonstrations are reported as having been replicated in over 100 American cities and 
over 1500 cities worldwide, how police deal with those collective protests rise to the 
level of a significant homeland security issue.8 America needs to maintain watch on its 
civilian law enforcement because, as Gary Marx posited, “a democratic society needs 
protection both by police and [protection] from police.”9  
How the police respond to citizens’ public expression of dissent is the subject of 
ongoing study and continues to affect how policies will be crafted, what new laws will be 
brought for consideration, and how the next cities will handle protests on this scale. The 
National Security Strategy of the United States identifies “honest police forces” as a key 
institution of democratic accountability for emerging nations.10 It also addresses the need 
to strengthen our example to the world by, among other things preserving “our people’s 
8 Colleen Long, “700 Wall Street Protesters Arrested on Brooklyn Bridge,” WFAA ABC News, 
October 1, 2011, http://www.wfaa.com/news/national/Hundreds-arrested-in-financial-protest-on-Brooklyn-
Bridge-130921088.html.  
9 Gary T. Marx, Menachem Amir, and Stanley Einstein, “Police and Democracy,” in Policing, 
Security and Democracy: Theory and Practice 2 (2001), http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/dempol.html.  
10 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=24251. 
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 privacy and civil liberties.” American consistency in respecting its own citizens’ rights 
increases American credibility in the world theatre.  
Policing protest has undergone significant evolutionary changes in the United 
States since the 1950s. Scholars have theorized that the methods have shifted from a 
posture of escalated force in the 1950s and 60s to negotiated management in the 1990s, to 
strategic incapacitation in the 2000s.11  
The study of protest in general often requires that scholars examine protests of 
different groups and sizes in different locations and at different times. Studying protests 
with these disparate variables has the potential to make attribution of successful strategy 
and tactics more difficult. Some of what made my study of policing protest challenging 
was the sheer diversity of tactics in use across the jurisdictions today. It is necessary and 
inherently difficult to define metrics for comparison. Police departments also have vastly 
different capabilities. For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) can 
dedicate hundreds of officers to a spontaneous protest without dramatically impacting its 
crime fighting capabilities. However, the Oakland police department, which in recent 
years has seen a sizeable reduction in its manpower, would not. 
With its national footprint, the Occupy Movement made this study easier and 
reduced the number of variables. Specifically, the method of protests—extended 
occupation of public space—in each city was the same and occurred roughly over the 
same time period. Additionally, the removal or eviction of protesters from their 
respective camps occurred within a short time frame relative to one another. Gillham also 
notes that Occupy Wall Street (OWS) was the “most significant social movement to 
utilize transgressive protest tactics in the U.S. in the last 40 years.”12 
11 Patrick F. Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of Protest 
Since the 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks,” Sociology Compass 5, no. 7 (July 2011): 636–652, 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x. 
12 Transgressive tactics are those that breach some limit or acceptable custom or law. Patrick F. 
Gillham, Bob Edwards, and John Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation and the Policing of the Occupy Wall 
Street Protests,” Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy, 
doi:10.1080/10439463.2012.727607; Dictionary.com, s.v. “Transgressive,” Dictionary.com, accessed 
January 13, 2014, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transgressive. 
 3 
                                                        
 Technology, and in particular the use of social media, was something new and 
somewhat universal in all the Occupy encampments as well. In addition to traditional 
transgressive tactics, including hard plastic (PVC) restraints, homemade shields, and 
makeshift barriers, Occupy protesters used social media in new and insightful ways to 
better communicate their message with followers and the general public.13  The police 
adapted as well and in some instances made use of similar technology to enhance 
communications.  
Examining police response to protest in light of Dr. Philip Zimbardo’s research 
into deindividuation and situational influences on behavior provides additional 
considerations for police leadership.14  It is important for police leaders to consider the 
potential consequences of officers donning certain protective equipment and how that 
affects an individual’s propensity for violence or simply reacting differently than they 
otherwise would. Armed with this knowledge, they can make more educated decisions on 
strategy and response. 
Moving forward through the twenty-first century, local governments must 
contend with the increased speed of information transfer. Social media and ubiquitous 
handheld technology make live streaming of audio and video possible from almost any 
location in the country. No longer is there time after the fact to craft a message; this must 
be considered ahead of time. Leaders will need to innovate responses to protest where 
perhaps they would prefer to attempt to rely on “best practices” or concepts that have 
served them well in past protests. As Kurtz and Snowden point out, applying best 
practices may be the catalyst that sends one over the edge and into chaos.15  
In this thesis, I will examine four large cities and their responses to the Occupy 
Movement protests of 2011. Additionally, I will employ the Cynefin framework in my 
analysis and recommendations and illustrate how doing so helps provide a new way of 
13 Portland Police Bureau, Occupy Events: Situation Report Portland, OR (Portland, OR: Portland 
Police Bureau, 2011). 
14 “Deindividuation” refers to a person’s loss of individual awareness of behavior as a result of 
situational forces. 
15 Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a 
Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 469. 
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 approaching protest for the future. 16   To gather and analyze the available data, I 
conducted the case studies and built theories from the relevant data. I developed the 
typology for studying the four cities and analyzed the similarities and differences.   
Along the way, I discovered an abundance of video footage readily available on 
social media. I compared this video footage, shot by amateurs affiliated with the various 
Occupy movements who were casual observers, with that footage shot by mainstream 
media and police when available. For example in the Portland case, I discovered the 
existence of hundreds of videos available online from the Occupy Portland Media 
Coalition.17  I called this new research method “social media video analysis” as I could 
find nowhere in the literature where scholars had compared social media against 
traditional media and governmental records to analyze and evaluate protest methods and 
tactics. To avoid issues of whether or not the footage had been altered or was misleading 
of the events, I compared the footage to multiple sources—television media, police 
reports, print media, and online reports. For example, if footage shot by an amateur 
videographer depicted the beating of a protester at an event that the media and police 
depicted as peaceful and without said violent encounter, I either did not include the 
amateur video as part of the analysis or verified the incident with official reports. In 
general, I found the mass of video available seemed to result in a broad spectrum of 
consistent depictions of the varying protest events. I have also created the timelines you 
see throughout this document based on my research. Additionally, I have created maps 
using Google Maps depicting the various Occupy camps studied.  
I outline my review of scholarly literature in Chapter II. In addition, I describe the 
recent history of the evolution of policing protest from about the 1950s until today. I 
discuss the changes that occurred in the wake of the World Trade Organization protests 
of 1999 in Seattle, Washington. I address the issues of an increased militarization of 
civilian police raised by Kraska, Nemeth, and others. Later, in the analysis of the cases, I 
16 The Cynefin framework is introduced by Kurtz and Snowden. It provides a “sense-making model” 
for dealing with situations with varying levels of complexity. Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of 
Strategy.” 
17 Occupy Portland media content can be accessed at http://www.youtube.com/user/OccupyPDX.  
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 address how such observed increases may have affected the behavior of officers in 
response to the Occupy Movement. I then discuss literature that concerns the 
government’s control of space as a means of affecting the expression of dissent. In the 
later case studies, this comes into play when examining how the NYPD created “hard 
zones,” such as in the financial district limiting access to only credentialed personnel and 
excluding protesters. I close the review by addressing literature related to the sociology of 
protest, which is closely tied to the issue of controlling space. 
In Chapter III, I begin by examining the New York City response to the 
movement. I illustrate how a slow response and an apparently unexpected action by 
protesters to camp overnight quickly turned into a national movement that stretched on 
for months. I also show that when examined as a whole, the New York response can be 
considered a “simple response,” as defined by the Cynefin framework, to a complex 
issue.18  I address specific incidents during their response to the Occupy Movement that, 
while they may have quelled civil disruption for the moment, eventually cost the city 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in settlements. I address how the government’s 
restrictions on items and space served to delegitimate actions that are otherwise legal and 
acceptable and how this contributed to the simplicity of their response. I also address 
what could be called a “New York exceptionalism” that appears to fuel this simple 
approach to dealing with citizens’ First Amendment rights. I also address how police 
used a massive amount of technology to gather intelligence about the protests occurring 
immediately next to the financial district.  
Next, in Chapter IV, I examine the response of the city of Oakland, California to 
its Occupy contingent. I describe how a lack of cohesive leadership and a more 
militarized posture contributed to a chaotic response that resulted in several injuries to 
protesters and police, law suits and reportedly one of the most violent responses to 
protesters of the entire Occupy Movement.19  At least one of these incidents resulted in 
18 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007): 68. 
19 Eoin Reynolds, “Occupy Oakland Protesters Awarded $1m over Police Violence during Arrests,” 
The Guardian, July 3, 2013, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/occupy-
oakland-protesters-1m-police. 
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 the critical injury of an Iraqi War veteran and garnered national media attention, which 
served as a catalyst for multiple protests in other cities. The Oakland leaders’ inability to 
efficiently plan for and manage both internal and external resources contributed to their 
difficulties and their elevated use of force. Had they had more cohesion among their 
leadership and looked for emergent patterns in the protests, I argue that they could have 
achieved a more community-oriented solution and one with less violence.  
In Chapter V, I cover the Portland, Oregon response and the first of the four that 
are addressed in this thesis that used a complex approach to the emergent patterns of the 
Occupy Movement. Portland quickly grew to be the largest of the Occupy events in the 
nation and showcased a community policing approach and innovation in dealing with 
novel protest tactics.20  I also show how, even with the success of the Portland Police 
Bureau’s response, elements of how it dealt with issues of camp condition seem to have 
contributed to its degradation. This degradation was then later cited as a reason for 
needing to evict the protesters.  
The Dallas, Texas response to the Occupy Movement is covered is Chapter VI. 
This is the response of my home agency and is the one with which I am most familiar. 
Similar to Portland, Dallas had success in using innovative methods in dealing with its 
encampment. I articulate how it utilized “fast failure” and adaptation to find the responses 
that worked better than others.21  The Dallas chapter highlights how originally applying 
best practices of negotiated management and attempted facilitation of goals by the police 
department were unsuccessful and that, had they been continued, they likely would have 
led to increased confrontation. The Dallas case study also sheds light on underlying 
motives for action on the part of the protesters as well as those of the city leadership. 
Specifically, I cover how early negotiations with attorneys for both the city and Occupy 
Dallas was successful in moving the protesters to a more advantageous place for the city 
and the police department.  
20 “Portland ‘Occupy’ Protest One of Largest Events in Nation,” King 5, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.king5.com/news/local/Occupy-Portland-today-may-snarl-transit-streets-sidewalks-
131233489.html. 
21 “Fast failure” refers to the idea that failures in tactics are to be expected and therefore require 
adaptation and changes in order to discover successful methods—could also be called emergent practice. 
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 I present my analysis of the data in Chapter VII by highlighting the prevailing 
issues and commonalities that became clearer after examining the four representative 
cities. There I address the effects of cohesive leadership on the outcomes of policing the 
various protests and how simply being cohesive does not guarantee that a particular 
approach will be considered in the public’s best interest. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
responses points to the effects of social media use both by police and protester alike and 
in what ways that will likely change going forward in the coming decades. Analysis of 
the data also revealed that by either agreeing to or refusing to provide for basic human 
needs, a municipality creates certain consequences, intended or otherwise, which affects 
the perceived ability of its population to express dissent.  
Finally, in Chapter VIII, I present my conclusions that are drawn from analysis of 
the studied data. I am able to provide city and police leaders a framework for 
conceptualizing a response to protest in the twenty-first century. An adaptation of “A 
Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” introduced by Snowden and Boone, my 
“Leader’s Framework for Policing Protest,” provides police and civic leaders with a 
sense-making method not previously available.22  Innovative methods of protest and the 
expression of dissent result in new protest tactics. While tactical responses are not 
necessarily universally transferrable, an overarching and universal strategy to policing 
protest in an ethical and innovative way is.  
22 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making.” 
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 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF RESPONSE 
In this chapter, I examine relevant scholarly literature relating to the topic of 
policing protest; however, I have worked to limit the scope of my research to more timely 
articles. An examination of the history of the evolution of policing protest is required and 
carried out in this chapter. Then, I compare the existing literature and the gaps where my 
research adds to the knowledge. Policing protest is a subspecialty in the field of criminal 
justice in general. Underpinning that subspecialty, the literature on the topic can be 
broken into the following themes: literature associated with the historical evolution of 
police response methods, the control of space by the government, instructional literature 
related to planning for mass gatherings, and literature focused on the sociology of protest 
and police legitimacy issues. In the interest of narrowing focus, the author has restricted 
this analysis to literature associated with policing protest from approximately 1999 to the 
present.23  
Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly contend that the study of the 
effects of social movements on society are considerably underrepresented in the scholarly 
literature and worthy of further examination.24 Patrick Gillham has written a number of 
articles related to the evolution of policing protest from the 1950s to today. Gillham 
maintains that police are moving from a “negotiated management” philosophy to a 
“strategic incapacitation” model of policing protest.25  Additionally, Gillham argues that 
in the aftermath of 9/11, there has been an increase in “securitization” and a concerted 
move by law enforcement to restrict dissent.26 Additional study of modern protest would 
serve to add to the discourse on whether that is playing out some 12 years post-9/11.  
23 1999 is significant because of the violence associated with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
riots in Seattle during November and December of 1999. 
24 Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota, 1999): xiv–xv.  
25 Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation,” 636–652. 
26 Ibid. 
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 The literature itself is often event based as it points to specifics of particular 
protests. As such, much has been written about the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
protests in Seattle, Washington in 1999. For example, Gillham contends that the police 
failed to recognize the limitations of negotiated management during WTO.27  In addition, 
former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper has written articles indicating that the Seattle 
Police Department, under his direction, did not respond well to the protesters and utilized 
ineffective tactics.28 Furthermore, Heidi Boghosian, writing for the National Lawyer’s 
Guild, points to the significance of Seattle as the benchmark for how law enforcement 
plans for national special security events (NSSEs).29 
Within the last decade, scholars have begun studying the effects of social media 
on social movements and protests. In “This Protest Will Be Tweeted,” Jennifer Earl et al. 
examine what Twitter provides to the movement as compared to other social media 
platforms “such as websites or Facebook.” 30 Simon O’Rourke, writing for the Perth 
Western University, in 2011 noted, “Facebook and Twitter are becoming recognized as 
key mediums from which to drive change.”31 
The increase of militarization of American police in dealing with protesters 
continues to be a topic in the analysis of policing protest. In their article addressing 
militarization in American policing, Victor Kraska and Peter Kappeler discuss the use of 
metaphors as influence on societal perspectives. They touch on how the ongoing 
metaphor of war in American society has a “filter encased within” that is one of 
27 Ibid., 639. 
28 “Former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper on Paramilitary Policing From WTO to Occupy Wall 
Street,” Democracy Now!, November 17, 2011, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/17/paramilitary_policing_of_occupy_wall_street. 
29 Heidi Boghosian, Assault on Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent: A National Lawyers 
Guild Report on Government Violations of First Amendment Rights in the United States (Great Barrington, 
MA: Partnership for Civil Justice, 2004), i, 
http://www.rnc08report.org/engine/uploads/1/NLG_DissentBookWeb.pdf. 
30 Jennifer Earl et al., “This Protest Will Be Tweeted,” Information, Communication & Society 16, no. 
4 (2013). 
31 Simon O’Rourke, “Empowering Protest through Social Media” (presented at the International Cyer 
Resilience Conference, Perth Western Australia: School of Computer and Information Science, Security 
Research Centre, Edith Cowan University, 2011), 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context. 
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 militarism.32  As such, the contention is that by becoming more militarized, there is a 
resulting authoritarian application of civilian law and as opposed to a democratic creation 
and application of existing law, thereby resulting in more constricted speech. The advent 
of social media, threatens these restrictions by providing additional means of rapid 
communication over which the civilian police have relatively little control.   
Kraska and Kappler also examine the rising number of paramilitary police units 
operating in the United States.33  In his book SWAT Madness and the Militarization of 
American Police, Jim Fisher asserts that in many jurisdictions, civilian police have 
changed their focus from serving the public to operating as an occupation force.34  These 
examples are representative of two sides that either expresses the perception of increased 
action by the police to squelch free speech rights or more closely monitor active 
dissenters.   
Tying into this is a study relating to accessing information and the 2004 
Republican National Convention. Jennifer Earl contends that since the Bush 
administration declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT), there has been an increase in 
“political repression,” especially when dealing with “free exercise of constitutional rights 
to speech and assembly.”35  This has application when considering that what Gillham and 
others contend is something akin to a surreptitious reduction in the states allowing 
citizens to express dissent.36 
B. SPATIAL CONTROL AND USE OF FORCE 
This issue of the state’s control of public space is a significant topic of scholarly 
research. How the state legislates public space, who it permits to access that space, and 
32 Victor E. Kappeler and Peter B. Kraska, “Militarizing American Police: The Rise and 
Normalization of Paramilitary Units,” Social Problems 44, no. 1 (1997). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jim Fisher, SWAT Madness and the Militarization of the American Police a National Dilemma 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=678369. 
35 Jennifer Earl, “Information Access and Protest Policing Post-9/11: Studying the Policing of the 
2004 Republican National Convention,” American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 1 (2009): 44, 
doi:10.1177/0002764209338784. 
36 Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation.” 
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 how that access affects the public’s willingness to engage in expressing dissent are all 
representative topics under the heading of spatial control by the state.   
Mike King adds to the discussion regarding the use of force, control of space, and 
the negotiated management approach to protest policing, in “Disruption is Not Permitted: 
The Policing and Social Control of Occupy Oakland.” He asserts that by making 
negotiated management the norm or standard by which we should judge reasonableness, 
police delegitimize all those who choose not to adhere to that procedure.37  This has 
special implications where the Occupy Movement is concerned because of the almost 
universal lack of central leadership and the absence of leaders willing or able to negotiate 
with police within the movement. King goes on to identify the resulting pressure felt by 
police during the Occupy Movement to protect the right of citizens to assemble 
peacefully and voice their dissent, while at the same time to maintain order.38   
In another work, “Seeing Blue—A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest 
Policing,” Jennifer Earl and Sarah Soule provide insight into possible explanations for 
police behavior and decision making in policing protests.39  They identify four ways that 
police can respond to a protest. They give them the following names and descriptors:  
1. “Do nothing” approach, which, is very self-explanatory,  
2. “Nothing to See Here” approach, where officers do things other than make 
arrests and involves little action on their part,  
3. “Ounce of Prevention” approach, where officers place barricades or make 
arrests to “prevent disorder, and  
4.  “Dirty Harry” approach, wherein police use an abundance of force 
including “hand-to-hand” conflict.40 
Adding to the discussion on control of public space and its implications on dissent 
is Associate Professor David S. Allen from the University of Wisconsin. Allen argues, 
37 Mike King, “Disruption Is Not Permitted: The Policing and Social Control of Occupy Oakland,” 
Critical Criminology 21, no. 14 (2013): 1–13, doi:10.1007/s10612-013-9198-z. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Jennifer Earl and Sarah A Soule, “Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest Policing,” 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11, no. 2 (2006): 145–164. 
40 Ibid, 152. 
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 “the use of free speech zones as an acceptable limitation on dissent is a product of a 
series of developments that can be understood through…spatial frameworks.”41  This is 
representative of a growing narrative on the means that a government uses to 
“acceptably” restrict free speech. Echoing this concern is Mary Cheh, a legal scholar, 
who notes, “Most of the demonstrations affected by government suppression tactics are 
just those troublesome popular risings…”42 Moreover, Staeheli and Thompson point to 
the very purpose of public space being the natural place for public expression and where 
“people of diverse backgrounds can meet as a community.”43  While many of their ideas 
center on youth access to public spaces, they make the key observation that “public 
spaces play a central role in democratizing a society, as they are the places where group 
diversity is most visible.”44  Jeremy Németh echoes the importance of access to public 
space likening it to the “playing field for protest and dissent.” 45   He balances his 
argument with the acknowledgement that there is clearly a need for private space and that 
control, presumably by the police, is needed in public space lest that contribute to a 
“tragedy of the commons.”46 
Noakes Klocke, and Gillham further contend that police and protesters vie for 
control over space in multiple ways.47  They outline that in these contests, police are 
either “restricting protester access” to a particular space or moving protesters out of a 
41 David S. Allen, “Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks to Free Speech 
Zones,” Communication Law and Policy 16, no. 4 (2011): 383–424. 
42 Mary M. Cheh, “Demonstrations, Security Zones, and First Amendment Protection of Special 
Places,” University of the District of Columbia Law Review 53 (2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=781485.  
43 Lynn A. Staeheli and Albert Thompson, “Citizenship, Community, and Struggles for Public Space,” 
The Professional Geographer 49, no. 1 (1997): 29–30, doi:10.1111/0033-0124.00053. 
44 Ibid, 31. 
45 Jeremy Németh, “Controlling the Commons: How Public Is Public Space?,” Urban Affairs Review 
48, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 812, doi:10.1177/1078087412446445. 
46 “Tragedy of the commons” refers to degradation or depletion of resources to which a group has 
access but no one is forced to maintain. Németh, “Controlling the Commons: How Public Is Public 
Space?,” 813. 
47 John A. Noakes, Brian V. Klocke, and Patrick F. Gillham, “Whose Streets? Police and Protester 
Struggles over Space in Washington, DC, 29–30 September 2001,” Policing & Society 15, no. 3 (2005): 
238, doi:10.1080/10439460500168576. 
 13 
                                                        
 particular space.48  They also note the following tactics as “having become central to the 
policing of protest:”   
• Establishment of extensive no protest zones 
• Disruption of safe spaces where protesters congregate 
• Use of less-lethal weaponry to incapacitate protesters 
• Use of electronic surveillance 
• Pre-emptive arrests to reorganize leaders49 
Discourse on police use of surveillance technology also contributes to the idea of 
the government’s control of space in order to influence or restrict dissent. Luis Fernandez 
raises the point that as a result of technology, at the end of the last century we saw a rapid 
increase of globalized interconnectedness. 50   He goes on to discuss whether this 
increased globalization has contributed to a weakening of the state. Starr et al.\  note that 
while although the idea of associating politically is not specifically addressed the U.S. 
Constitution, “association is recognized as fundamental to the workings of a healthy 
democracy.”51  They present this in the context of state surveillance and articulate that 
participation by individuals is critical to social movements and that participation is 
negatively affected by recent (2006) publicity about massive surveillance databases.52  
Technology shows no sign of a slowing in evolution, so this topic will continue to be of 
concern. David Gould, writing for the journal Surveillance & Society notes, “both 
supporters and opponents of CCTV, closed circuit cameras have the potential to 
transform not only how the policing…is organized, but also the working practices and 
attitudes of individual police officers.”53  
48 Ibid. 
49 Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham, “Whose Streets?” 
50 “Policing Dissent,” YouTube video, October 18, 2012, 167, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVbw7wFu62w&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
51 Amory Starr et al., “The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A 
Socio-Legal Analysis,” Qualitative Sociology 31, no. 3 (September 2008): 245. 
52 Ibid., 258. 
53 Benjamin J. Gold, “Public Area Surveillance and Police Work: The Impact of CCTV on Police 
Behaviour and Autonomy,” Journal of Surveillance and Society 1, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): 191–203. 
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 Specifically addressing one method of use of force, less-lethal options, the Human 
Effects Advisory Panel of Penn State University asserts that the goal of the Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Program is, “the means to influence the behavior and activities of a 
potentially hostile crowd…”54 As such, it recommends further study on crowd dynamics 
and measures of control. My research into the policing of protest directly addresses this 
call for additional study. The National Institute of Justice convened a panel in 2007 to 
research pharmaceuticals that “might be an addition or alternative to law enforcement’s 
current less-lethal options.” 55   The literature on less-lethal ordinance is generally 
addressed in its use as a tool to accomplish government control. From a police 
perspective, the literature deals primarily with its efficacy and methods of deployment. A 
gap in the literature lies in the strategic options available for police departments when 
facing a significant protest movement and how more adequately plan for the second and 
third order effects of this use of force.   
C. POLICE LEADERSHIP 
Leaders in general are often looking for “what works” and there are myriad 
sources for leadership guidance. Useful here is Snowden and colleagues’ concept of the 
Cynefin framework.56  The framework has been applied across a wide spectrum of fields 
and professions. For example, French and Nicolae have applied this framework in issues 
of homeland security and, more specifically, in dealing with the aftermath of catastrophic 
events.57 In addition, Louisa J. O’Neill examined what influence faith had on policy 
making of the George W. Bush presidential administration using the Cynefin framework. 
Furthermore, Joseph Pelrine examined Agile software development within the context of 
54 John M. Kenny et al., Crowd Behavior, Crowd Control, and the Use of Non-Lethal Weapons 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2001), www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a446472.pdf. 
55 Danielle M. Weiss, “Calming Down: Could Sedative Drugs Be a Less-Lethal Option?” National 
Institute of Justice Journal, no. 261 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/224083.pdf.  
56 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making;” Kurtz and Snowden, “The 
New Dynamics of Strategy,” 462. 
57 Simon French and Carmen Niculae, “Believe in the Model: Mishandle the Emergency,” Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005): 1–16. 
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 a complex environment, also using the framework.58  This framework, while not directed 
to the topic of policing protest, is one that when applied, can help civic and police leaders 
better respond to new evolutions of protest and dissent.   
A significant piece of the collective works of Snowden, Boone, and Kurtz is the 
caution that “best practices,” as mentioned above and that police are often quick to cite as 
a preferred method of operating, are what often send protesters over the edge into a 
chaotic environment. In my experience, the term “best practices” is a term often used to 
describe an idea or tactic that worked in similar situations. Police development or 
discovery of best practices often involves informal research into what other similar sized 
departments are doing and then assessing applicability to one’s own organization. As 
such, there is considerable reliance on organizations like the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The impact 
of this work and its applicability are addressed most heavily in my conclusions and 
recommendations in Chapter VIII. 
Furthermore, Gillham and Marx also touch on this when, in discussing the failures 
of Seattle police at the World Trade Organization Protests (WTO), they assert that other 
cities that had more experience dealing with protest would have operated differently and 
“avoided the problems.”59  This unspoken push for collaboration occurred during the 
Occupy Movement, with the aid of the Police Executive Research Forum, and is relevant 
to the cases I study here. Later, Gillham and Marx address the difficulty for police to 
devise a “one size fits all” approach.60 I will illustrate how police and city leaders should 
avoid trying to apply this “best practice” approach and look to employ emergent 
responses. 
58 Louisa J. O’Neill, “Faith and Decision-Making in the Bush Presidency: The God Elephant in the 
Middle of America’s Living-Room,” Emergence-Mahwah-Lawrence Erlbaum 6, no. 1–2 (2004): 149; 
Joseph Pelrine, “On Understanding Software Agility: A Social Complexity Point of View,” Emergence: 
Complexity & Organization 13 (2011): 26–37. 
59 Patrick F. Gillham and Gary T. Marx, “Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The 
World Trade Organization in Seattle,” Social Justice 27, no. 2 (2000): 214. 
60 Ibid, 215. 
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 More toward the topic of traditional police leadership literature are publications 
by PERF. It has published multiple books, articles and recommendations surrounding the 
topic of policing protest. Tony Narr, writing for PERF, notes as important “a balance to 
be struck between…First Amendment rights and other civil liberties and…the 
interventions required to protect public safety and property.”61  
In “Breaking the Wave—Repression, Identity and Seattle Tactic 1998–2004,” 
Leslie J. Wood contends that police actions of control affect protesters response.62  In 
addition, della Porta and Tarrow contribute to this discussion by adding that police and 
protester “repertoires spread transnationally in interaction with one another.” 63   The 
recommendations, based on this research, I make deal with inputs of police control and 
considerations for their effects on protester activity while advising police leaders on 
understanding that the actions of protesters will have an effect on police officers. This is a 
gap in the literature that my research and findings addresses. This argument also lends 
support to my position that police application of “best practice” tactics, without applying 
an effective strategic framework for thinking of protest, increases the likelihood that 
those tactics will be ineffectual and increase the pressure toward chaos. 
D. SOCIOLOGY OF PROTEST 
The sociology of protest is, itself, an entire field of study. There are myriad 
articles on the topic, and those exploring the topic of police and protester interrelations 
and influence are germane to my research. As such, I have explored some of the more 
recent books and articles related to this topic. Some of the more applicable are outlined 
below.  
For example, della Porta has researched the response of various governments to 
protest. In “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts” della Porta suggests that we “[look] at 
61 Tony Narr, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful 
Approaches (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2006). 
62 Lesley J. Wood, “Breaking the Wave: Repression, Identity, and Seattle Tactics,” Mobilization: An 
International Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2007): 378. 
63 Donatella della Porta and S. Tarrow, “Interactive Diffusion: The Coevolution of Police and Protest 
Behavior With an Application to Transnational Contention,” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 1 
(2011): 122, doi:10.1177/0010414011425665.  
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 protests as eventful, in the sense of having relevant cognitive, affective and relational 
transformative impacts on the very movements that carry them out.”64  She articulates 
that protest is the key vehicle or “repertoire” of social movements and therefore stands in 
opposition to the “repertoires” of control exhibited by police.65  She also makes a critical 
observation that is the “emergent nature of protest itself,” which is relevant to my 
findings.66  It is this “emergent nature” that I will argue requires a different way of 
conceptualizing a response.     
Vitale has explored sociological issues confronting both protester and police and 
at its core, and he addresses what he contends are more authoritarian responses by state 
entities to protest.67  This is important to understanding the differences in approaches, 
such as when I contrast the approaches of Dallas and Portland to that of New York City. 
In his article “Managing Defiance: Protest Policing and the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement,” Vitale notes that in response to increased protests, many law enforcement 
agencies have “relied on a variety of aggressive tactics.”68  
Some authors address a perceived change in planning aspect for police, which is 
closely tied to the control of space issue. Don Mitchell and Lynn A. Staeheli assert that in 
places such as New York City, officials have denied permits to march in specific public 
locations saying that the marches “would create a considerable security threat.”69 This 
order versus democracy issue was displayed during the Occupy Movement and is an on-
going and relevant debate that calls for more study. 
64 Donatella della Porta, “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of 
Social Theory 17 (2008): 26–27. 
65 Ibid., 28. 
66 Ibid., 29. 
67 Alex S. Vitale, “From Negotiated Management to Command and Control: How the New York 
Police Department Polices Protests,” Policing and Society 15, no. 3 (September 2005): 283–304, 
doi:10.1080/10439460500168592. 
68 Alex Vitale, “Managing Defiance: The Policing of the Occupy Wall Street Movement,” paper 
presented at Annual Meeting of Law and Society Association, Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, MA, May 
30, 2013. 
69 Don Mitchell and Lynn A. Staeheli, “Permitting Protest: Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in 
America,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29, no. 4 (2005): 796–813. 
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 The issue of maintaining legitimacy is a concern facing police leaders in the 
United States. As Herbert Kelman, Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus at Harvard, 
observes, “Legitimization and deligitimization processes generally operate in tandem.”70 
This means that when law enforcement acts in a way that tends to delegitimize itself, it, 
in turn, serves to make more legitimate those appearing in opposition. More study is 
warranted in that legitimization/deligitimization process as it is concerned with modern 
protest activities. 
My research and analysis contribute to the gaps that I have outlined in this review. 
In addressing the gaps, my research contributes toward the sociological aspect of protest 
and how that interaction affects both protester and police. I contributed to the knowledge 
of strategic planning with those sociological concepts in mind. My research and 
conclusions also speak to the issue of legitimacy maintenance by police. In addition, my 
research also provides the unique perspective of a veteran police officer, accustomed to 
the culture and training aspects of policing protest, combined with the scholarly 
application of research and theory. Additionally, my conclusions branch out to address 
conceptualization and the adoption and use of a thinking framework for police and city 
leaders. Moving forward, more research on this and the continuing evolution of protest, 




70 Herbert C. Kelman, “Reflections on Social and Psychological Processes of Legitimization and 
Delegitimization,” in The Psychology of Legitimacy; Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and 
Intergroup Relations, ed. John T. Jost and Brenda Major (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 
2001): 54. 
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 III. OCCUPY WALL STREET 
To assist the reader in understanding how events related to Occupy Wall Street occurred, Figure 2 is the timeline specific to 
Occupy Wall Street. 
 
 
Figure 2.  A Timeline of Significant Events Related to Occupy Wall Street in the Fall of 2011. 
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 A. THE PROTEST 
I begin the case analysis with the city of New York because it was the cornerstone 
in the Occupy Movement. It was first and is likely the one most often thought of in terms 
of the Occupy Movement itself. Occurring in New York, it garnered some of the most 
national media attention and is credited with spawning hundreds of localized Occupy 
Movements across the United States and the world.  
The Occupy Movement, perhaps the most contentious and widespread U.S. 
movement since perhaps the Vietnam War era protests, has humble beginnings. The 
Occupy Movement emerged from discussions between a handful of students, activists, 
and artists meeting near Wall Street to explore how they might “change the world.”71  
With input from the New York activists, the Canadian online magazine Adbusters, 
published an announcement on July 13, 2011 asking readers, “Are you ready for a Tahrir 
moment?”—referring to the start of the Arab Spring in Egypt and requesting for 20,000 
people to “flood into lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and 
occupy Wall Street” on September 17, 2011. 72  The successful mobilizing efforts of 
activists in New York City drew thousands to the financial district that day where they 
eventually set up an encampment in Zuccotti Park. 
Zuccotti Park itself was, “established in a wave of development that spurred 
corporate plazas after changes were made to the city’s zoning laws in the 1960s.”73 
Developers of the One Liberty Plaza building, a 54-story tower near the park, were 
allowed to add an additional 500,000 square feet to their building in exchange for 
providing a public space.74  It was developed under original New York zoning laws that 
71 Andy Kroll, “How Occupy Wall Street Really Got Started,” Mother Jones, October 17, 2011, 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-international-origins. 
72 Culture Jammers HQ, “#OCCUPYWALLSTREET: A shift in Revolutionary Tactics,” Adbusters 
(blog), July 13, 2011, https://www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/occupywallstreet.html.  
73 Lisa W. Foderaro, “Zuccotti Park Is Privately Owned, but Open to the Public,” New York Times, 
October 13, 2011, sec. N.Y. / Region, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/nyregion/zuccotti-park-is-
privately-owned-but-open-to-the-public.html. 
74 Colin Moynihan, “Park Gives Wall St. Protesters a Place to Call Home,” City Room (blog), New 
York Times, September 27, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/park-gives-wall-st-
protesters-a-place-to-call-home/. 
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 provided for the parks to be open 24 hours-a-day—more recent rules are more restrictive 
on times that the parks are allowed to be open to the public.75  As such, private security 
guards who are hired by the property management company normally provide security 
for the park.76 
During their stay in Zuccotti Park, the occupiers formed committees and groups—
a direct action committee, a finance committee, food and comfort committee, arts and 
culture committee, security, legal, media, and other a host of other groups.77  Protesters 
were provided with education on how to more effectively engage in direct action protests. 
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Lawyers Guild provided advice on how to 
engage in protest as well as assistance with legal matters to protesters who had been 
arrested.78  In contrast to the seeming cohesion among the diverse protesters, there were 
allegations of paid instigators coming to the camp and creating confrontations. 79  
Additionally, as with Occupy movements in other cities, the camp at Zuccotti Park saw 
an influx of homeless people.80 
On the first day of the march, September 17, 2011, protest signs vying for 
politicians to “Stop Trading our Future” and “People Not Profits” were visible in video 
shot by CNN and a number of unidentified protesters voiced displeasure at the disparity 
of income between “classes.”81  Protesters in that initial march voiced a desire to change 
to an even “more democratic” form of government— “from the ground up,” as one 
protester put it. 82  Marching through the streets of Manhattan chanting, “We are the 
75 Foderaro, “Zuccotti Park Is Privately Owned.” 
76 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation,” 10. 
77 Ows Minutes, “#Occupy Wall Street General Assembly Minutes 9/17/2011,” #OccupyWallStreet 
NYC General Assembly, September 17, 2011, http://www.nycga.net/2011/09/general-assembly-minutes-
91711/.  
78 “Occupy Wall Street : The Tour (Uncut),” YouTube video, posted by Lee Stranahan, November 4, 
2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZrbagiVtDo&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
79 Occupy Unmasked, directed by Stephen K. Bannon (Dallas, TX: Magnolia Home Entertainment, 
2012). 
80 Ibid. 




                                                        
 99%!” referring to the gap in income between the wealthiest one percent and the other 99 
percent of Americans. 
By 3:00 p.m. on September 17, hundreds of protesters had descended on Wall 
Street and moved into Zuccotti Park while hundreds more gathered in Bowling Green 
Park some five blocks away. When their numbers swelled to over 500, they spilled into 
another nearby park. 83  As expressed by some of the organizers, one of the original 
intentions was for the protesters to actually camp for several weeks or months as if to 
replicate the protests in the Egypt and other Middle Eastern and European countries that 
had occurred earlier in 2011.84  The march and gathering remained relatively peaceful 
during those first few hours and by early evening only two people were reported arrested. 
The initial protester arrests were for violating a loitering law on the books since 1845, 
which prohibits “Being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire 
or facial alteration…”85 New York police acknowledged that many of the protesters had 
been compliant, heeding officers’ direction to keep streets and sidewalks clear of 
blockages.86 Officers gave repeated warnings of arrest should the protesters elect not to 
comply. At Wall Street and Broadway, a line of at least 12 to 15 officers stood in front of 
barricades.   
Figure 3 is a map depicting the relative area of the Occupy Wall Street Movement 
Fall 2011. 
83 Julienne Pepitone, “Hundreds of Protesters Descend to ‘Occupy Wall Street,’” CNN Money, 
September 17, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/17/technology/occupy_wall_street/index.htm. 
84 Colin Moynihan, “Wall Street Protest Begins, With Demonstrators Blocked,” City Room (blog), 
New York Times, September 17, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/wall-street-protest-
begins-with-demonstrators-blocked/.  
85 State of New York, “New York Penal Article 240 § 240.35 Loitering,” 2011, 
http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0240.35_240.35.html. 
86 Candice Smith, “Protesters Begin Effort to ‘Occupy Wall Street,’” ABC News Blogs, September 17, 
2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/09/protesters-begin-effort-to-occupy-wall-street/.  
 24 
                                                        
  
Figure 3.  Occupy Wall Street Camp 
As crowds gathered in Zuccotti Park that afternoon and evening, protesters set up 
tents and other structures. In the course of my work as a police officer, I had occasion to 
speak with individuals from police departments who responded to the Occupy Movement 
regarding their response it. These individuals have requested anonymity, and I have 
honored that request in each occurrence. According to one New York Police Department 
(NYPD) official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, the police moved too slowly to 
prevent the erection of tents and other semi-permanent structures in the park.87  The 
crowd used the park as a base of operations from which to begin their almost daily 
marches.88  Early on, the protesters established a makeshift society with divisions of 
labor and responsibility in spite of their fragmented relationships with one another and 
lack of central leadership. Protesters “built” a library and an “infoshop” with fliers and 
pamphlets and other protest related literature.89  In addition, the protesters established a 
kitchen to store and distribute food and put together lists of chores, such as camp cleanup 
87 Anonymous NYPD official, personal communication with author, August 2013. 
88 Moynihan, “Park Gives Wall St. Protesters a Place to Call Home.” 
89 Ibid. 
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 duties for volunteers. 90   Other volunteers helped run the meetings, which tended to 
operate with democratic principles. 
The crowd was estimated at about 5,000 at its peak in spite of the calls for 20,000 
to show up.91 Those numbers fell through the weekend but for those that remained, the 
media estimated that they appeared ready to stick it out for quite some time and at least 
for the time being, and the NYPD was content to allow them to remain.92  The protesters 
vowed to stay peaceful, content to wait on an answer to demands that were not always 
clear or understood by fellow members or the public at large.   
Within a few days the overnight crowd of protesters held at about 200 people, and 
most of those were from places like Texas, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Missouri.93  
A study of participants in Occupy Wall Street indicated that an “overrepresentation” of 
“highly educated young adults.” 94   In fact, 80 percent of actively engaged survey 
respondents indicated that they had a bachelor’s degree or higher.95  Speaking to their 
reasoning for participating in the Occupy Movement, survey respondents indicated their 
distrust of the current political system as a means of changing the current sociopolitical 
situation.96  Likewise in another published survey, Occupy participants indicated that 
they did not think that they could trust the government in Washington 94 percent of the 
90 Ibid. 
91 Erin McLaughlin, “Wall St. Protesters Say They’re Settled In,” ABC News Blogs, September 18, 
2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/09/wall-st-protesters-say-theyre-settled-in/.  
92 Ibid. 
93 Megan Barr, “‘Occupy Wall Street’ Protesters Vow To Camp Near Wall St. Indefinitely,” 
Huffington Post, September 9, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/21/occupy-wall-street-
protest_n_974693.html; Ginia Bellafante, “Protesters Are Gunning for Wall Street, with Faulty Aim,” New 
York Times, September 23, 2011, sec. N.Y. / Region, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/25/nyregion/protesters-are-gunning-for-wall-street-with-faulty-aim.html. 
94 Ruth Milkman, Stephanie Luce, and Penny Lewis, Changing the Subject: A Bottom-Up Account of 
Occupy Wall Street in New York City (New York: Murphy Institute, 2013), 4, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/562862/changing-the-subject-2.pdf. 
95 Ibid, 10. 
96 Ibid, 4. 
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 time.97  This perception of trust in the government is a factor in the issue of legitimacy of 
local police that I discuss in my analysis. 
A New York City General Assembly member in a Huffington Post online video 
described the daily activities of protesters as marching, chanting and a “variety of fun 
things as well as serious discussion on the economic situation.”98  Every afternoon, the 
group reportedly held a General Assembly meeting in the center of Zuccotti Park in 
which they would map out their tactics for the coming day. 99  In order to facilitate 
everyone hearing the message, protesters used a manner of speaking they dubbed “the 
people’s microphone.”  One person would speak a few words and the crowd would repeat 
those words so that everyone could hear.  
Arrangements in the camp were such that the protesters worked to develop a way 
to improve communications within the camp during the first few days of the occupation. 
They established information and welcome tables and meetings on various topics were 
held, generally at 60 Wall Street in the Atrium building throughout the day. A dry erase 
board in the camp highlighted topics of the meetings ranging from “Think Tanks” to 
“Direct Action” to general “Organization” meetings and “performances” by some of the 
protesters.100  An unofficial estimate was that 40 percent of the meetings that were held 
were relevant to maintaining the space in Zuccotti Park, and other than a few “arts” and 
“hobby” meetings, the rest were “pretty political.”101 The teachers union of New York 
also reportedly provided the Occupy contingent with storage space.102 
Other than an incident near the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on Tuesday, 
September 20 that resulted in the arrest of seven and injuries to one, the daily protests had 
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 not turned violent at that point and police had made relatively few arrests.103  That would 
change in the days to come.  
On September 24, a group of protesters left the Occupy camp and marched Union 
Square. Barricades and police (who through various open source social media posts had 
begun monitoring the group’s plans) met them. In one of the first of several videos 
capturing violent arrest scenes, a New York police officer used a violent takedown on a 
person with a cell phone. 104   The individual, who turned out to be a nearby café 
employee who came out from work and started filming the police, was seen holding his 
hands up in the air in an apparent defensive manner and gesture of surrender. The officer 
grabbed him and threw him to the ground in what is commonly referred to in police use 
of force manuals as an arm-bar styled takedown. It appears as though the officers are 
arresting another individual in the background and police are attempting to move the 
onlookers back away from the arresting officers.   
Later, the police began using an orange hand-held plastic or fabric fence to corral 
or kettle a segment of protesters for reportedly blocking traffic, although a YouTube 
video of the event shows protesters on the sidewalk at that point.105 As officers in the 
foreground of the video are shown corralling a group of female protesters, most of who 
have cameras and appear to be recording video and/or photos, in the background an 
unidentified individual appears to be taken into custody by a number of NYPD officers. 
This arrest evoked a frenzied response and at least two white-shirted NYPD supervisors 
moved quickly toward the women being corralled. One supervisor appeared to admonish 
the protesters while another, later identified as Anthony Bologna, sprayed pepper spray in 
103 Barr, “‘Occupy Wall Street’ Protesters Vow To Camp.” 
104 “Arrested for Talking to a Cop,” YouTube video, posted by LibertyPlazRev, September 24, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNyMr6VmGJo&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
105 Nathan Schneider, “#OccupyWallStreet Bleeds and Leads—Waging Nonviolence,” Waging 
Nonviolence, accessed August 26, 2013, http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/occupywallstreet-bleeds-
and-leads/; “Peaceful Female Protesters Penned in the Street and Maced!,” YouTube video, posted by 
TheOther99Percent, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moD2JnGTToA&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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 the faces of the female protesters.106  In his action of spraying the unarmed females, 
some later contended that he galvanized the Occupy Movement worldwide.107  At least 
80 people were arrested by the end of the day. Police cited charges of disorderly conduct, 
blocking traffic, and failure to obey a lawful order. The NYPD also pointed out that the 
protesters had no permit for the march.108  As night fell, hundreds of protesters remained 
in the Zuccotti Park encampment.  
The march to commemorate the second week anniversary of the occupation on 
October 1, began about 3pm from Zuccotti Park with a swell of about 2000 
participants.109  As the protesters reached the Brooklyn Bridge, some eight to 10 blocks 
away, activists participating in the march recorded hundreds of videos using cell phones 
and personal cameras, which showed that the crowd filled the walkway on the bridge. 
Many of these videos were subsequently uploaded to social media sites and as such 
provided source data for the development and use of social media video analysis used in 
my research. Police initially blocked protesters from walking on the roadway portion of 
the bridge. 110  The crowd continued to grow and was heard chanting, “Take the 
bridge!”111  Also present in the video were officers of the Technical Assistance Response 
Unit (TARU). They often provide technical equipment involved in filming NYPD actions 
in protest and demonstration scenarios. A captain with the New York Police Department, 
flanked by four to five additional officers, used a bullhorn to warn the protesters if they 
106 “Peaceful Female Protesters Penned in the Street and Maced!” YouTube Video; Christopher 
Mathias, “Anthony Bologna, NYPD Cop Who Pepper-Sprayed Occupy Protesters, Will Get No Help From 
City In Lawsuit,” Huffington Post, August 3, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/03/anthony-
bologna-nypd-cop-pepper-spray-occupy-wall-street-lawsuit_n_1739036.html.  
107 Christina Boyle, “Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna’s Decision to Pepper Spray Occupy Wall 
Street Protesters Helped Galvanize Worldwide Support the Movement,” NY Daily News, September 9, 
2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/deputy-inspector-anthony-bologna-decision-pepper-spray-
occupy-wall-street-protesters-helped-galvanize-worldwide-support-movement-article-1.1155084. 
108 Matt DeLuca and Christina Boyle, “Wall Street Protesters Cuffed, Pepper-Sprayed during 
‘Inequality’ March,” NY Daily News, September 25, 2011, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/wall-street-protesters-cuffed-pepper-sprayed-inequality-
march-article-1.953939. 
109 Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation,” 




                                                        
 did not move out of the roadway they would be subject to arrest.112  Multiple officers 
wearing “NYPD TARU” raid jackets stood by filming the crowd.113  A small contingent 
of protesters emerged from the crowd and formed a line in front of the group and began 
to advance toward the officers. The officers retreated and the crowd began its march 
across the bridge in the traffic lane and on the adjacent pedestrian walkways. According 
to Natasha Lennard, a New York Times reporter covering the march, “The mood was 
celebratory and confrontations with the police were not widely expected.”114 
Partway across the bridge however, the police, with additional uniformed officers, 
formed a line and would not allow protesters to continue. Rank and file uniformed police 
officers, in an odd arrangement of personnel, stood in a line behind the white-shirted 
supervisors. This was an odd arrangement because it put the supervisors who were in 
charge of the police response in a generally unsafe position between the advancing crowd 
and the line officers. The supervisors and a few of the line officers then began selecting 
people at the front of the crowd for arrest, handcuffing them with flexible plastic 
restraints and escorting them away. None of the officers was wearing riot gear and in 
several instances officers actually turned their backs on the largest portion of the crowd 
just a few feet away.115   
The police had used a tactic known as “kettling” in their response to the Brooklyn 
Bridge march.116  They did so by confining the throng of protesters to one area of the 
112 The captain first warns the protesters and then appears to read a warning off a script of some sort.  
He introduces himself but his name is unintelligible. Ibid. 
113 A raid jacket is generally a windbreaker style jacket with markings designed to readily identify the 
wearer as a police officer.  
114 Natasha Lennard, “Covering the March, on Foot and in Handcuffs,” NewCity Room (blog), New 
York Times, October 2, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/covering-the-march-on-foot-
and-in-handcuffs/. 
115 “Brooklyn Bridge Video: Police Arrest Occupy Wall Street Protesters,” YouTube video, posted by 
Daryl Long, October 1, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_1bYVMwg8k&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
116 Kettling, a term often used in Great Britain, refers to the actions of police or other authorities in 
restricting the movement of protesters to a confined area and not allowing them to leave.  The ACLU point 
out that kettling has the potential to increase violent interactions between police and protester, cause 
confusion and panic, and dissuade individuals from expressing their First Amendment rights. Emi 
MacLean, Katherine Glenn, and Sarah Knuckey, Suppressing Protest: Human Rights Violations in the U.S. 
Response to Occupy Wall Street (New York University. Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=718264. 
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 bridge. They again used the orange flexible fencing and personnel to establish a barrier 
on the bridge itself, and some reported that they did the same at the entrance to the 
bridge.117  One protester remarked that there was a belief that the police actually led the 
way across the bridge and that many protesters felt that they were assisting their 
crossing.118  When they reached the police line and tried to turn around, she said that they 
saw that police were coming up from behind them. She said, “People were distressed and 
scared and terrified…” and that as a result, people were climbing the rails trying to get 
onto the pedestrian pathways and off the roadway.119 This protester remarked that she 
was unaware that this was an “arrestable situation” and noted that there were children 
accompanying adults on the march.120  In at least one video, officers can be observed 
warning the crowd of possible arrest but it is unclear how effective these warnings were. 
The vast majority of the crowd was chanting, officers were using handheld bullhorns, and 
at times what they were saying was unintelligible.121 
After those initial arrests, police reinforcements arrived with additional flexible 
handcuffs as well as transport vehicles; the custodial arrests continued. If media reports 
of the arrestees are accurate, then many of those arrested faced delays of several hours 
before even arriving at a detention facility—several hours more before they were booked 
in. 122  All totaled, more than 700 people were arrested during the march across the 
Brooklyn Bridge.123  By late the next day, fewer than 20 people remained in custody with 
117 Lennard, “Covering the March, on Foot and in Handcuffs.” 
118 “Day 16 Bklyn Bridge Police “Kettling” Boosts Protesters Support,” YouTube video, posted by 




121 “Brooklyn Bridge Video: Police Arrest Occupy Wall Street Protesters,” YouTube video. 
122 Lennard, “Covering the March, on Foot and in Handcuffs.” 
123 “‘Let Us Go!’: About 700 Arrested in Wall Street Protest,” NBC News, October 2, 2011, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44742659/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/let-us-go-about-arrested-wall-
street-protest/; “About 700 Arrested in Wall Street Protest—The DOWNFALL of WALL STREET Has 
BEGUN!,” YouTube video, posted by DougandDonna Bickford, October 2, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MXUU5-5krGY&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Colin Moynihan, 
“Last Scheduled Case of Brooklyn Bridge Arrests, Like Most Others, Is Dismissed,” New York Times, 
October 20, 2013, sec. N.Y. / Region, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/nyregion/last-scheduled-case-
of-brooklyn-bridge-arrests-like-most-others-is-dismissed.html. 
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 the majority of them having been issued citations for disorderly conduct with a later court 
date.124 
On Wednesday, October 5, 2011, protesters again gathered for what would be 
reported as the largest collective action to date in New York related to the Occupy 
Movement. The “Union March,” backed by at least 15 of the nation’s largest labor 
unions, started from Foley Square in lower Manhattan in the afternoon and ended at 
Zuccotti Park just after dark. Among those represented at the march were the AFL-CIO, 
United Auto Workers, Transit Workers Union, Teamsters Local 111 and, the Coalition of 
Black Trade Unionists.125  The march began peacefully but violence broke out between 
protesters and police after nightfall. In a CNN video taken during the daylight hours, one 
protester remarked that the police had been helpful and facilitated the march and that the 
crowd had swelled due to the support of those labor unions.126   
At some time after dark, reports indicate that about 200 protesters tried to force 
their way through police barricades that restricted access to the financial district. In one 
video, referenced in a New York Daily News article, a white-shirted police supervisor in a 
crowd of yelling and screaming protesters can be seen striking protesters with a baton.127  
The officer can be seen swinging the baton in an overhead motion with both hands in a 
way that is reserved for deadly force encounters, due to the propensity for the baton to 
strike someone’s head.128  For all the violence, media reports indicated that upwards of 
30 protesters were actually arrested out of a crowd estimated by union organizers to be in 
124 “Wall Street Protesters Released,” BBC, October 2, 2011, sec. US & Canada, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15143509. 
125 Gregory Krieg, “Occupy Wall Street Protests: Police Make Numerous Arrests,” ABC News, 
October 14, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/occupy-wall-street-protests-police-make-numerous-
arrests/story?id=14673346; Occupy Wall Street, 2011. 
126 Karmalize, “Occupy Wall Street Rally @ Foley Square 10/5/11,” CNN iReport [blog], accessed 
September 10, 2013, http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-684322.  
127 “Cops Beating People up at Occupy Wall Street,” YouTube video, posted by Yasha Gruben, 
October 5, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpOMlDVaXzc&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
128 The Dallas Police Department, the North Carolina Department of Corrections, the Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department and other departments consider overhead baton strikes acceptable only in 
response to the threat of serious bodily injury or death.  
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 the neighborhood of 10,000 to 20,000.129  None of the officers in this video was seen 
wearing any type of riot gear or other personal protective equipment.  
In mid-October and in response to a “rescheduled” eviction and cleanup of 
Zuccotti park, protesters formed cleanup crews who swept and mopped throughout the 
night.130  According to Mayor Bloomberg, Brookfield Properties officials had received 
“intense pressure” not to close the park at that time.131  The discourse about the sanitary 
conditions in the park and a planned cleanup resulted in increased attention and the crowd 
in the park swelled to numbers near 3,000 according to one Occupy Wall Street 
member.132 
Protesters saw a rise in donated food including pizzas, catered food and other 
foodstuffs—so much that they were able to establish a food storage area near their 
working kitchen in camp. A number of celebrities, such as Roseanne Barr, Russell 
Simmons, and Michael Moore made visits to the Occupy camp and were met with mixed 
results, some suggesting the timing of the visits were publicity stunts.133 
B. POLICE RESPONSE 
The NYPD’s response to the Occupy Movement was unique among the four cities 
studied in that they had the ability to reassign hundreds of officers from other precincts to 
police the Occupy Movement. It is difficult to conceive of how this would not influence 
decisions on how to deal with protesters. In this section, I articulate how NYPD 
129 Christina Boyle, Emily Sher, Anjali Mullany, and Helen Kennedy, “Occupy Wall Street Protests: 
Police Make Arrests, Use Pepper Spray as Some Activists Storm Barricade,” NY Daily News, October 5, 
2011, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/occupy-wall-street-protests-police-arrests-pepper-spray-
activists-storm-barricade-article-1.961645. 
130 Colin Moynihan and Cara Buckley, “Cleanup of Zuccotti Park Is Postponed,” City Room (blog), 
New York Times, October 14, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/cleanup-of-zuccotti-
park-cancelled/. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Esmé E. Deprez, Joel Stonington, and Chris Dolmetsch, “Occupy Wall Street Park Cleaning 
Postponed,” Bloomberg News, October 14, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-14/occupy-
wall-street-park-cleaning-is-postponed-as-14-protesters-in-custody.html.  
133 “Roseanne Barr: ‘Guilty’ Wall Street Bankers Should Be Sent to Reeducation Camps or 
Beheaded,” FoxNews, October 3, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2011/10/03/roseanne-barr-
guilty-wall-street-bankers-should-be-sent-to-reeducation-camps-or/. 
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 responded to the encampment and what actions they took in preparations for the eviction 
of activists from Zuccotti Park. 
According to police close to the operation who wished to remain anonymous, they 
worked to communicate the law to the protesters as well as what was considered 
acceptable protest behavior. Officers on foot, horseback, bicycle, and scooters were 
visible in the area around the park and financial district. The American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) noted that the NYPD employed “force projection usually via large 
numbers of officers on foot and on scooters…”134 In the midst of the protest, the NYPD 
reportedly ceded patrolling of the interior of the park to the protesters and were content to 
station officers on the perimeter of the park. Mayor Bloomberg would come to cite rising 
crime and safety concerns as supporting reasons for their eviction.135  As with other cities 
that attempted negotiating with the Occupy protesters, the NYPD found it difficult to do 
so because of the group’s leaderless structure. NYPD also found it difficult to address 
their concerns since the protesters publicized no stated objectives for their occupation. 
Officers assigned to the perimeter detail of Zuccotti Park remarked, “We try to maintain a 
low profile and not antagonize the crowd. And once you go in there, there’s a sense of 
hostility.”136  
Like what is illustrated in the Portland case in Chapter V, New York prohibited 
the occupation from expanding. On October 15, during the one-month anniversary of the 
New York City occupation, a research team from the ACLU observed at least 50 officers, 
some wearing riot gear enter Washington Square Park at midnight en masse to arrest 
fewer than 12 protesters for violating park closure hours.137  Those arrested had been part 
134 Sarah Knuckey, Katherine Glenn, and Emi MacLean, Suppressing Protest: Human Rights 
Violations in the U.S. Response to Occupy Wall Street (New York: The Global Justice Clinic, 2012), 
Protest and Assembly Rights Project, www.documentcloud.org/documents/403969-protest.html. 
135 “Michael Bloomberg’s Statement on the Zuccotti Park Clearance,” The Guardian, November 15, 
2011, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/15/michael-bloomberg-statement-
zuccotti-park. 
136 Cara Buckley and Matt Flegenheimer, “At Occupy Wall Street Protest, Rising Concern about 
Crime,” New York Times, November 8, 2011, sec. N.Y. / Region, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/nyregion/at-occupy-wall-street-protest-rising-concern-about-
crime.html. 
137 Knuckey, Glenn, and MacLean, Suppressing Protest. 
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 of a group of over 1,000 protesters that had gathered in Washington Square Park for 
several hours previously to hold a General Assembly meeting to debate on whether to 
establish another encampment at the square.138  Police had demanded that the General 
Assembly disband and participants exit the park by the midnight curfew, or face arrest. 
Most activists left the park by the midnight deadline but the 12 who were arrested 
remained peaceful and seated when police entered the park.139   
The ACLU also pointed out that members of the media or legal observers to 
witness the arrests in spite of their requests to peacefully negotiate were not allowed 
access to the scene after they had exited the park with the bulk of the crowd.140  In my 
experience, in major cities, park closure hours are rarely enforced for those expressing 
their First Amendment rights.  
C. SPATIAL CONTROL 
The theme of spatial control by the state was a recurring theme in both the 
literature reviewed while researching this topic and in each of the cases studied. In this 
section I address how the city of New York limited access to public areas and diverted 
activists during their marches. I also describe how their actions served to increase 
tensions between police and protesters. This more authoritarian approach served as the 
basis for what I characterized as the perceived approach of “New York exceptionalism,” 
as mentioned in Chapter I.  
The ACLU outlines containment, including kettling, “exclusional dispersal” and 
“frozen zones” as some of the routine measures that the NYPD uses to restrict the 
expression of dissent. 141  Gillham et al. have referred to the tactics as supporting 
“strategic incapacitation.”142 During the Occupy Movement the NYPD used several of 
these tactics to control Occupy protesters. According to informal after-action reports, the 
138 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
139 Ibid. 
140 Knuckey, Glenn, and MacLean, Suppressing Protest 
141 Ibid. 
142 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
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 NYPD eventually began assigning executive level commanders to work 12-hour shifts 
overseeing the encampment.143 They also utilized temporary barricades to surround the 
park and as mentioned, worked to restrict its expansion. Camping or “occupation” was 
not allowed in other areas. Police subsequently seized supplies of the activists, prohibited 
the use of portable generators and heaters and refused to allow activists to bring portable 
toilets onsite.144 
Another tactic that the NYPD used was declaring what the ACLU termed “frozen 
zones” and Gillham et al. referred to as “hard zones.”145  Frozen zones and/or closed 
sidewalks were employed by the NYPD to redirect marches or to “disperse individuals 
from a specific area, rather than contain them within it.” 146  This appears to be a 
continuing practice as they closed the sidewalks on the street in front of Mayor 
Bloomberg’s house to all pedestrians when protesters have come to speak out. 147  
Gillham et al. assert that that NYPD, in its response to the Occupy Movement, 
established a “hard-zone” around the financial district using barricades and officers.148  
The police restricted access to the hard-zones to only credentialed individuals and, 
therefore, prevented protesters from accessing or disrupting areas of the city that 
otherwise would have been available to enter.  
As mentioned with regard to the incident involving the pepper-spraying of the 
female protesters, the NYPD also employed flexible orange mesh fencing to corral 
protesters in areas or the deny access to sidewalks. Officers can be seen in multiple 
videos shot by both protester and police alike, attempting to herd people in one direction 
143 Informal after-action report available from author upon request. 
144 Lauren Kelley, “Occupy Updates: NYPD Takes Generators as Temps Drop, Threatens to Sue 
OWS; Oakland Mayor Says No Camping Overnight,” AlterNet, October 28, 2011, 
http://www.alternet.org/newsandviews/article/686499/occupy_updates%3A_nypd_takes_generators_as_te
mps_drop,_threatens_to_sue_ows%3B_oakland_mayor_says_no_camping_overnight. 
145 Knuckey, Glenn, and MacLean, Suppressing Protest; Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic 
Incapacitation.” 
146 MacLean, Glenn, and Knuckey, “Supressing Protest.” 
147 John Leland and Colin Moynihan, “Thousands March Silently down Fifth Avenue to Protest Stop-
and-Frisk Policies,” New York Times, June 17, 2012, sec. N.Y. / Region, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/thousands-march-silently-to-protest-stop-and-frisk-
policies.html. 
148 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
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 or another.149  A year after the start of the Occupy Wall Street encampment, plaintiffs 
filed a federal law suit against the NYPD for its, “use of orange netting and police lines to 
conduct indiscriminate group arrests.”150 
Most of the marches undertaken by the Occupy protesters were without permits. 
This meant that any who participated in the protest marches did so from the sidewalk and 
remained clear of the street. 151  This exacerbated the situations where police closed 
sidewalks or instituted “frozen zones.”  
D. SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
A little more than a month before Occupy Wall Street began, the NYPD 
announced that it had formed a new “Social Media Unit” designed to identify and catch 
criminals who would announce plans or brag about criminal plans on social networking 
sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Police Commissioner Ray Kelly announced, “We 
look at social networking. We’re very much focused on weekend parties…”152 In spite of 
the initial focus on “weekend parties,” that focus would shift once the Occupy protesters 
began broadcasting almost every action they were planning on social media.153  Both the 
protesters and New York City Mayor’s office were active on Twitter. The new Social 
Media Unit appeared to be adept at monitoring and intelligence gathering. Its head, 
Assistant Commissioner Kevin O’Connor, was known for conducting a successful online 
149 “Liberty Lockdown, Raid on Zuccotti [leaked TARU footage],” YouTube video, posted by 
Cointelulz, September 24, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-
SnG8BvAS8&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
150 The lawsuit is, Sterling, et al. v. City of New York, et al, Case No. 12-CV-7086. “New Federal 
Lawsuit Filed against NYPD for Occupy Arrests: PCJF Challenges Unlawful Police Tactics, Sidewalk 
Arrests Orange Netting Corral,” Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, September 20, 2012, 
http://www.justiceonline.org/commentary/new-federal-lawsuit-filed.html. 
151 Knuckey, Glenn, and MacLean, Suppressing Protest. 
152 Christopher Mathias, “NYPD Social Media Unit,” Huffington Post, August 10, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/nypd-social-media-unit/. 
153 One NYPD officer speaking on the author on the condition of anonymity expressed that social 
media sites made it very easy for officers to acquire intelligence information from open source social 
networking sites.  
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 sting operation directed at catching child predators.154 In contrast, the NYPD did not 
utilize social media to transmit information to the public. It created a departmental 
Facebook page in February of 2012, long after the occupation of Zuccoti Park. 
So important was the use of technology and especially social media, that when 
police and firefighters removed the generators in October, the protesters crafted 
generators that were powered by people riding bicycles to supply electricity for their 
computers. Given the propensity for video clips of violent interactions with police to go 
“viral,” video submissions were called for in General Assembly meetings.155  Protesters 
used a site called “Livestream.com” to broadcast various activities live as they happened 
on the web. Clips were uploaded to YouTube almost immediately after the incidents and 
photographs were “texted,” emailed, and shared almost constantly during the events. In 
videos of the various events, most protesters can be seen marching with their own 
camera-phones and even some laptops. By October 22, Facebook pages related to the 
Occupy Wall Street movement had accumulated in excess of 390,000 “likes,” while more 
than 770,000 “likes” had been recorded for the 324 related local pages.156 
E. POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
The NYPD conducted surveillance using multiple technologies during the Occupy 
Wall Street encampment. For all the places in New York for the Occupy Movement to be 
encamped, Lower Manhattan was, in some ways, a bit serendipitous for police 
intelligence given the overwhelming number of fixed CCTV cameras in and around the 
financial center.157  Information from these sources would have been consolidated and 
154 Rocco Parascandola, “NYPD Forms New Social Media Unit to Mine Facebook and Twitter for 
Mayhem,” NY Daily News, August 10, 2011, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-forms-new-
social-media-unit-facebook-twitter-mayhem-article-1.945242. 
155 Ows Minutes, “NYCGA Minutes 10/1/2011,” #OccupyWallStreet NYC General Assembly, 
October 1, 2011, http://www.nycga.net/2011/10/general-assembly-minutes-930-7pm/. 
156 Neal Caren and Sarah Gaby, “Occupy Online: Facebook and the Spread of Occupy Wall Street,” 
SSRN Working Paper Series (October 2011), 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1095345294?accountid=12702. 
157 Scientific American Magazine contends that nowhere is surveillance more pervasive in the U.S. 
than in Lower Manhattan. Larry Greenmeier, “The Apple of Its Eye: Security and Surveillance Pervades 
Post-9/11 New York City [Video],” September 9, 2011, Scientific American, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=post-911-nyc-video-surveillance. 
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 analyzed in order to glean actionable intelligence for dissemination to officers in the area. 
While the actual methods or working processes remain a closely guarded secret by the 
NYPD, this would have been an expected response for police. Also, given NYPD’s 
history of active intelligence gathering, one may assume that this took place.158  It wasn’t 
just the officers assigned to the Intelligence Unit that were providing information to the 
NYPD. Because of the sheer number of officers assigned to the Occupy Movement, they 
had information coming in from the rank and file officers who were looking at social 
media, reporting on their observations, speaking with protesters and business owners in 
the area.159 
NYPD set up at least two mobile surveillance trailers called “Sky Watch Towers” 
to provide elevated platforms for conducting personal and video surveillance. 160  
Questions still remain about whether the units were actually occupied or used to 
compliment the camera surveillance network after one officer acknowledged that the 
cameras often times do not work.161  The trailered observation posts have the capability 
of being elevated and are designed to raise an individual to a height of about 25’ in the 
air. The platform protects the officer from the elements and according to the 
manufacturer’s website, some models have a diesel generator, a run-time of up to 150 
hours, and can be stocked with a multitude of surveillance equipment.162 
CCTV cameras in the years after September 11, 2001 have increased 
dramatically. In a report commissioned by the New York Civil Liberties Union, New 
York was reported to have had 2,397 video surveillance cameras visible from street level 
158 Post 9/11/2001 the NYPD, with the help of a former CIA officer, built the NYPD’s intelligence 
gathering program. Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “Inside the Spy Unit That NYPD Says Doesn’t 
Exist,” Yahoo News, August 11, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/inside-spy-unit-nypd-says-doesnt-exist-
090802750.html.  
159 Anonymous police official, personal communication with author, August 29, 2013. 
160 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
161 “Occupy Wall Street Latest Target of Controversial NYPD Surveillance Units,” International 
Business Times, November 9, 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com/occupy-wall-street-latest-target-controversial-
nypd-surveillance-units-367522. 
162 See Skywatch Tower specs available at http://gs.flir.com/integrated-systems/skywatch/skywatch-
features 
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 in Manhattan in 1998.163  Less than a decade later in 2005, the number of cameras 
counted only in the area of lower Manhattan was 4,176 cameras below 14th street.164 In 
the area where an abundance of Occupy protest activity was held, the financial district, 
the number of cameras totaled 1,306 in 2005.165  It is safe to assume that those numbers 
have not decreased and in all likelihood have increased significantly from 2005 to 2011. 
According to the study, both private and public cameras have proliferated in all manner 
of business including corporate headquarters and small sandwich shops. 166  In 
maintaining an air of secrecy around the policies governing the use of its video 
surveillance equipment, the NYPD was reluctant to release its operating guidelines.167  In 
at least one case brought against the city of New York by protesters arrested during the 
Occupy Wall Street movement, video surveillance shot by NYPD cameras provided 
exculpatory information at trial that led to the acquittal of the arrestee.168 
On the first day of the occupation, police used long-range acoustic devices 
(LRADs) to blast the crowd with focused sound waves. 169   According to the 
manufacturer, LRAD is a device that uses focused sound waves to transmit intelligible 
audio messages and/or warning or defensive tones across great distances.170  The LRAD, 
as such, holds the distinction of being a device that fits both a communications device 
and a use of force device. Proponents of the technology point out that it causes no injury, 
as it uses no kinetic impact upon the subject. Police and manufacturers point to the 
deficiencies in traditional megaphones as a reason to employ an LRAD device over long 
163 American Civil Liberties Union, Who’s Watching? Video Camera Surveillance in Ney York City 





167 Ibid., 4–5. 
168 Diane Sweet, “NYPD Loses 2nd Occupy Wall Street Trial,” Crooks and Liars, May 18, 2012, 
http://occupyamerica.crooksandliars.com/diane-sweet/nypd-loses-2nd-occupy-wall-street-tria.  
169 “NYPD Blast LRAD Sound Cannons at “Occupy Wall Street,” YouTube video, posted by 
NeedToAwaken, November 17, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhqF_gf4gek&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
170 See LRAD 360X device specs available at http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/15/110  
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 distances and to mass gatherings of people.171  The devices are capable of transmitting 
intelligible audio from between 650–8900 meters (over 5.7 miles).172  These devices are 
portable and can be carried by hand, mounted on vehicles and even attached to unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs). The ACLU argues that the very appearance of an LRAD alone 
causes an intimidation of protesters and has no business being used at peaceable civilian 
demonstrations. The legal director of the ACLU in Pennsylvania said in a media release 
on the topic, “Police should not be using weapons built for the military on civilian 
protesters.”173 
There were also reports and at least one video of officers using a strobe-like 
function on a flashlight to interfere with media filming protest activities. 174  
Development of light emitting diode (LED) technology in flashlights has been around for 
a number of years. In recent years, it has also been developed as a means of disrupting 
vision and the thought process to repel or control a person. 175   Almost all of this 
technology came into play on November 15, 2011, the day that the NYPD evicted the 
Occupy protesters from their encampment in Zuccotti Park. 
F. THE EVICTION 
The U.S. Conference of Mayors also held two conference calls related to the 
Occupy movement on October 13 and November 10. 176   Mayor Bloomberg’s 
spokesperson denied that the mayor took part in these calls, however, in spite of the fact 
171 Carl Frazen, “LRAD Defends ‘Sound Cannon’ Use At Occupy Wall Street,” TPM, November 17, 
2011, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/lrad-defends-sound-cannon-use-at-occupy-wall-street. 
172 Ibid 
173 American Civil Liberties Union, “Bystander Sues City of Pittsburgh over Pain and Hearing Loss 
Caused by Use of Long Range Acoustic Device at G-20 Protest,” September 21, 2011, 
http://www.aclupa.org/pressroom/bystandersuespittsburghove.htm.  
174 “Video: NYPD Use Strobe Lights on RT Camera at OWS,” YouTube video, posted by RT, 
October 17, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dVaCGHn8LnY&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
175 “Flashlight Weapon Makes Targets Throw up Fox News,” Fox News, December 7, 2011, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,292271,00.html. 
176 Andy Kroll, “Mayors and Cops Traded Strategies for Dealing with Occupy Protesters,” Mother 
Jones, accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/11/occupy-protest-coordinate-
crackdown-wall-street. 
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 that the postponed original eviction of Zuccotti Park was to have occurred one day after 
the first call.177 
On Tuesday, November 15, 2011, at about 1 a.m., the NYPD enacted its plan to 
evict the Occupy Wall Street protesters from Zuccotti Park. Officers donned riot gear and 
sealed off the area just after midnight on Tuesday. According to Mayor Bloomberg, the 
eviction came at the behest of Brookfield Properties, the owners of the park.178  There 
was some conjecture, however, on whether the raid on the camp came as a result of the 
Occupy second-month anniversary protests planed and designed to shut down various 
subway routes on November 17.179  Bloomberg also cited safety and health concerns in 
his address, pointing out that here, as in other Occupy camps, conditions had degraded to 
the point of being dangerous.180 
The protesters were told to immediately leave the park and many were given fliers 
telling them to leave and take all their belongings with them. The mayor’s office also 
tweeted that “the eviction is only temporary” and that protesters could return after the 
park had been cleaned; the intention was that tents and structures would not be 
allowed.181  NYPD prepared to force the eviction and sanitation crews readied to clean 
the park.182   
177 Garth Johnston, “Build Up To A Raid: NYPD Planned Occupy Wall Street Eviction for Weeks,” 
Gothamist, November 16, 2011, 
http://gothamist.com/2011/11/16/anatomy_of_a_raid_nypd_planned_ows.php. 
178 Michael Bloomberg, “Statement of Mayor Michael Bloomberg on Clearing and Re-Opening of 
Zuccotti Park,” November 15, 2011, www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2011b/pr410-11.html . 
179 Graham Rayman, “Occupy Wall Street Vows to Shut down Subways; NYPD Issues Plan to 
Mobilize 432 Headquarters Cops If Necessary,” The Village Voice (blog), November 14, 2011, 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/11/occupy_wall_str_28.php. 
180 Bloomberg, “Statement of Mayor Michael.” 
181 In hindsight, this goal seems ambitious given the lengthy rehabilitation periods required for parks 
in other cities. In Portland, Oregon, for example, it took at least six months to rehabilitate the park 
following the occupation. Dashell Bennett, “The NYPD Emptied Zuccotti Park in the Middle of the Night,” 
The Atlantic Wire, November 15, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2011/11/nypd-empties-
zuccotti-park-middle-night/44984/; “Repaired Portland Parks Reopen after Occupy,” NGW News, May 17, 
2012, http://www.kgw.com/news/Repaired-Portland-parks-reopen-after-Occupy-151922105.html. 
182 Bloomberg, “Bloomberg Statement on Occupy Eviction;” Bennett, “The NYPD Emptied Zuccotti 
Park.” 
 42 
                                                        
 According to Gillham et al., about 1000 police officers were used to effect the 
eviction. Exactly what transpired in the hours that followed is not completely clear 
although video footage shot by police, protesters, and the media depicted a turbulent 
scene of arrests and in some instances violence.183 Officers moved in and began tearing 
down the tents. It is unclear how long protesters had to collect their things before police 
forced their removal. Property that was not immediately removed was seized and thrown 
into dumpsters, apparently without cataloging or recording of ownership.184  This would 
prove problematic later for both Brookfield Properties and the city of New York as 
lawsuits were filed for losses of almost $100,000 worth of property.185  This explains, at 
least in small part, how the police were able to clean the park so quickly as cataloging 
and recording all that property would have taken much longer.  
Gillham et al. note that before moving in, police removed and detained members 
of the media.186  On the Monday following the eviction, media organizations sent letters 
to New York city officials in protest of the police handling of journalists who were 
covering the Occupy Wall Street protests; they further asked for meetings on the topic.187  
Police and protester videos shot during the eviction show police in riot helmets with side-
handled batons moving en masse through the camp and pulling the remaining protesters 
183 “Liberty Lockdown, Raid on Zuccotti,” YouTube video. 
184 “New York Ordered to Pay up over NYPD’s Destruction of Occupy Property,” April 10, 2013, 
http://rt.com/usa/nyc-settlement-occupy-library-600/. 
185 The city of New York and Brookfield Properties would settle the suit in 2013 for $186,000, which 
included the cost of the property and the legal fees. They also agreed to settle two related federal law suits 
by paying protesters $75,000 for lost/damaged computers, network and broadcasting equipment.  They also 
paid $8,500 to an environmental group for 16 lost or damaged “energy bicycles” used as power generators 
in the park. Nick Pinto, “City and Brookfield Turn on Each Other in Lawsuits over Zuccotti Eviction,” The 
Village Voice (blog), August 27, 2012, 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2012/08/city_and_brookf.php; “Settlement Announced In 
Lawsuit Over Seizure Of OWS Library,: CBS New York, April 9 ,2013, 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/04/09/settlement-announced-in-lawsuit-over-seizure-of-ows-library/; 
Markthshark, “Daily Kos: Occupy Wall Street Wins LawSuit against City of New York & Brookfield 
Properties—A Win Is a Win,” Daily Kos (blog), Aril 12, 2013, 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/04/12/1201168/-Occupy-Wall-Street-Wins-LawSuit-Against-City-of-
New-York-Brookfield-Properties-A-Win-is-a-Win. 
186 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation,” 10. 
187 Deepthi Hajela, “Occupy Wall Street: Journalists Protest NYPD’s Handling of Media during 
Zuccotti Eviction,” Huffington Post, November 22, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/22/occupy-wall-street-journa_n_1107373.html. 
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 out. Many of the protesters locked arms and held onto one another as police worked to 
arrest them, forcing police to pull them apart. Video of the incident showed a protester 
discharging a fire extinguisher as officers moved in to remove a group of protesters.188  
Officers are seen striking protesters with batons and in at least one instance, striking a 
protester with an overhead swing of the baton to the protester’s head—considered by 
most police departments as a deadly force strike.189  This same video shows that the 
Chief of the NYPD Joseph Esposito was present. He appeared in the video mere seconds 
after the protester was struck in the head.  
As officers worked to cut the chain of one protester who was chained to a tree, 
officers can be heard remarking to the officer with the grinder that he had started a fire 
(because of the sparks thrown from grinding the chain). Meanwhile, the protester screams 
in pain.190 Several people remained in camp and did not lock arms or defensively resist. 
Several more protesters dispersed from the camp and began impromptu marches around 
the downtown Manhattan area, occasionally having run-ins with police on the perimeter 
of the eviction operation. 191  NYPD continued to exclude most of the media as the 
eviction continued, which seemed to increase the number of rumors and unconfirmed 
stories posted on social media. 192  At one point theatlanticwire.com advised of an 
unconfirmed report that police were using the LRAD again to disperse protesters.193  A 
Mother Jones writer reported via Twitter that the NYPD used tear gas to remove the last 
few protesters from an area in camp around the food tents.194 
The park was completely cleared of protesters in about three hours from the time 
the NYPD began the eviction but by 6:30 a.m. that same morning; New York State 




191 “The NYPD Emptied Zuccotti Park in the Middle of the Night;” “Raid on Zuccotti Park,” 
YouTube video. 




                                                        
 Supreme Court Judge Lucy Billings directed that the city and allow protesters access to 
the park.195  The city responded by opting to close the park to everyone rather than allow 
protesters back in with tents and other articles. 196  The judge sided with Brookfield 
Properties insistence on certain rules prohibiting sleeping bags and tents, and this resulted 
in the park reopening later that day under the new rules.197 
Later that same evening, protesters had to walk through what one of them 
described as a “gauntlet” of police in order to get to one of two established entrances of 
the park.198  They were then searched and if they had tents, sleeping bags, or even protest 
paraphernalia they were denied access to the park.199  Private security guards patrolled 
the interior of the park and forced the protesters who did enter the park to keep 
moving.200  Security guards would not let them lie down, and police were called to 
remove those who refused to comply with the guards’ direction.201 
Two days later on November 17, protesters gathered around Zuccotti Park in what 
they dubbed a “Day of Action.”  Thousands gathered in the financial district and even 
removed several police barricades around the park.202  Police utilized the LRAD system 
again to disperse protesters and demanded identification of people in order to access 
public sidewalks. 203   The encounter in Zuccotti Park turned violent, and bloodied 
protesters can be seen in video and photographs being arrested and escorted from the 
195 Ibid.; “Raid on Zuccotti Park,” YouTube video. 
196 Matt Wells, “Occupy Wall Street: Zuccotti Park Re-Opens—As It Happened,” The Guardian, 
November 15, 2011, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/nov/15/occupy-wall-
street-zuccotti-eviction-live. 
197 Colin Moynihan, “Occupy Wall Street Drops Suit on Zuccotti Park,” City Room (blog), New York 
Times, January 23, 2012, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/occupy-wall-street-drops-suit-on-
zuccotti-park/. 
198 James Barron and Colin Moynihan, “Police Oust Occupy Wall Street Protesters at Zuccotti Park,” 
New York Times, November 15, 2011, sec. N.Y. / Region, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html. 
199 Ibid.; Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation,” 11. 
200 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
201 Ibid, 11. 




                                                        
 park.204  Mayor Bloomberg’s office later confirmed an additional 177 arrests by 4:00 
p.m. that day.205  “Day of Action” protests were carried out in multiple cities around the 
country and for the most part marked the end of the Occupy Movement, as it had existed 
over the course of the previous two months. 
With its abundant resources, NYPD managed the Occupy Movement with 
hundreds of officers reassigned from other precincts. They allowed this occupation in 
Zuccotti Park arguably only because current ordinances required that the park be 
accessible 24 hours-a-day. In other aspects of the demonstrations, the NYPD took swift 
action to either direct or remove those who would not comply with orders. Officers 
placed an emphasis on intelligence collection, in keeping with their anti-terror stance in 
the wake of September 11 and barely touched on the capabilities of social media use for 
their benefit. These and other factors created a situation in New York that was unlike the 
other cities studied. As I illustrate in Chapter IV, Oakland’s reductions in manpower prior 
to Occupy Movement contributed to the opposite approach of the NYPD. Where NYPD 










204 David Ariosto, “‘Occupy’ Protesters, Police Clash during ‘Day of Action,’” CNN, November 17, 
2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/us/new-york-occupy/index.html; “Raid on Zuccotti Park,” YouTube 
video. 
205 “OWS Day of Action: Police vs People (PHOTO, VIDEO),” November 17, 2011, 
http://rt.com/usa/occupy-wall-street-619/. 
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 IV. OCCUPY OAKLAND  
“You want to know about Occupy Oakland? I’ll tell you about Occupy Oakland. It was a God D*** disaster!” 
Anonymous Officer, Oakland PD206 




Figure 4.  Occupy Oakland Timeline 2011 
206 In an effort to protect the identity of some sources and to respect their request to remain anonymous, I will indicate when sources will not be named as I 
have done with this quote. 
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 Oakland’s Occupy Movement wasn’t the first or even the largest of the Occupy 
Movements; it was however, noteworthy for the reported volume of violent encounters 
between police and activists. As a major American city, the events in Oakland serve to 
illustrate what can happen when governments respond in a chaotic and often unstructured 
way. In this chapter, I articulate how fluctuations in leadership direction and decision-
making contributed to violence that spread to other Occupy camps in other cities. These 
conflicts would lead to “double duty” in the form of a second eviction to evict activists. 
Oakland is not known for a financial district or for being the home to any large 
corporate banks. Rather, Oakland is often considered a blue-collar neighbor to San 
Francisco, known for shipping—nearly 200,000 jobs are associated with the port and its 
transportation of cargo.207  So when, on October 10, 2011, first one tent, then another, 
and another appeared on the green grass of Frank Ogawa Plaza, many watched in 
disbelief and, in many ways, underestimated the significance of what was occurring. Less 
than 15 minutes from Berkeley, California, and its storied history of demonstrations and 
protests, Oakland, with its weather and potential union support was an ideal location for a 
protest of this scope.  
A. THE PROTEST 
Protesters in Oakland rallied and marched downtown on Monday, October 10, 
2011, gathering in Frank Ogawa Plaza. The plaza, renamed in 1998 in honor of the late 
Oakland City Councilmember Frank H. Ogawa who served from 1966 to 1994, was itself 
representative of protest and the expression of dissent. Ogawa, a recognized civil rights 
leader, a survivor of Japanese internment camps during World War II, and who died in 
1994, seemed a fitting representative of the culture of civil dissent and protest of the Bay 
Area. The 160,000 square foot plaza provided protesters with a grassy commons area and 
an amphitheater next to City Hall. 208  The occupiers unofficially renamed the plaza 
207 “Oakland: Economy—Major Industries and Commercial Activity,” City Data, accessed October 4, 
2013, http://www.city-data.com/us-cities/The-West/Oakland-Economy.html. 




                                                        
 “Oscar Grant Plaza” in memory of an unarmed black man who had been shot by Bay 
Area Rapid Transit police New Year’s Day in 2009. Grant’s shooting had sparked other 
protests and increased anti-police sentiment that lingered in the Bay Area.  
The initial protest started on that rainy Monday and a crowd estimated at about 
500 converged on the plaza.209 By the end of that first day, there were between one and 
two-dozen tents in the plaza. Like other Occupy factions throughout the country, 
ascribing a clear message to the group was difficult. Recognizing the disjointed 
messaging that was occurring, a protester called for labor union support and explained to 
a local news reporter that it would take time before a clear message could be 
discerned.210  She went on to say that what was occurring in Oakland, while different 
from what was occurring in San Francisco, New York, and other cities, was in fact an 
organic coming-together of people on common ground that was occurring rapidly.211   
Frank Ogawa plaza is a triangle shaped area surrounded on two of the three sides 
by city owned and operated buildings. As a consequence of Oakland’s wet weather, the 
grassy commons area quickly became muddy. According to sources within the police 
department who wished to remain anonymous, protesters brought in hay bales, wooden 
pallets, and 2 X 4s and laid them down to form walkways through the encampment. 
Within those first few hours, the protesters had set up kitchen and childcare areas and 
appropriated electricity from plugs located on top of the plaza’s light poles. Officers 
initially requested direction as to how to deal with those who were erecting more 
permanent structures and tents. Emails exchanged between city leadership indicate that 
the city allowed the camp to form as a means of showing the city’s desire to support the 
First Amendment rights. 212   Figure 5 is a map of the Occupy Oakland camp and 
immediate surrounding area. 




212 Daniel Willis and Thomas Peele, “In Their Own Words: Occupy Oakland According to City 
Officials—Part 2,” Contra Costa Times, February 26, 2011, 
http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_20040091.  
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Figure 5.  Occupy Oakland Camp213 
As the occupation progressed and media attention increased, two Oakland city 
council members not only joined the occupation in spirit but in the tents as well. At least 
one council member spent two nights in tents alongside the others protesters who started 
the encampment.214 As in other cities, support for the protesters, came from multiple 
sources. The Oakland Education Association teachers’ union and the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) supplied port-a-potties and a large portable sink; homeless 
shelters provided food and clothing and the occupiers themselves collected donations.215  
A finance committee was among a dozen committees established by the “leaderless” 
group in the days that followed the start of the occupation. 216  Others came with a 
generator for power and, following the lead of Occupy Wall Street, laid the ground work 
213 Created by author in Google Maps. 
214 Sean Maher, “Rats and Drugs Mar Occupy Oakland Tent City, Officials Say,” Mercury News, 
October 18, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/bay-area-news/ci_19139574.  
215 Dave Id, “Occupy Oakland Grows and Builds out Infrastructure on Day Two, 10/11/11: Photos,” 
IndyBay, October 12, 2011, http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2011/10/12/18693207.php. 
216 “Online Funding Pipeline Fueling Occupy Movement,” KTVU, November 8, 2011, 
http://www.ktvu.com/news/news/occupy-oakland-makes-plans-thousands-donations/nFYRb/. 
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 for bicycle-generated power to be finalized over the course of the following few days.217  
Mayor of Oakland Jean Quan was also quoted early on as telling the occupiers that they 
could stay as long as they liked so long as they respected the oak tree in the plaza and did 
not urinate underneath it.218  
Absent the signs of protest, the encampment seemed to resemble a block-party 
where even the local fire fighters union offered to cook for those camping on the plaza—
one Oakland resident even called it a “carnival atmosphere.”219  In keeping with the 
demographic makeup of other Occupy movements, the initial Occupy Oakland protesters 
were a diverse group. Made up of a broad spectrum of people who were postal and other 
federal employees to unemployed musicians with a desire to “be a part of something,” the 
Occupy Oakland members took turns speaking to the gathered media and one another in 
the plaza during the first days of protest. During the first days of protest, the protesters 
remained relatively contained within the plaza. 
On October 15, 2011, in celebration of the first month anniversary of the Occupy 
movement, protesters organized a march from Frank Ogawa Plaza to police headquarters 
and back. Prior to leaving the plaza on their march, they were addressed by film and 
television actor Danny Glover, who spoke from the amphitheater stage in support of the 
movement.220  At the outset, Occupy Oakland seemed to be more oriented towards an 
anti-government tone than other cities whereas initial protests appeared to be more anti-
income disparity leaning. The protesters were met at the detention facility by lines of 
police officers already decked out in riot gear.221  Officers along the way had positioned 
barricades and facilitated the group’s crossing of streets. The group was reportedly 
217 Id, “Occupy Oakland Grows and Builds.” 
218 Ibid. 
219 Matthai Kuruvila, “Occupy Oakland Shuts Streets, Defy Eviction Order,” SFGate, October 23, 
2011, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Occupy-Oakland-shuts-streets-defy-eviction-order-
2326348.php#src=fb.  
220 “Danny Glover Speaks to Occupy Oakland, October 15, 2911,” YouTube video, posted by KPFA 
News, October 15, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50IXNRiIuWg&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
221 Sergio Quintana and Tihanna McCleese, “Occupy Oakland Holds Short March during Rush 
Hour,” ABC Local, October 15, 2011, 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8392891.  
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 confrontational but non-violent. 222   Some protesters remarked to local media about 
solidarity with police because many felt that police were hurt by the economy just as the 
protesters themselves were.223  
B. EXPANSION OF THE ENCAMPMENT 
By October 18, 2011, Frank Ogawa Plaza had reached its capacity. Police refused 
to allow additional campers to expand onto the concrete areas surrounding the plaza and 
those who wished to join the rest were prevented from doing so. The protesters were not 
just from Oakland. After-action reports outlined questions regarding the number of out-
of-town arrestees, indicating that there was at least a perception that protesters were 
coming from outside the city of Oakland. The homeless population in and around the 
plaza grew steadily as the encampment continued.224 
On that Tuesday, while city officials began to warn of a possible need to evict 
occupiers from the plaza due to health concerns, a group of protesters expanded the 
encampment by moving to Snow Park. 225   Media outlets reported that numbers of 
protesters in the park had been growing steadily throughout the evening and at that time 
numbered about two-dozen.226  Unlike in Frank Ogawa Plaza, this time police warned 
protesters that they would be required to leave the park by 10:00 p.m. At about 8:30 p.m. 
a group of protesters held something of a General Assembly meeting in Snow Park and 
tried to reach a consensus on what actions they would undertake should the police 
attempt to enforce the order to vacate after 10:00 p.m. Some protesters told local media 
that they would opt to leave the park peacefully, and others voiced their intent to be 
peacefully arrested. However, that deadline came and went with no police action. Police 
Chief Jordan visited the camp at Snow Park and observed that there were no signs in 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 “Occupy Oakland Encampment Includes Liberals, Homeless, Drifters & Anarchists,” CBS Local, 
November 8, 2011, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/11/08/occupy-oakland-encampment-includes-
liberals-homeless-drifters-anarchists/.  




                                                        
 place advising of the park closure hours. According to an email he sent other city leaders, 
he could not take enforcement action until signs had been posted.227  Public works agreed 
to have the signs erected later that day. There would be no police action, however, until 
the formal eviction operation occurred on October 25, 2011, and the population of 
occupiers held at about 25 until then.228   
Alameda County Health Department officials toured the camp in response to 
reports of deteriorating conditions and an increase in the number of rats.229  Protesters 
had brought furniture into their encampment, including couches and recliners that health 
officials cited as possibly contributing to the rodent problem. 230  The Oakland City 
administrator spokesperson, speaking to local news media, said although camping in the 
plaza was illegal, the city had been “accommodating it.”231  She also added that the city, 
“reserved the right to change its mind at any time,” thereby putting the protesters on 
notice that there was no certainty as to the level of accommodation that the city was 
willing to extend.232  This issue of safety versus free speech is addressed in Chapter VII.  
The following day the city issued a “notice to vacate” to the protesters citing 
among other things fire and safety hazards, denial of access, sanitation and health 
hazards, physical damage and disruption of the plaza for public use.233 Undeterred and 
still in place, the protesters planned and executed another march two days later.   
Hundreds of protesters took to the streets of downtown Oakland on 22 October, 
making their way to join the others at Snow Park.234  Officers helped the protesters by 
227 “Documents: Oakland City Official Emails from Oct. 12 to Nov. 13, 2011,” Mercury News, 269, 
accessed October 8, 2013, http://www.mercurynews.com/documents/ci_20040081.  
228 Frazier Group, LLC, Independent Investigation Occupy Oakland Response October 25, 2011 
(Oakland, CA: Frazier Group, 2012), 20, 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/webcontent/oak036236.pdf. 
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234 Kuruvila and Writer, “Occupy Oakland Shuts Streets, Defy Eviction Order.” 
 53 
                                                        
 clearing city streets blocks in advance of the marchers and facilitating their demonstration 
through the downtown area.235  No formal leadership for the Occupy Oakland faction had 
made itself known and, as with other Occupy factions across the country carried itself as 
another leaderless movement where collective decisions were made and general 
assemblies got consensus of the participants. Local media attributed an initial non-
confrontational tone of the march to the assistance of the police, not only allowing the 
march, but aiding in its movement.236  
That cooperative scene changed, however, when the marchers reached the Wells 
Fargo and Chase Bank branches near Lake Merritt. The Wells Fargo employees quickly 
closed the branch but the Chase employees elected to keep the bank open. In short order, 
an estimated 75 protesters including masked anarchists entered the bank and began 
chanting, “Banks got bailed out! We got sold out!”237  With that, several protesters began 
tearing and throwing hundreds of deposit slips into the air creating a mess inside the 
bank. Interestingly, at least one protester demanded that some of the protesters stay 
behind and help clean up the mess, which they did as shocked bank workers looked on 
with police standing by.238 
On Monday October 24, 2011, the interim deputy fire chief looked out over Frank 
Ogawa Plaza in shock as she watched a fire grow larger and larger.239  According to 
police and fire, they had been told by city officials, including Mayor Jean Quan to 
“respect the boundaries” of the plaza and refrain from taking enforcement action in the 
park.240  The most enforcement action that Baker took that day was to go down to the 
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 which was coming from a gas grill being used to cook food for the camp.241   It was 
unclear whether the cooking fire was that large deliberately, caused as a result of the 
equipment used, or was simply out of control.   
C. POLICE RESPONSE 
On October 10, 2011, Anthony Batts, Chief of the Oakland Police Department 
(OPD), submitted his resignation effective immediately. Batts cited, as reasoning for his 
decision, his “having 20 percent control but full accountability.”242  Mayor Jean Quan 
did not lament the decision telling a local reporter, “I didn’t ask him to leave, but if he 
were to leave this was a good time…”243 Assistant Chief Howard Jordan was appointed 
acting chief of police and was immediately thrust into the middle of this growing protest.  
According to sources that wished to remain anonymous, once the tents started to 
appear, police and firefighters were instructed not to proceed into the camp with fewer 
than four officers together following incidents where individuals and groups expressed 
hostility toward officers. 244  As mentioned, firefighters had been directed to take no 
enforcement action on the group within the camp. Chief Jordan had worked with Mayor 
Quan off and on for years as she had been involved not only in city government but also 
had served on the school board for a number of years. 245   In spite of what was 
characterized as a good working relationship, police leadership and the mayor had 
different philosophies on how to handle the protest. Mayor Quan came with a personal 
history of activism, and her initial accommodation of the occupiers conflicted with the 
desires of police leadership to enforce the law.246  Oakland used a small detail of officers 
assigned to the downtown area that varied as the occupation continued with which to 
241 Ibid. 
242 Lori Preuitt, “Oakland Police Chief Anthony Batts Resigns,” NBC Bay Area, October 13, 2011, 
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Oakland-Police-Chief-Anthony-Batts-Resigns-131545568.html 
243 Ibid. 
244 Anonymous source, personnal communication with author, September 10, 2013 
245 Matthew Artz, “Oakland Mayor Names New Chiefs for Police, Fire,” InsideBayArea, February 1, 
2012, http://www.insidebayarea.com/top-stories/ci_19868749. 




                                                        
 monitor the camp.247  Monitor is used here as opposed to “patrol” the camp because as I 
illustrate, the police were soon put on notice that they were not welcome in the camp. 
In contrast to other Occupy cities, Oakland police donned riot gear almost 
immediately. Oakland officers can be seen in news footage, wearing riot gear standing in 
front of police headquarters on October 15, 2011.248  Because of personnel shortages, 
Oakland police were spread thinner with regard to officers devoted to traditional crime 
fighting with having to staff a response to the Occupy protests. According to police, this 
strategy quickly began to wear on the officers who worked the protest day in and day 
out.249  Shortly before Occupy Oakland began, sworn officers in Oakland numbered 
under 650. 250 That was down almost 200 officers from a 2008 figure of 836 sworn 
officers, a reduction attributed to the economic downturn amounting to over a 20 percent 
reduction in force.251 
D. SPATIAL CONTROL 
Although ordinances were in place to prevent camping and sleeping overnight in 
public parks, like many other cities with Occupy protesters, Oakland allowed the 
encampment to continue. Emails between city leadership repeatedly expressed the desire 
for assessment and evaluation of “minor infractions” and a perceived need to take 
enforcement action.252  There was no definitive statement about what would be allowed 
or prohibited with regard to the occupation of public spaces such as Frank Ogawa Plaza 
or Snow Park.  
247 Anonymous source, personnal communication with author, September 10, 2013.  
248 Quintana and McCleese, “Occupy Oakland Holds Short March during Rush Hour.” 
249 Tasneem Raja, “Open Letter from Oakland Police Union: ‘We Are Confused,’” Mother Jones, 
November 1, 2011, http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/11/open-letter-oakland-police-association-we-
are-confused. 
250 Chip Johnson, “Oakland Police Reorganization a Strategic Plan,” SFGate, July 8, 2011, 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Oakland-police-reorganization-a-strategic-plan-
2355561.php#src=fb. 
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 A flyer distributed to Occupy Oakland protesters, dated October 12, 2011, advised 
them, “Keep in mind that regardless of your first amendment right, the City reserves the 
right to control the time, manner and place of your speech.”253 This idea was reinforced 
when the encampment was expanded to include Snow Park. Protesters were warned that 
they would not be allowed to stay but when the 10:00 p.m. deadline came and went with 
no enforcement action whatsoever, protesters were emboldened with a sense of 
accomplishment.254 
In additional emails back and forth between the Assistant to the City 
Administrator and the Mayor’s Communication Manager, the two discussed the hope that 
the lack of space in the plaza would be containment enough.255  These email exchanges 
indicated the frustration and impotency of the police as the occupation continued. One 
Oakland Police Deputy Chief expressed this frustration in an email dated October 17, 
2011 when he told the Assistant to the City Administrator: 
Another note: The campers formed a skirmish line to prevent OPD from 
entering the plaza (50–75 people). This is the action we can expect every 
time OPD arrives on the scene. We can expect to be confronted and 
challenged every time we arrive to investigate a complaint. This leaves us 
unable to investigate anything in the plaza.256 
The fears were twofold; the city administration feared appearing “toothless” on 
one side and “heavy handed” on the other.257  They chose instead to work on their image 
with the media, in an odd move by restricting the space of the media. After one member 
of the media was bitten by a protester’s dog in camp, instead of discussing the seizure of 
the dog, quarantine of the animal or possible charges against the owner, the prevailing 
discussion between police and the Assistant to the City Administrator, was the warning to 
253 Arturo Sanchez, “Memo from City of Oakland to Occupy Oakland Protesters Dated October 12, 
2011” (Oakland, CA: City of Oakland, 2011), 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/procedure/oak031712.pdf. 
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255 “Documents: Oakland City Official Emails from Oct. 12 to Nov. 13, 2011,” Mercury News, 151. 
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 the media not to block the sidewalks at the direction of “MJQ” (assumedly “Mayor Jean 
Quan”).258 
Mayor Quan took a few minutes to address the Occupy Oakland group during 
their General Assembly meeting. In spite of having been overtly hostile to police and 
media, they permitted her to address the group. She spoke briefly, warning them about 
not damaging the historic oak tree.259 
City officials continued an email discussion of a policy related to the allowance of 
camping some five days into the encampment.260  Police expressed concern about their 
already diminishing resources being unable to monitor any additional camps. Deputy 
Chief Israel recommended no additional camps being allowed in an email stating, “We 
should limit where the City will tolerate violations of the law in the interest of exercising 
the First Amendment and balancing the public’s right to enjoy the rest of the City’s 
parks.” 261  Oakland’s City Administrator replied later that there would be no other 
camping allowed and asked to be advised of “when and where we’ll be preventing 
camping.”262  Still the message coming in email form from the Chief of Police was one 
of cooperative effort.263 
E. SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY USE 
There is little evidence that Oakland police used social media in any way to 
broadcast helpful information to its citizens during the occupy movement. In fact, the 
Oakland Police Department did not establish a Facebook account until September 16, 
2013, two years after the Occupy encampment was evicted.264  On October 25, 2011, 
Oakland PD did tweet the link to a press release titled “Occupy Oakland Activity 
258 “Documents,” 227. 
259 Ibid, 244. 
260 “Documents: Oakland City Official Emails from Oct. 12 to Nov. 13, 2011,” Mercury News. 
261 Ibid., 172. 
262 Ibid., 176. 
263 Ibid., 197. 
264 “Oakland Police Department Facebook,” posted May 13, 2013, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Oakland-Police-Department/158045635105 
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 Update,” which attempted to answer why action was taken, what the health and safety 
concerns were, and finally why the action was undertaken in the early morning hours, 
referring to the eviction of Occupy Oakland that is discussed below.265 The next three 
tweets came on December 12, 2011 in response to the Occupy march on the Port of 
Oakland.266 
In similar fashion to other Occupy factions, Occupy Oakland broadcast its 
General Assembly meetings via livestream.com. In contrast to some other camps, 
however, Occupy Oakland did not have a host of advanced technology. A primary 
contributor to the live streaming of events came from one person with a smart phone, its 
eight megapixel camera and Internet access.267  The fact that someone even broadcast the 
eviction of Occupy Oakland on October 25 was the result of Twitter. At 2:30 a.m. on the 
October 25, someone tweeted about the Oakland Police “raiding” the Occupy camp and 
curious citizen hopped out of bed, threw on some clothes and drove into downtown 
Oakland to broadcast the action.268  According to reports, nearly 60,000 people viewed 
this transmission of Occupy Oakland events over the course of the next few days.269  
F. POLICE SURVEILLANCE 
By monitoring the Occupy Oakland livestream.com feed and the Occupy Oakland 
Facebook, the Oakland Police Department were able to gather intelligence information 
with little effort. Similar to the NYPD, the department also was not posting information 
related to Occupy, such as street closures, marches or other information to assist those 
potentially affected by the protests. The Oakland police did use live streaming technology 
but did not broadcast it to the general public. They equipped two officers at a time with 
video streaming equipment in backpacks and deployed them covertly among the 
265  “Oakland Activity Update,” October 25, 2011, https://twitter.com /oaklandpoliceca. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Angela Woodall, “An Accidental Social Media Phenomenon Emerges from the Occupy Oakland 





                                                        
 protesters. The live stream was broadcast back to the police department’s command post 
where commanders were able to review it. A group formed dedicated to monitoring 
police actions produced a video that identified some Oakland police officers who 
patrolled the encampment in a covert capacity with this equipment.270  Links to the video 
were tweeted and became so popular on social media circles that social media “friends” 
of involved officer, Fred Shavies, alerted him to it. He responded to the newfound 
notoriety by addressing it using his personal twitter account. He announced that he 
attended the Occupy functions in both his professional role as a police officer and off 
duty on his own time.271  He went on to add, in an exchange with the producer of the 
original video, that he thought the idea that someone could “infiltrate a transparent and 
leaderless movement is comical.”272  He later spoke to that group and produced another 
video for the web outlining his views.273 
In addition to their mobile deployable streaming cameras, the Oakland Police 
Department also relied on assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms 
(ATF). Officers involved in response who wished to remain anonymous, advised that the 
ATF installed some covert “pole cameras” around and directed toward Frank Ogawa 
Plaza. In my experience, many of these cameras operate via a cellular data collection and 
can provide multiple users with access to the video feed. The feed can also be accessed 
via a laptop or mobile device with Internet access.  
270 “Berkeley Copwatch,” Berkeley Copwatch, October 10, 2013, http://www.berkeleycopwatch.org/; 
“Copwatch@Occupy Oakland: Beware of Police Infiltrators and Provocateurs,” YouTube video, posted by 
Jacob Crawford, October 28, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrvMzqopHH0&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
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Movement,” The Lede, November 14, 2011, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/police-officer-
accused-of-infiltrating-occupy-oakland-says-he-supports-the-movement/. 
272 Ibid. 
273 In general, individual officers’ activities on social media related to Occupy was outside the scope 
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attention, were more extensive than a single post or tweet, and because he was identified as a covert officer 
monitoring the Occupy Oakland group. 
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 Just as New York did, Oakland PD employed a long range acoustic device 
(LRAD) to “loud hail” the crowd.274 Anonymous sources advised that they borrowed two 
other LRAD devices from other agencies and, although the devices have the ability to 
emit a deafening signal using alternating tones, the devices were only used to provide the 
crowds with information or to give them directions.275 
G. THE EVICTION 
On October 16, a protester was injured and the crowd of protesters prevented 
police and medical personnel from attending to him. This incident seemed to heighten 
tensions between protesters and police causing the police department to from then on, 
require a sergeant be notified of any requests for police inside Frank Ogawa Plaza.276  
On October 18, 2011, the Assistant to the City Administrator distributed a flyer to 
a number of protesters in Frank Ogawa plaza. The flyer articulated the violations that had 
been occurring and that those staying in the plaza needed to cease and withdraw from the 
plaza. According to Sanchez, “The flyer was not well received by the protesters. 277  
According to police the conditions in camp were deteriorating.278 The strain on regular 
crime fighting resources increased as they were called upon to staff the marches. An 
Oakland Deputy Chief, in an email to the Chief of Police expressed this concern in 
discussing two additional marches planned for the afternoon and evening of the 
eighteenth.279   
As a result, officers from Santa Clara, San Francisco County Sheriff’s Office, 
Palo Alto and other departments in the area were called in to assist. Police planned 
operations for the early morning hours of October 25, 2011. Mayor Jean Quan was out of 
274 Xeni Jardin, “Occupy Oakland: Riot Police Use Tear Gas, Other Nonlethal Weapons on 
Protesters,” Boing Boing, October 25, 2011, http://boingboing.net/2011/10/25/occupy-oakland-protesters-
face-off-with-riot-police-after-chaotic-day-of-evictions-arrests.html. 
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 town attending a conference and official emails indicate that Chief Jordan elected not to 
tell her of the eviction operation.280 City administrators notified her when she returned 
home to Oakland later that day.  
Over the preceding days, the city of Oakland put the Occupy faction on notice 
that they were about to be evicted from Frank Ogawa Plaza in the form of flyers and 
informal meetings with individual protesters. Oakland police relied on California Penal 
Code 647(e) (misdemeanor) Disorderly Conduct as their basis for evicting the protesters. 
The section stated that a person committed the offense of disorderly conduct by lodging 
in a “place, whether public or private, without the permission of the owner or person 
entitled to the possession or in control of it.”281  This was in contrast to cities like Dallas 
and New York who used ordinances related to park occupancy hours as the legal 
justification for eviction. 
The city activated and staffed its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on the 
morning of the October 25 in concert with the 2:00 a.m. staging time. All OPD resources 
and outside agencies staged at the Oakland Coliseum, about six miles away from Frank 
Ogawa Plaza. Staging units were briefed on the operation and prior to deployment 
formed into their teams. OPD rented 25 vans to transport its personnel to the operations 
area. The bulk of the almost 500 law enforcement officers assigned work the first 
operational period of the eviction operation were OPD officers. In a move that tipped off 
the protesters to the impending raid, immediately prior to commencing eviction 
operations members of the California Highway Patrol, working in support of the 
operation reportedly drove by the plaza with their lights and siren activated or “Code 
3.”“282  Officers quickly moved into position and began their eviction operations in spite 
of rocks and bottles being thrown by a small number of protesters. Interestingly, officers 
280 Shoshana Walter, “Mayor Reopens Plaza to Protesters, Promises Dialogue and ‘Minimum Police 
Presence’ If Demonstrations Stay Peaceful,” The Bay Citizen, October 27, 2011, /news/occupy-
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Department, After Action Report: Oakland Police Department: Analysis of Operation BF01-2011-000 - 
October 25, 2011 (Oakland, CA: City of Oakland, 2012), 18. 
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 observed a number of protesters circling the plaza and surrounding area and considered 
them to be acting as counter-surveillance.   
Oakland Police used three mobile field force companies to facilitate the 
eviction.283  They put those forces under the command of three Oakland police captains. 
Two of the forces were made up exclusively of Oakland personnel; the third was a mix of 
officers from Berkeley PD, Pleasanton PD, and UC Berkeley PD. This configuration 
would prove problematic. Oakland Police tasked the eviction of certain portions of the 
plaza to different field force elements.  
Police gave protesters five minutes to evacuate the plaza, once the eviction 
operation commenced.284  Considering the kitchen area to be potentially more dangerous, 
a “Tango Team” tossed a hand-deployed tear gas device near the southern end of the 
plaza as an “area denial” tactic. 285   Indications are that there was a breakdown in 
communication at this time when field force officers were then told to don their gas 
masks after the deployment of gas. In spite of some confusion, officers succeeded in 
clearing the plaza within about an hour and public works crews set about cleaning up. A 
field force company was sent to Snow Park and immediately began clearing out the 
Occupy protesters there as well. By 10:00 a.m. the plaza and park were clear and 
perimeter officers reported dealing with occasional small groups of protesters attempting 
to regain access to Frank Ogawa Plaza. Several temporary metal barricades were stored 
near the plaza as initial operations came to an end. 
The initial plan had been to evict the protesters and then allow them access to the 
plaza after it had been cleaned later that same day. Oakland PD had no plans to keep 
protesters from accessing the plaza or the park following the initial operational period. By 
2:00 p.m. that afternoon the initial officers had been on duty for 12 hours. The second 
operational period commenced with a much smaller group of officers. 
283 Mobile field forces are designed around squads generally made up of a sergeant and seven 
officers.  A collection of six or more squads generally makes up one company but this is neither universal 
nor required. 
284 Oakland Police Department, Oakland After-Action Report. 
285 Ibid., 15. 
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 Between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. the protesters gathered together in downtown 
Oakland and held a General Assembly meeting where they voted to reoccupy the 
plaza.286  Their initial clash with police that afternoon occurred in front of the public 
library. An estimated crowd of 400–500 protesters moved down Broadway and police 
deployed gas, redirecting them toward Frank Ogawa plaza.287  At about 7:45 p.m. in a 
much publicized and violent clash with Occupy Oakland protesters, a member of the 
Oakland police department fired what is believed to either be a beanbag round or a tear 
gas projectile, which then struck former Marine, Iraqi war veteran, and Occupy Oakland 
protester Scott Olsen in the head causing serious injury.   
As fellow protesters rushed to his aid, a police officer could be seen throwing a 
secondary explosive device into the group of those helping.288  In one video posted on 
social media and broadcast on Democracy Now, protesters could be seen throwing active 
canisters of tear gas back across an approximately 30’ divide at police. According to 
Jesse Palmer, an Occupy Oakland activist speaking to Democracy Now, people were 
dispersing and not advancing on the officers.289  The shooting of Olsen set off a series of 
reactions in multiple cities with Occupy protest contingents. In New York, members of a 
chapter of Iraq Veterans Against the War, told media that following the news of the 
shooting of Olsen, their membership grew quickly. A post on the Facebook page of 
Occupy Dallas put it simply, “We all stand in solidarity with Scott Olsen.”290  
286 Frazier Group, LLC, Independent Investigation Occupy Oakland. 
287 Oakland Police Department, Oakland After-Action Report. 
288 A similar device is made by Defense Technology and carries 15 32-caliber rubber balls that, 
according to the manufacturer’s description, “…detonate in a 50’ circular pattern, spraying rubber pellets 
with micro-pulverized chemical agent.” They are commonly used for riot control and in prison settings. 
Chief Supply, “Defense Technology 32-caliber Stinger Rubber Ball Grenades, 15 Rubber Pellets,” accessed 
October 18, 2013, http://www.chiefsupply.com/defense-technology-32-caliber-stinger-rubber-ball-
grenades-15-rubber-pellets.html. “Iraq War Vet Hospitalized with Fractured Skull After Being Shot by 
Police at Occupy Oakland Protest,” Democracy Now!, October 27, 2011, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/10/27/iraq_war_vet_hospitalized_with_fractured. 
289 Ibid. 
290 “Occupy Dallas: We All Stand in Solidarity with Scott Olsen,” Occupy Dallas Facebook, 
November 13, 2011, https://www.facebook.com/OccupyDallas/posts/284724021559377. 
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 Mayor Jean Quan was immediately criticized for the decision to evict the 
protesters from the plaza.291  She responded by pointing out that she was not aware of the 
planned police action because she had been on a trip to Washington, DC at the time of the 
raid. That also stood in contrast to other statements attributed to her that said she “was 
forced to act because of the unsanitary condition of the protests.”292  Chief Howard 
Jordan cited deteriorating conditions in the camp as the reason they moved to evict.293  
Contributing to the contradicting and confusing statements, the official press release from 
the city of Oakland said that the loud noises heard during the eviction were caused by 
protesters throwing fireworks at police when in fact the chemical agents (tear gas) used 
by police generated similar explosions.294 
Two protests were held in the two days immediately following the eviction. Both 
were peaceful and drew an estimated 1000 people. The following week, Occupy Oakland 
called for a massive strike over their primary complaint of economic inequality. The 
Oakland Police Officers Association, responding to what they believed was a laissez-faire 
approach from Mayor Quan, released an open letter to the Mayor declaring their 
confusion about their directions.295  Three separate protests took place on November 2, 
2011 and, according to the Police Association, city of Oakland employees (with the 
exception of police officers) were allowed to participate in the demonstrations.296  The 
Occupy protesters in Frank Ogawa plaza grew quickly to numbers that, according to the 
police association, eclipsed the original pre-eviction numbers.297 
291 Kristin Bender, “Occupy Oakland Protesters Return Downtown to Claim Frank Ogawa Plaza,” 
Mercury News, October 26, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_19197518. 
292 Sajid Farooq and Lori Preuitt, “Cops Raid Occupy Oakland Camp,” NBC Bay Area, October 25, 
2011, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Occupy-Oakland-Gets-Shut-Down-132527503.html. 
293 Bender, “Occupy Oakland Protesters Return.” 
294 City of Oakland, “Oakland Press Release RE: Eviction of Occupy Oakland” (Oakland, CA: City 
of Oakland, CA, 2011), 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca/groups/cityadministrator/documents/pressrelease/oak031911.pdf. 
295 Kevin Fagan and Demian Bulwa, “Oakland Police Union: ‘We Are Confused’ by Quan,” SFGate, 





                                                        
 A local news helicopter broadcast images of thousands of protesters marching 
into the Port of Oakland, and some local media put the estimates at 100,000.298  The port 
was forced to cease operations for the day although the encounters at the port were 
nonviolent. According to a statement to the media, the closure of the port for the day had 
the potential to cost upwards of $8 million dollars.299  An encounter between a motorist 
and protesters walking in the streets of downtown Oakland was also captured on amateur 
video and resulted in a violent confrontation between the occupants of the vehicle and the 
crowd of protesters.300 Media coverage of the incident indicated that police investigated 
the incident and released the motorist, which appeared to add to the anger of the 
protesters directed at police.301 
Protesters lingered on the city streets of Oakland in masse on November 3. As 
they stood back from police by some 30 to 50 feet, a self-described videographer named 
Scott Campbell walked parallel to a stationary police line in the downtown area recording 
a video of officers. On the video, Campbell can be heard asking the officers twice, “Is 
this ok?”302  Campbell continued to move to his right, across a blocked street and when 
he almost reached the other side, an Oakland police officer shot him in the thigh with a 
bean-bag round without apparent provocation on the part of Campbell. Officers’ body 
298 “Raw video: NewsChopper 2 Footage of Huge Crowd Marching to Port of Oakland,” KTVU, 
accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.ktvu.com/videos/news/raw-video-newschopper-2-footage-of-huge-
crowd/vD4mx/; Zennie62, “Occupy Oakland Strike Draws 100,000; Violence Caused by 100,” City 
Brights: Zennie Abraham [blog], November 3, 2011, http://blog.sfgate.com/abraham/2011/11/03/occupy-
oakland-strike-draws-100000-violence-caused-by-100/. 
299 “Occupy Oakland General Strike Shuts down Port; Anarchists ‘Bent on Creating Problems,’” CBS 
Local, November 11, 2012, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/11/02/general-strike-protesters-shut-
down-port-of-oakland/. 
300 “Occupy Oakland Protesters Stop and Attack Car and Get Ran Over,” YouTube video, posted by 
DiSaStaCaPiTaLisM, November 3, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxAahGg1CyQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
301 “Occupy Oakland General Strike Shuts down Port; Anarchists ‘Bent on Creating Problems.’” CBS 
Local. 
302 “Shot by Police with Rubber Bullet at Occupy Oakland,” YouTube video, posted by antiprocon, 
November 5, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0pX9LeE-g8&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
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 camera footage confirmed the incident from an alternative angle and is disturbing to 
watch.303  
Protests continued on an almost daily basis for the next week and a half. On 
November 4, 2011, multiple cities’ police chiefs and other city leaders joined in on a 
second conference call (the first occurred almost a month prior on October 11, 2011) 
facilitated by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). 304  According to Chuck 
Wexler, Director of PERF, the calls came about as a result of the chiefs of police of 
Boston and Portland, Oregon making the request for a conference call. Wexler told 
multiple sources that they extended the invitation to police agencies and that to his 
knowledge no federal agencies took part in the calls.305   
The situation in and around the encampment in Frank Ogawa plaza spiraled 
downhill rapidly. The Occupy Oakland General Assembly voted to withdraw a resolution 
they had originally agreed upon to remain peaceful in their demonstrations. 306   In 
response, the city turned off both the streetlights and nearby water faucets that the 
protesters relied on for water.307   
The next day during the 5:00 p.m. evening rush hour, violence erupted at the edge 
of Occupy encampment in Frank Ogawa plaza. What local media described as having 
started with a couple of people getting into a “scuffle” escalated into a shooting leaving 
303 “New Footage: OPD Shooting of Scott Campbell at Occupy Oakland,” YouTube video, posted by 
WeCopwatch, July 3, 2013, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0pfL9HkBnCk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
304 There were conflicting media reports regarding the dates of the various conference calls. Based on 
my research and statements by Chuck Wexler in those media accounts, this is the most accurate timeline I 
could determine. Kroll, “Mayors and Cops Traded.” 
305 “Former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper on Paramilitary Policing From WTO to Occupy Wall 
Street,” Democracy Now!, November 17, 2011, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/17/paramilitary_policing_of_occupy_wall_street.  
306 “Protesters Withdraw Resolution to Remain Peaceful,” YouTube video, posted by ABC-7 News, 
November 19, 2011, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8427150.  
307 “Shots Fired near ‘Occupy Oakland,’ One Dead,” ABC Local, November 10, 2011, 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8427634. 
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 one person dead.308  This reinvigorated the call for the shutting down of the encampment 
and Frank Ogawa Plaza was about to be cleared again.309  
On the evening of Sunday November 13, 2011, Occupy Oakland held a General 
Assembly where they briefly discussed an imminent anticipated eviction by police.310  
Some of the protesters called for a condemnation of violence while others advocated for a 
multitude of tactics. As the night turned to morning, a large crowd gathered. Police 
assembled with mutual aid from the “San Leandro, San Francisco, Hayward and Fremont 
police departments along with assistance from Alameda, Santa Clara and San Mateo 
county sheriff’s deputies.”311  There was less emphasis on secrecy on this operation and 
Occupy Oakland clearly expected the police to come. This time a majority of the Occupy 
protesters left voluntarily ahead of the raid. A few protesters moved their tents from 
Frank Ogawa Plaza to Snow Park but by almost 4:30 a.m. a number of tents had already 
been taken down.312  Police moved in, dressed in riot gear and shortly after 5:00 a.m., a 
group of about 200 officers had surrounded the camp and were preparing to 
systematically go through the camp, one tent at a time.313 
They positioned themselves between the crowd at the intersection and the plaza. 
Unlike during the October 25, 2011 eviction of Frank Ogawa Plaza, the crowd refrained 
from throwing rocks and bottles at officers. Just over 30 protesters had chosen to remain 
in camp; they were arrested by 8:00 a.m. that morning. Those protesters that left Frank 
Ogawa Plaza intent on continuing the protest moved either to Snow Park, joining others 
already there, or pushed on to the outskirts of the downtown area.314 
308 Ibid. 
309 In the days following the shooting, the victim was identified as Kayode Ola Foster who had been 
staying at Frank Ogawa Plaza. The shooting suspect was also reported to have been staying in the 
encampment in the days leading up to the shooting. “Shooting Victim Is Tied to Occupy Oakland,” LA 
Times L.A. NOW [blog], November 13, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/shooting-
victim-tied-to-occupy-oakland.html. 
310 Kristin J. Bender et al., “Occupy Oakland Live Blog: Police Outnumber Protesters at Ogawa 
Plaza,” Mercury News, November 14, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/occupy-oakland/ci_19331752.  
311 Ibid. 




                                                        
 By that evening, in an unprecedented move, two members of Mayor Quan’s team 
had resigned. First to quit was her legal advisor, Dan Siegel and later the Co-deputy 
Mayor, Sharon Cornu, tendered her resignation.315  Siegel stated that he “had come close 
to resigning over the city’s first raid,” and Cornu cited her belief that she was being 
ineffectual in her position.316  Occupy Oakland protesters gathered by the hundreds in 
Frank Ogawa plaza once police reopened it later that afternoon. Police notified those 
protesting that the plaza closure hour of 10:00 p.m. would be strictly enforced. Police 
also repeated warnings about their intention to remove protesters although no specific 
timeframe was revealed. According to media accounts, by 11:05 p.m. there were fewer 
than 12 protesters left in frank Ogawa Plaza. In spite of their warnings to the contrary, 
Oakland Police declined to arrest any additional protesters that had elected to stay in the 
plaza after it closed. There were no tents or structures.    
About 24 tents remained in Snow Park that Oakland police allowed to remain 
until November 21. The day following the highly publicized and controversial pepper-
spraying of passively resisting students at the University of California Davis campus, 
Oakland police moved in and ordered those remaining in Snow Park to collect their 
belongings and leave.    
According to an Oakland Police Department spokesperson there were no 
arrests.317  This marked the last of the occupation for Oakland although not the last of the 
Occupy Oakland protests. On January 12, 2012, over 400 people were arrested after 
protesters reportedly gathered and marched to the vacant convention center building.318  
Oakland’s protest policing tactics were again called into question when it was reported 
315 Jason Cherkis, “Mayor Jean Quan’s Legal Adviser Quits Over Clearing Of Occupy Oakland 
Camp,” Huffington Post, November 14, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/14/mayor-jean-
quans-legal-advisor-quits-over-occupy-oakland_n_1093019.html; Matthai Kuruvila, “Oakland Mayor Jean 
Quan’s Top Staffer Resigns,” Politics Blog, November 14, 2011, 
http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/2011/11/14/oakland-mayor-jean-quans-top-staffer-resigns/. 
316 Ibid. 
317 “Occupy Oakland Evicted, Police Scrutinized over Use of Pepper Spray,” U.S. News, November 
21, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/11/21/occupy-oakland-evicted-police-use-of-pepper-
spray-under-scrutiny. 
318 Sarah Maslin Nir and Matt Flegenheimer, “Occupy Oakland Protest Leads to Hundreds of 
Arrests,” New York Times, January 29, 2012, sec. U.S, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/us/occupy-
oakland-protest-leads-to-hundreds-of-arrests.html. 
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 that they “kettled” protesters and made mass arrests.319  This incident came shortly after 
a court-appointed monitor for the department “submitted a report to a federal judge that 
included ‘serious concerns’ about the department’s handling of the Occupy protests.”320  
Sporadic Occupy protests continue to this day but not with a true occupation of public 
space as was seen in the fall of 2011.  
Oakland provides an interesting example of a chaotic experience in a complex 
adaptive environment of demonstrations and police action. I explain this in depth in 
Chapter VII on analysis. While the violence experienced in Oakland is what is often 
thought of, how Oakland failed to properly strategize and prepare for this prolonged 
demonstration is more valuable to police and city leaders. Oakland stands juxtaposed to 
New York with its overwhelming resources, with far fewer officers than it had only a few 
years prior. Likewise, Oakland’s response stands in stark contrast to the approaches of 
Portland and Dallas, which follow in Chapters V and VI, as both used emergent strategies 
to respond to the Occupy Movement. 
 
319 Kettling is the practice of blockading protesters and leaving them no avenues of escape.  This 
tends to increase the tension and often requires higher levels of force by the police.  It is against many 
departments’ policies and procedures.  




                                                        
 V. OCCUPY PORTLAND 








 A. THE PROTEST 
On Thursday, October 6, 2011, Occupy Portland began as the Occupy Movement 
did in many of the other cities. Portland was different in at least one aspect and that was 
its size. Media outlets reported police estimates of the initial surge into the area of the 
Pioneer Courthouse in the area of about 4000 strong.321  By mid-day however, the crowd 
had grown to excess capacity of the square’s 10,000. Protesters were standing “elbow to 
elbow with people spilling out into surrounding streets.”322  As one article noted, “the 
cast of thousands…spent hours gathering, listening, chanting, marching and finally 
mostly leaving downtown unscathed…”323   
Like the other cities in this study, Portland’s occupiers were a diverse group 
primarily voicing dissatisfaction with what they termed income inequality and corporate 
greed. Unlike New York however, whose planning had begun in January 2011, the 
Portland event had been hastily thrown together in about two weeks.324  In spite of the 
late start, Occupy Portland succeeded in eclipsing the crowds at the original Occupy Wall 
Street protest in New York. With the newness of the movement still intact, protesters 
declared that, while they did not have a permit, they were intent on being peaceful and 
marching.325 
Recognizing the impact that the establishment of a camp in a major downtown 
urban area could have, the occupiers marched two blocks east and two blocks south to set 
up their initial camp in three contiguous parks (see Figure 7), Pioneer Square, Lownsdale 
Square, and Terry Schrunk Plaza while sporadically chanting, “Whose streets? Our 
321 “Occupy Portland: Protesters March, Begin to Fill Pioneer Courthouse Square,” The Oregonian—
OregonLive, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/10/occupy_portland_mayor_sam_adam.html.  
322 Ibid. 
323Margaret Haberman, “Occupy Portland Hits Town with Cast of Thousands for Massive, Peaceful 
Demonstration,” The Oregonian—OregonLive, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/10/occupy_portland_holds_massive.html.  
324 Ibid. 
325 Unknown woman in video. “Occupy Portland—Evolution of Democracy (Day 1),” YouTube 
video, posted by OccupyPDXloki, October 11, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=isWuatOKl6I.  
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 Streets!”326  Upon arriving at the parks, several pitched tents and camped with the city’s 
approval, at least initially. 327   As the group continued into the park, the 
OccupyPortland.org film crew interviewed Lieutenant Robert King with the Portland 
police who advised that as of that time, the “event” had been peaceful and that there had 
been no arrests.328 
 
Figure 7.  Occupy Portland Camps 
326 Ibid. 
327 Haberman, “Occupy Portland Hits Town.” 
328 “Occupy Portland...How the Police Should Treat Us,” YouTube video, posted by Thomas Tullis, 
October 6, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=B0mPvHYQTPM#t=6s. 
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 That Friday morning, shortly before the “People’s Marathon”—so nicknamed for 
its policy of rewarding all finishers equally—marathon organizers agreed to allow the 
occupiers to continue to camp in Chapman Square. 329   Race organizers actually 
celebrated the presence of the protesters, citing the additional attention expected to be 
focused on the race as a result. Ultimately, race organizers blocked the view of the camp 
from the racers at the finish line remarking on concerns about safety and the need to 
prevent a pileup of runners.330  Over 14,000 additional people were expected to be in the 
immediate vicinity of the occupiers as a result of the race.331  Portland police noted no 
serious disruptions as a result of the race. Their only notable arrests came from the 
“tagging” of several locations, including one Portland police squad car, by two 
suspects.332  Although the incident happened at 1:00 a.m., the suspects (who admitted to 
the offense) were caught with aerosol paints, stencils and “over 100 Occupy Portland 
flyers for posting…”333 
Officers assigned to the Occupy encampment reported noteworthy incidents and 
arrests in “situation reports.”  In routine operations, police departments often use a 
similar form of reporting and call them “morning reports” or “chief’s reports.”  They are 
intended as a means of communicating important highlighted information to oncoming 
watches and commanders. In Portland, these situation reports were circulated through the 
command ranks. Dallas used standard “morning reports” and emails to communicate 
noteworthy activity, Oakland used emails among command staff and supervisors, and, 
according to an anonymous source in New York, the NYPD also used similar means of 
communicating and circulating information on daily occurrences.334 
329 Elliot Njus, “Portland Marathon Agrees to Accommodate Occupy Portland Encampment,” The 




332 “Tagging” refers to the spray painting of a building or object, generally with the individual’s 
moniker or artistic graffiti signature. 
333 Portland Police Bureau, Occupy Events. 
334 Anonymous police official, personal communication with author.  
 74 
                                                        
 Organizers of the march were keen on organization and had already branded 
several members of the group with their voluntary job titles—peacekeeper, food provider, 
medics, and others.335 Portland police reported that during the first week of occupation, 
the group organized classes for those who elected to serve on the “Occupy Security 
Team.”336  At least one of the classes was on techniques for dealing with the mentally ill 
(presumably to address the homeless who had begun to flock to the camp).337  Within 24 
hours, the Occupy contingent had medical tents and a meeting space erected and had also 
established a centralized food service station.338  There were so many people camping in 
the park that weekend that with the exception of a narrow path through the tents and 
shelters, the ground was barely visible.339 
The camp experienced a recurring problem of mentally ill and homeless people 
venturing into camp. As happened in other cities, the local homeless population tried to 
take advantage of the occupiers somewhat communal operation; however, they became 
distracting and unwelcome attendees rather quickly. Police resources were initially taxed 
with reports of disturbances between homeless and occupiers. Officers reported making 
multiple arrests and transporting to local hospitals for mental evaluations only to have the 
arrestees return and cause additional disturbances.340 
B. POLICE RESPONSE 
Lauded by some as one of the more liberal cities in the nation, Portland 
government appeared to embrace the Occupy Movement from the outset. With the largest 
Occupy contingent in the nation, the city allowed camping almost immediately in the city 
parks, although at first they attempted to prevent the erection of structures (including 
tents). Literally overnight, Chapman and Lownsdale Parks were transformed into tent 
335 Njus, “Portland Marathon Agrees.” 
336 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” October 10, 2011 (internal document, Portland Police 
Bureau, Portland, OR). 
337 Ibid. 
338 Njus, “Portland Marathon Agrees to Accommodate Occupy Portland Encampment.” 
339 Occupy Portland—Evolution of Democracy (Day 1),” YouTube video. 
340 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” October 20, 2011 (internal document, Portland Police 
Bureau, Portland, OR). 
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 cities. Whatever the policing approach to the downtown core was prior to October 6, 
2011, at least in this two-block area, it had changed dramatically. 
Although the Portland police had advised against it, the city council and mayor 
opted for allowing the occupiers to establish their camp. Recognizing the local and 
national media attention that the Occupy Movement was garnering, Portland police 
handpicked officers for assignment to the camp for around-the-clock coverage. Officers 
were chosen for their communication skills and temperament.341 As with many large 
operations, manpower fluctuated over the course of the encampment, but in general 
Portland Police Bureau kept four officers exclusively patrolling the parks during the day 
and evening hours and 2 officers patrolling overnight.342 
The Portland Police Bureau, like other cities studied, subscribed to the negotiated 
management philosophy for policing protest. An added challenge was that the Occupy 
Movement was billed as one where there was no identifiable leadership. As with many of 
the Occupy encampments, the participants were reluctant to identify any “leaders,” 
opting for a rudimentary pseudo-democratic process often called a “general assembly.”  
These general assembly meetings reportedly occurred almost daily, were open to any 
who wanted to attend (including the police) and often resulted in votes taken to establish 
a group consensus. However, there were informal leaders that seemed to command some 
sort of authority within the groups. Portland police identified these informal leaders and, 
in keeping with negotiated management, elicited their support in managing the crowd as 
best they could.343  
Single officers and two-officer teams patrolled the parks on bicycle and on foot. 
Almost immediately the officers began establishing relationships with the group of 
Occupiers. A direct benefit of these relationships was the exchange of information 
between police and protester. One example occurred relatively soon after Occupiers 
established camp. On the tenth of October, Occupy members reported a possible sexual 




                                                        
 assault having occurred inside the encampment in Chapman Square.344  Officers located 
the complainant; however, she declined to cooperate with officers. Occupy protesters, 
still committed to working with the police on the issue, located the suspect and officers 
documented the incident in the event that the victim changed her mind.345   
In mid-October, a sex offender registered the Occupy Portland camp as his 
address.346  This was reportedly met with mixed emotions from a number of residents of 
the camp, as there were children of the protesters living in the camp with parents or 
guardians. The Occupy security contingent maintained patrols in the camp throughout the 
night.347 The Occupy Media Coalition focused on highlighting the work of their medical 
tent and volunteers. Like other occupation encampments, medical volunteers in camp 
ranged from those who knew first aid to registered nurses.348  
Online videos and news reports establish that, during the early stages of the 
Occupy Portland marches and encampment, officers wore their “regular” patrol uniforms 
with no “riot gear” or other equipment that would indicate anything other than a response 
with regular patrol officers. This was intentional although the officers were instructed to 
keep their riot gear at the ready.  
Unlike many cities, Portland Occupy protesters held an entire segment of street 
closed for an extended period and engaged in discussions on whether or not to relinquish 
control over that street. The Portland police, unbeknownst to the protesters, had no plans 
to open the street by force and were content for the time being to allow protesters to 
express themselves in that manner.349 
344 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” October 10, 2011 (internal document, Portland Police 
Bureau, Portland, OR). 
345 Ibid. 
346 Anita Kissee, “Sex Offender Registers Occupy Portland Camp as Address,” KATU, October 16, 
2011, http://www.katu.com/news/local/131955313.html.  
347 Ibid. 
348 “Day 7: Organizing Occupy Portland,” October 12, 2011, 
http://occupyportland.org/2011/10/12/day-7-organizing/. 
349 Data obtained from informal agency after-action reports available from author. 
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 C. SPATIAL CONTROL 
Portland Mayor Sam Adams agreed early on to allow occupation of Chapman and 
Lownsdale Squares exclusively but prohibited the expansion of the occupation into any 
other parks.350  At least for the first few weeks, the majority of Occupy Portland was 
content to limit their encampment to those two areas. Comparing Portland with New 
York and Oakland’s enforcement of local codes and ordinances, Portland police relied on 
their local codes related to park closure hours and police powers to exclude activists from 
public area.351 
One could argue that the restriction of the Portland Occupy contingent to 
Chapman and Lownsdale parks is akin to establishing them as free speech zones. Once 
the encampment was established, the police prohibited and actively prevented the 
expansion of the camp. Mayor Sam Adams expressed to local media that he believed he 
was being balanced in his approach to the Occupy Movement.352  He also addressed the 
Portland police having assisted federal authorities in removing protesters from Terry 
Schrunk Plaza saying that he also believed that their actions were in keeping with that 
balance.353  
Terry Schrunk Plaza, while immediately adjacent to Chapman and Lownsdale 
squares, is not a park owned or operated by the city of Portland. Instead, it is federal 
property and falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal Protective Services. No campers or 
occupiers were ever allowed to establish an encampment or set up temporary structures in 
Schrunk Plaza, although daily gatherings were permitted. According to media reports and 
emails obtained through freedom of information (FOIA) requests made by the 
350 Anne Saker, “Occupy Portland Gets Warning against Expanding Demonstration to The Pearl’s 
Jamison Square,” The Oregonian—OregonLive, October 28, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/10/occupy_portland_gets_warning_a.html. 
351 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps;” City of Portland, “Portland City Code,” accessed 
October 16, 2013, www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?a=147824&c=28627. 
352 Anne Saker, “Occupy Portland an Exercise of Free Speech: Mayor Adams on Radio Show,” The 




                                                        
 Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, the White House directed federal agencies to go easy 
on the Occupy Movement people.354   
According to an email from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—
National Protection and Programs Directorate Chief of Staff to General Services 
Administration (GSA) Public Buildings Service Commissioner, DHS asked that the 
Federal Protective Services enforce neither the curfew at the park nor the prohibition on 
overnight encampments. 355   According to Portland Police Bureau documents, the 
protesters who had chained themselves to each other in the plaza were “disappointed” 
that they were not going to be arrested.356 
Portland Police utilized its riot gear during some of the planned and spontaneous 
marches to remove and arrest about 25 protesters who attempted to expand the 
occupation to Jamison Square.357  When protesters arrived at Jamison Square, about 15 
officers were waiting for them. The police warned them that they stood poised to lose the 
support of the city government if they attempted to occupy an additional park.358 
Shortly after midnight Mayor Sam Adams reportedly circled the park to survey 
the scene, advising that he was there to observe and keep the peace.359  Some two hours 
later, Portland police in protective riot gear made their way through the park clearing it 
with the assistance of half a dozen mounted officers and arresting some 25 protesters. Mr. 
Adams tweeted, “My decision to enforce park hours at Jamison is based on the fact it is 
surrounded by homes: Lonsdale/Chapman [sic] are not.” 360   Apartments surround 
354 Perry Chiaramonte, “White House Told Authorities Not to Crack down on ‘Occupy’ Protesters, 
Documents Show,” Fox News, August 8, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/08/gsa-urged-to-
stand-down-on-occupy-portland-protests-by-white-house-documents/. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 6, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). 
357 Hannah Hoffman and Aaron Mesh, “UPDATED: Pearl District Occupation Ends with 27 Arrests,” 
Williamette Week, October 30, 2011, http://www.wweek.com/portland/blog-27807-
updated_pearl_district_occupation_ends_with_27_arr.html. 
358 “Occupy Portland Protesters March to Pearl District,” KATU, October 29, 2011, 
http://www.katu.com/news/local/132859558.html.  
359 Hoffman and Mesh, “Pearl District Occupation Ends.” 
360 Ibid. 
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 Jamison square whereas commercial buildings and the Portland Police Bureau 
Headquarters surround Lownsdale and Chapman. 
Not all the Occupy contingent was supportive of the 25 arrestees, however. Many 
saw the work that had been accomplished with the assistance of the city of Portland as 
being jeopardized by this minority contingent of protesters. One protester said that many 
did not know why they were there in Jamison Square and that the actions of this small 
group could be perceived as a “slap in the face” to the city.361  Police situation reports 
from the encampment point to an unease felt by the occupiers who remained in camp. 
Several, fearing that police would evict them, expressed their intent to move out if police 
warned them to leave.362 
Police credit the relationship established with the protesters for their ability to 
calm and reassure the Occupy members still in camp and with preventing further 
disruptions.363  The divergent actions of the groups were indicative of the struggle with 
leadership that the Occupy Movement was experiencing on a grander scale and in more 
places than just Portland.  
D. SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
A social movement born on the back of social media, Occupy Portland was one of 
the more technologically progressive of the already progressive Occupy contingents. 
Social media sites were used to broadcast live events and offered personal perspectives of 
those directly involved in the action, not just journalists’ opinions. Live-streaming video 
of meetings and marches became the norm for a segment of society in a few short weeks. 
Portland State history professor Chet Orloff posited, “What you’re seeing, through the 
361 Ibid. 
362 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” October 30, 2011 (internal document, Portland Police 
Bureau, Portland, OR). 
363 Data obtained from informal Portland Police Bureau after-action reports (internal documents) 
available from author. 
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 advent of social media is the speeding up of the process, but the process is still by and 
large the same,” referring to the history of expressing dissent.364   
From the outset, Occupy Portland utilized technology in ways that other locations 
did not or could not. In contrast to the other occupations, Occupy Portland held General 
Assembly (GA) meetings in full view of not only protesters present on-site but also the 
online world tuning into to watch the event streamed live. GA meetings were then posted 
and available on YouTube.com almost immediately after the events. Among the most 
popular sites used during the encampment and protests were Facebook and Twitter; 
however, protesters also used Tumblr, a blogging platform for posting information 
primarily in narrative form; Instragram, a site for posting photos; Flickr, another photo 
website; and Storify. Storify collected social media postings on a range of topics and 
consolidated them in to a space where users could better understand them.365 
The Portland Media Coalition has a substantial amount of video available for 
public viewing documenting virtually every day of the occupation in over 120 videos.366  
The videos appear to be professionally edited and contain interviews with protesters, 
police, business leaders, and residents of Portland. All Occupy-related Facebook pages 
gained a multitude of followers very quickly. The Portland Police Bureau acknowledged 
the planned march and posted a message on its Facebook page acknowledging their 
awareness.367 
The police department’s use of Twitter was considerably more abundant than its 
use of Facebook. Looking prior to the start of Occupy Portland, from October 6, 2011 
through the month of December 2011, Portland police tweeted over 120 times regarding 
issues related to Occupy. Most of the updates were “as they happened” updates regarding 
364 Erica Heartquist and Michael Rollins, “Inside the ‘Occupy Portland’ Camp,” KGW, October 14, 
2011, http://www.kgw.com/news/Inside-the-Occupy-Portland-camp-131876418.html. 
365 Rosalynn Rothstein and Adam Rothstein, “POSZU : Occupying Strategic and Tactical Media 
Space: Failures of Tools, Behaviors, and Narratives,” Poszu, May 6, 2013, 
http://www.poszu.com/poszu/index.php/blog-archive/occupying-media-space/. 
366 Occupy Portland media content can be accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/user/OccupyPDX 
367 Portland Police Bureau Facebook posts were accessed online at 
http://www.facebook.com/portlandpolice. 
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 the progress of Occupy-related marches and street blockages and closures. Also included 
were tweets notifying interested parties as to the location of police spokespeople to offer 
updates on the policing of the movement. Portland police even tweeted rumor control 
updates, advising that a “raid” on Chapman Square was not being planned.368  When 140 
characters were insufficient to convey the message, Portland police tweeted links to their 
website where they posted longer press releases. Portland Mayor Sam Adams was 
comfortable with Twitter as well and used it often.  
E. POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
In keeping with the city’s initial handling of the Occupy protesters, the police 
department refrained from employing some technology that other cities did. For instance, 
Portland police did not utilize any kind of closed circuit television cameras for 
surveillance. Portland, unlike New York or Dallas, did not use any kind of deployable 
platform with surveillance technology to monitor the protesters at any location. Portland 
does have one fixed-wing aircraft, which they deployed during marches to assist with 
traffic spotting, but not to record protester movements with cameras or surveillance 
equipment. In contrast to the NYPD’s Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU), the 
only kind of cameras the police used individually, not including officers’ personal cell 
phones for which Portland Police Bureau keeps no record, were those carried by 
designated officers during the marches to document police use of force. These were 
reviewed as part of my social media video analysis for comparison with open source 
video.  
Instead, Portland police maintained connection to the live-streaming video feed 
provided by the protesters themselves. The feed was available in the Portland police 
Occupy command post virtually 24 hours-a-day. This was used in conjunction with 
uniformed officers’ personal attendance at the meetings and their foot patrols through the 
camp as their means of gathering intelligence and identifying concerns within the camp. 
Police commanders observed that with over 600 people living so close together in two 
368 “Rumor Control,” October 10, 2011, https://twitter.com/PortlandPolice. 
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 adjacent parks, it was easy for them to mobilize quickly and begin an unplanned march 
through the streets.   
F. THE EVICTION 
Portland police held regular meetings with both the mayor and city council and 
kept them abreast of the rising crime in the Chapman and Lownsdale parks.369  As the 
camp conditions degraded, so too did the health of the protesters as evidenced by reports 
of officers assigned to the camp.370  The medical tent had grown to be a busy place in 
camp as the occupation wore on. This concern for health and medical problems brought 
on by the degrading camp conditions is a primary reason cited by all four cities studied as 
justification for eventual eviction. Portland Police reported the incidents of sick and ill 
Occupy members to be increasing the longer they stayed. During overnight shifts, 
officers had reported hearing increasing coughing throughout the night.371  There were 
however, no reported outbreaks of any one particular illness. It is unclear whether these 
symptoms were indicative of something more serious.  
Some four weeks into the occupation, officers patrolling the camp witnessed 
multiple fights between protesters.372  Police discussed these incidents with the mayor 
and city council and over the course of the first week of November, they put together a 
plan to evict the protesters from their encampment. This is consistent with media reports 
that the plans were hatched during the conference calls requested by Boston and Portland 
police and brokered by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) that took place on 
October 11 and November 4.373  
369 Data obtained from informal agency after-action reports available from author. 
370 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 9, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). 
371 Ibid. 
372 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 4, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). 
373 “Former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper on Paramilitary Policing From WTO to Occupy Wall 
Street,” Democracy Now! November 17, 2011, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/17/paramilitary_policing_of_occupy_wall_street. 
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 In meetings with the mayor and council, the police outlined mounting concerns 
about the plans of some of the protesters after a series of events. On November 8, 2011, 
officers were called to the Portland World Trade Center, after an apparent Molotov 
cocktail was thrown in the doorway. Added concern came after finding what appeared to 
be a cache of “fist size [sic] rocks” and chunks of concrete in one area of the park.374 On 
November 11, 2011, according to police reports, officers observed protesters carrying 
wooden pallets into Chapman Square.375  It appeared to the officers that some of the 
protesters were building some sort of structure and noted, “It appears that it has been 
excavated on the inside, about 2–3 feet below ground level.” 376   Additionally, 
peacekeeping personnel with the Occupy group advised police that the individuals who 
were building the structure were using the pallets to fortify it as well as building shields 
in preparation for an anticipated eviction. The following day a protester turned over what 
appeared to police to be a number of improvised weapons that he advised were found in 
the camp.377  
Officers also had conversations with other protesters about “reinforcements” 
anticipated to arrive from Occupy Oakland, Seattle, and Salem. According to the 
information officers received from interactions with the protesters, estimates were that 
between 100 and 300 additional protesters could be expected.378  In addition, a protester 
who was supportive of the officers also advised that they were expecting an additional 
150 anarchists.379 
Officers also received intelligence from sanitation workers on November 11, 2011 
advising that over the previous three weeks, they were missing five garbage cans and that 
they had long since stopped replacing the cans. Officers intimated that they would see the 
374 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 9, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). 
375 Ibid. 
376 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 11, 2011 (internal document, Portland 





                                                        
 trashcans again but next time filled with concrete with multiple protesters chained to 
them.380  
Officers began repeating the message that eviction was imminent, and on 
November 10, 2011 Mayor Sam Adams announced a deadline for all Occupy protesters 
to vacate the parks no later than 12:01 a.m., Sunday, November 14, 2011.381 On the 
morning of the thirteenth, officers reported seeing trucks and vans encircling the park and 
protesters packing up tents and other belongings then vacating the park. 382  As the 
deadline approached, thousands of Occupy supporters congregated in the area of the 
parks downtown.   
Midnight came and went and the police did not move in to evict the protesters. 
According to police, they had no intention of enforcing the deadline that night. 383  
Instead, they monitored the crowd and even backed off and allowed the protesters to shut 
down the street.384  An assistant chief of the Portland Police Bureau acknowledged that it 
would not make sense for the police to use force to keep that street open at the cost of 
what had the potential to be a violent confrontation. 385   As this protest carried on, 
Portland police leaders reminded the line officers that the crowd was not “anti-police” 
and told their officers that their mission was to “keep people safe.”386  One protester 
spoke with the Occupy Portland Media Coalition remarked that although he considered 
380 Ibid. 
381 “New York Deputy Mayor Criticizes Portland’s Eviction of the Occupy Portland Camp,” 
Willamette Week [staff blog]. November 17, 2011, http://www.wweek.com/portland/blog-27892-
new_york_deputy_mayor_criticizes_portlands_evictio.html.  
382 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 139, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). 
383 “Occupy Portland: Eviction of Downtown Parks Went ‘Exceptionally Well,’ Mayor Sam Adams 
Says,” The Oregonian—Oregon Live, November 14, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/11/occupy_portland_eviction_of_do.html.  
384 Ibid.; Jonathan J. Cooper and Terrence Petty, “Occupy Portland Protesters Defy Eviction Order in 
Oregon,” Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-
Wires/2011/1113/Occupy-Portland-protesters-defy-eviction-order-in-Oregon. 
385 “Occupy Portland: Eviction of Downtown Parks Went ‘Exceptionally Well,’ Mayor Sam Adams 




                                                        
 their protest a success, it was sad seeing other protesters move out earlier that day.387  
According to police, violence in the camp had gotten so bad that the media had stopped 
entering.388 
Portland police made use of a small van equipped with a loud public address 
system affixed to the roof to provide instructions to the protesters.389  When morning 
came, police continued to warn protesters that police were intent on opening the street 
(SW 3rd Ave) to vehicular traffic. At about 4:00 a.m. the media reported that there was a 
line of about 200 police officers in the street in front of the federal courthouse.390  One 
officer was injured during the operation after being struck in the leg with some sort of 
projectile.391  The repeated announcements, coupled with the main contingent of officers 
in protective gear in close proximity to the police van, drew the attention away from the 
park and a small group of about 20 or 30 protesters who were intent on remaining 
camped in the park.   
According to informal after-action reports, Portland police refrained from 
attempting an eviction of the activists when their numbers were high.392  Police opted to 
wait throughout the night until shortly after 9:30 a.m. on the morning of the fourteenth. 
Police commanders then threw a plan together to evict the remaining contingent. Portland 
police executed their plan by noon that day. Officers in riot gear moved quickly as the 
crowd’s attention was focused elsewhere. Media outlets reported that over 50 protesters 
387 “Inside Occupied Portland—Restoring Our Park,” YouTube video, posted by Occupy Portland 
Video Collective, November 14, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKts9VjLn8Q&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
388 “Video: Occupy Portland Camp Conditions Poor,” ABC News, November 13, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/video/occupy-portland-camp-conditions-poor-health-high-crime-mayor-moves-
shut-down-us-14943768.  
389 “Protesters Defend Occupy Portland from the Police,” YouTube video, posted by RT America, 
November 13, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32cxcQCAS0M&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
390 Petty, “Occupy Portland Protesters Defy Eviction Order in Oregon.” 
391 Ibid. 
392 Informal Portland Police Bureau after-action reports available from author. 
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 were arrested in the police action but noted that there was no use of “tear gas, rubber 
bullets or other so-called non-lethal weapons.”393  
Following the eviction, the city erected a hard zone of fencing around both 
Chapman and Lownsdale parks. The fencing served a two-fold purpose: it prevented the 
Occupy contingent from re-occupying the parks, and it provided the city an opportunity 
to rehabilitate the parks—a process that took four weeks and cost Portlanders in excess of 
$85,000.394 During the weeks leading up to and in the weeks and months following the 
eviction, various members who claimed affiliation to the Occupy Movement were 
detained and in some instances arrested for breaking into and “squatting” inside vacant 
homes and buildings in the Portland area.395  The Occupy-related protests continued for 
months but without an encampment and without the pre-eviction numbers. 
As opposed to following the lead of the NYPD or any other agency, in responding 
to Occupy Portland, the Portland Police Bureau employed standard community policing 
methods. They utilized skilled handpicked officers with temperaments suitable for 
dealing with the activists. Those officers, as outlined in this chapter, established 
relationships that proved beneficial to both the activists and police. While there were 
instances of violent encounters between police and activists, Portland police worked to 
minimize these occurrences, including delaying their planned eviction when activist’s 
numbers were extremely high. As I illustrate in Chapter VI about Dallas’ response, a 
softer approach or more community oriented approach was helpful to police.  
 
393 Jonathan J. Cooper and Terrence Petty, “Occupy Portland Protesters Face Showdown with Police 
over Eviction Order,” Huffington Post, November 14, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/14/occupy-portland-protesters-police_n_1090858.html. 
394 Anne Saker, “Occupy Portland: Costs to Fix Parks Now More than $85,000, City Says,” The 
Oregonian—Oregon Live, November 30, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/11/occupy_portland_costs_to_fix_p.html.  
395 Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 13, 2011 (internal document, Portland 
Police Bureau, Portland, OR). Squatting refers to illegally entering a building and living without effective 
consent of the responsible party. 
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 VI. OCCUPY DALLAS 
“To sin by silence, when we should protest, makes cowards of men.” 
Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1850–1919) 
To assist the reader in understanding how events related to Occupy Dallas occurred, Figure 8 is the timeline specific to Occupy 
Dallas. 
 
Figure 8.  Occupy Dallas Timeline 
 89 
 A. THE PROTEST 
Dallas is another example of a police department using emergent strategies to 
respond to the Occupy Movement. Dallas’ response was not without its challenges and 
opportunities for improvement—it was forced to deal with officer misconduct and 
excessive force complaints. However, in responding to those incidents with an attitude of 
respect for activists’ rights to protest and a desire for a minimal use of force, Dallas 
stands as another example similar to Portland of a city that did many things right during 
the Occupy Movement. Dallas police leaders also applied a concept, whether conscious 
of the terminology or not, of “intelligence fast failure” wherein they made decisions and 
took actions making occasional “small manageable mistakes” and correcting them along 
the way.396 
On October 6, 2011, a group of between 200 and 500 protesters gathered in Pike 
Park in Dallas, Texas and proceeded to march to the Federal Reserve Bank.397  The 
group in Pike Park grew under the watchful eye of circling news helicopters. This was 
not the first time for high profile protesting in Dallas. In 2006 and again in 2010, Dallas 
was host to immigration reform marches that drew crowds of 25,000 (2010) and 300,000 
(2006) people.398  The night prior saw sparks of violence between police and Occupy 
protesters in New York and this story made for an easy lead-in for the morning news 
stations. 399   Some protesters wore their student loan information around their necks 
illustrating the thousands of dollars they owed.   
396 “Intelligence fast failure,” as defined by Jack C. Matson, Ph.D., refers to making small 
manageable mistakes, learning from them and improving the product, process or strategy. John Ivanko, 
“Ecopreneurs Practicing ‘Intelligent Fast Failure’, like Green Biodiesel LLC,” Ecopreneurist, September 3, 
2008, http://ecopreneurist.com/2008/09/03/ecopreneurs-practicing-intelligent-fast-failure-like-green-
biodiesel-llc/. 
397 Matt Goodman, “500 Protesters ‘Occupy Dallas’ on Way to Federal Reserve,” CBS Dallas / Fort 
Worth. October 6, 2011, http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/10/06/500-protesters-occupy-dallas-on-way-to-
federal-reserve/. 
398 Mary Suhm, “OCCUPY: The Dallas Experience: The City Manager’s Perspective” (presented at 
the Institute for Law Enforcement Administration, Plano, TX, April 3, 2012). 
399 Cynthia Vega, “‘Occupy Dallas’ Protesters March through City,” WFAA, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.wfaa.com/home/related/Occupy-131218319.html. 
 90 
                                                        
 The crowd began the march from Pike Park on the west side of downtown moving 
east down Harry Hines Boulevard toward the Dallas branch of the Federal Reserve. 
Dallas police officers assigned to the Central Business District (CBD), the Gang Unit and 
some Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) officers in standard “Class A” uniforms 
helped facilitate the march by blocking traffic and moving with the crowd.400  The march 
was orderly as protesters kept to the sidewalks, carrying signs, and chanting various 
slogans.  
Protesters remained parked in front of the Fed for several hours before continuing 
east over Woodall Rodgers Freeway and into downtown. They made their way to the 
Chase Tower and then continued their march to the John F. Kennedy Memorial at on 
Main Street. The protesters left the JFK Memorial to protest in front of the Earl Cabell 
Federal Building. Once there, according to a blogger present at the march, they were 
warned that if they were to cross the street they would be arrested by federal police 
officers.401  They remained content to chant their slogans, bang their makeshift drums 
and “occupy” the parking lot to the west. At its peak that day, Dallas police estimated the 
crowd had grown from the initial 200 to somewhere close to 400 or 500 participants.402  
A Dallas Police Assistant Chief told Dallas Morning News reporters, “They’ve been 
cooperative with us. We haven’t had any issues at all. They’ve actually thanked us for 
being there.”403  Some of the protesters then moved to the historic Pioneer Plaza located 
a few blocks away next to the Dallas Convention Center complex and around the corner 
from the soon-to-be-opened Omni Hotel.404  
400 Class-A uniforms are normal uniforms issued to all Dallas police officers, as opposed to battle 
dress uniforms (BDUs) commonly associated with SWAT teams.  No officers donned riot gear at this time. 
401 rainbow4321, “Pics from OccupyDallas (10/6/11) PIC HEAVY,” Democraticunderground, 
October 7, 2011, 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=439x2078210. 
402 Brenda Case, “Hundreds Protest Corporate Greed in Occupy Dallas March,” Dallas News, 
October 6, 2011, http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20111006-hundreds-protest-corporate-
greed-in-occupy-dallas-march.ece. 
403 Ibid. 
404 “Omni Dallas Hotel Celebrates Grand Opening with $111 Rates,” Omni Hotels, October 6, 2011, 
http://www.omnihotels.com/AboutOmniHotels/Press/PressReleases/111006PressRelease.aspx. 
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 A group of about 60 protesters set up camp among the bronze cattle and, like in 
the other cities studied, erected tents and chairs along with some folding tables. Dallas 
police initially warned them about the city ordinance against sleeping in public along 
with the ordinance that establishes park closure hours.405  Activists set up medical and 
media tents along with a kitchen while supporters brought and donated food.406  Through 
the first four days of the occupation of Pioneer Park, there had been no arrests and no 
issues between police and protesters.  
Over that first weekend (similar to other Occupy groups) Occupy Dallas, using 
their encampment as a base of operations, took off through the downtown area on various 
marches. In Dallas, it was “Texas-OU weekend,” marking the annual football game 
between the Texas Longhorns and the Oklahoma Sooners held in the Cotton Bowl at the 
State Fair of Texas. Crowds in the downtown area are significantly higher during this 
weekend each year, and the Occupy contingent took advantage of the opportunity for 
increased media attention with a march through the “Deep Ellum” area of downtown.407 
Over the course of the next few days, the Dallas Occupy contingent went on 
sporadic marches through the downtown corridor or remained in camp exchanging stories 
with one another via bullhorn about their own experiences. Day 4 brought a deluge of 
rain that caused the collapse of several of the tents but many of the protesters huddled in 
their media tent to support it and keep it from succumbing to the weather.408  When the 
sun finally came out, the protesters took to draping their sleeping bags and other gear on 
the bronze sculptures in the park.  
405 According to “SEC. 32-9.1. Hours of Closure for Public Parks and Park Amenities—Dallas City 
Code,” all public parks and park amenities are closed to the public each day from 11:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. 
Accessed November 2, 2013, 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/dallas/volumei/preface?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vi
d=amlegal:dallas_tx 
406 Monika Diaz. “Economic Protesters Set up Camp in Downtown Dallas,” WFAA, October 9, 2011, 
http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/Economic-protesters-set-up-camp-in-downtown-Dallas-131434073.html.  
407 “Occupy Dallas Day 3—March through Deep Ellum,” YouTube video, posted by 
powerofyourbrains, October 10, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGOJzHEbj_U&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
408 “Occupy Dallas—Day 4 Fighting the Rain,” YouTube video, posted by powerofyourbrains, 
October 11, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGOJzHEbj_U&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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 On Monday, October 10, activists marched to City Hall seeking an audience with 
the mayor and city manager. They met the city manager in the hall and handed her a hand 
written letter asking for permission to remain in the park.409  The city granted Occupy 
Dallas a permit to remain encamped in Pioneer Plaza through Friday October 14 at 5:00 
p.m.410 A key stipulation to the permit was that proof of insurance was to be provided to 
the City of Dallas no later than 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday November 11, 2011. Protesters told 
local media that the Dallas Police Department had been cooperative and had agreed to 
give them at least 24-hours’ notice before requiring them to vacate Pioneer Plaza.411  
According to the permit issued to “Occupy Dallas” by the City of Dallas, the amount of 
the general liability insurance was to be in the amount of no less than $1,000,000.412  
With the insurance policy in place, the city would have allowed the Occupy 
contingent to put portable toilets (port-a-potties) in place in the park. Without it, they 
were restricted to local businesses, restaurants, and the nearby community college. The 
City of Dallas generally requires $500,000 of insurance for events involving over 2,500 
but less than 5,000 people.413  Dallas Observer reporter Jim Schutze interviewed some of 
the protesters and asked about their plans to get insurance. Occupy Dallas had yet to 
come close having to 2500 people in Pioneer Plaza. An Occupy protester told the Dallas 
Observer Newspaper that Occupy Dallas was taking the position that the city’s 
requirement for insurance did not apply to them in spite of the special events permit that 
called for it.414   
Tuesday evening came and went, and the Occupy Dallas contingent had failed to 
acquire an adequate insurance policy. Two local attorneys, Cameron Gray and Jonathan 
409 Jonathan Betz, “Occupy Dallas Campground Can Continue through Friday,” WFAA, October 10, 
2011, http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/Occupy-Dallas-protest-can-continue-through-Friday-
131488438.html.  
410 “Special Permit #2011-748—Occupy Dallas,” City of Dallas, TX, October 10, 2011. 
411 Betz, “Occupy Dallas Campground.” 
412 “Special Permit #2011-748—Occupy Dallas,” City of Dallas, TX, October 10, 2011. 
413 Insurance requirements can be obtained from City of Dallas Office of Special Events website 
http://www.dallasspecialevents.com/special-event/application/  
414 Jim Schutze, “City Hall Tells Dallas Occupiers to Get Insurance or Else. They’re Leaning Toward 
‘Or Else,’” Unfair Park, October 11, 2011, 
http://blogs.dallasobserver.com/unfairpark/2011/10/city_hall_tells_dallas_occupie.php. 
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 Winocour, hearing news reports of the protests and the difficulties experienced by the 
Occupy group, came to the camp and began to provide legal representation for the 
group.415  Gray, acting on behalf of the Occupy Dallas contingent, told media that he had 
worked for a significant part of the day trying to find an insurance company that would 
agree to provide the required amount of insurance but was unsuccessful. He added that 
what the city was requiring was an impossibility to obtain.416  The city advised, via a 
press release that since the Occupy Dallas contingent had failed to obtain the agreed upon 
insurance, their permit to remain in Pioneer Plaza was “no longer applicable.”417  In 
response, Cameron Gray advised that he would, on behalf of the Occupy Dallas group, be 
filing an injunction in federal court.  “We will be trying to structure a court order that will 
allow people to stay here and exercise their Constitutional rights without fear of arrest,” 
said Gray.418  
The city took no enforcement action Tuesday, and on Wednesday, Winocour and 
Gray filed for the injunction in federal court. The attorneys for both sides were involved 
in negotiations on Thursday and Gray expressed that he had “issues” with the location 
proposed for use by the city.419  The two parties met again in federal court the next day 
and worked out an agreement between Occupy Dallas and the City of Dallas. According 
to the settlement agreement, among other things, the City of Dallas agreed to:  
• Refrain from enforcing ordinances that: 1) prohibit sleeping in public or 2) 
prohibit anyone from occupying City Hall plaza, against members of 
Occupy Dallas during the period of 60 days from 5:00 a.m., October 15, 
2011 to December 14, 2011, at 5:00 p.m.; 
• Meet with representatives of Occupy Dallas within 5 days prior to 
December 14, 2011, to discuss whether additional time to occupy the 
premises will be granted; 
415 Ellen Goldberg and Ray Villeda, “Dallas Yanks Occupy Dallas Agreement,” NBC 5 Dallas-Fort 









                                                        
 • Not issue citations or arrest members of Occupy Dallas for: a) sleeping in 
the Subject Property; or b) occupying the Subject Property between the 
hours of midnight to 5:00 a.m.420 
According to the settlement agreement, among other things, Occupy Dallas 
agreed to: 
1. Maintain a copy of the List of Conditions on the site of the occupation to 
which the activists were to adhere 
2. Abide by the List of Conditions during the term of occupancy of the 
Subject Property. 
3. No tents shall be erected within, and no persons shall occupy the fenced-
area within the Subject Property. 
4. Meet with City representatives within 5 days prior to December 14, 2011, 
to discuss whether additional time to occupy the premises will be 
granted.421 
Figure 9 indicates the relative proximity from the original camp to the final camp 
and city hall.  
 
 
Figure 9.  Occupy Dallas Camps 
420 Jonathan Winocour, “Settlement Agreement between City of Dallas and Jennifer Florence 




                                                        
 As a result of the agreement, the city gave the Occupy protesters until 5:00 p.m. 
on Sunday, October 16 to vacate Pioneer Plaza and move to the designated grassy area 
behind City Hall referred to as “the horseshoe.” Gray articulated the opposing issues that 
required balance in the whole issue of the Occupy protesters: 
Two real issues or forces that need to be balanced together. One of those is 
the right of the city government to take care of its park, and the other is the 
First Amendment rights of the protesters to be able to express their 
grievances, to assemble peacefully and address their grievances to the 
government.422   
The protesters cleared Pioneer Plaza by the 5:00 p.m. Sunday deadline and took up 
residence behind City Hall.   
On October 19, a group of Occupy Dallas protesters changed protest tactics. 
According to witnesses, about a dozen protesters entered a Wal-Mart store near IH-30 
and Cockrell Hill Road in the Oak Cliff area of Dallas.423  This was a significant change 
in tactics by Occupy Dallas. Until this action, they had been relatively cooperative and 
refrained from engaging in more transgressive tactics. The protesters chanted anti-
corporate slogans as they, according to one witness, “started raising hell.”424  Dallas 
police were called but made no arrests. A protester who took part in the Wal-Mart protest 
told local media that he and his fellow protesters spent about 15 minutes “covertly 
slipping flyers into products on the shelves.” 425   This marked the beginning of 
transgressive tactics for Occupy Dallas. 
On October 24, 2011, a group of about 50 Occupy protesters converged on the 
Chase Bank branch at Main Street and Akard Street. The mission of several of them was 
to close out their bank accounts in a show of solidarity.426  Shortly after 11:00 a.m. 
422 Kevin Coakley and Ray Villeda, “Occupy Dallas Moving Sunday,” NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth, 
October 14, 2011, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Occupy-Dallas-Agrees-to-Move-131876573.html.  





426 Frank Heinz, “23 Arrested After Occupy Dallas Protest,” NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth, October 25, 
2011, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Occupy-Dallas-Mobilizes-at-Chase-Tower-132482553.html. 
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 Dallas police began receiving noise complaints and reports of protesters sitting down, 
interlocking arms, blocking the entrance to the bank, and refusing to leave.427  Officials 
with Chase Bank flanked by officers moved in and gave warnings to leave the premises 
and to quit blocking the entrance. With two assistant chiefs of police on hand directing 
the officers, Dallas police made the first arrests of the two-week-old movement when the 
protesters refused to comply.428 
In all, 23 protesters were arrested at the Chase bank and charged with criminal 
trespass, a Class B misdemeanor in the state of Texas. One officer reportedly received 
minor injuries to his leg although no one was charged related to that injury. 429  In 
response to the arrests, a group of about 20 Occupy protesters marched to the Dallas 
County Jail where they waited for several hours for the release of their fellow protesters, 
which would not come until the following day.430 
The same day, the media broke the story of a possible sexual assault of a juvenile 
inside the Occupy Dallas camp.431  Members of the Occupy Dallas camp approached 
police officers assigned to monitor the camp. The Occupy members told officers that they 
had recognized a juvenile runaway staying in their camp from a poster at a nearby 
homeless shelter. Officers located and arrested the suspect in the days following the 
reporting of the incident. Adding to the security concerns was the revelation that the 
person arrested was a “non-compliant” registered sex offender. He was charged with two 
felony counts. The reporting of the sexual assault was not unlike similar reports of sex 
crimes occurring in other Occupy camps across the country. The Occupy Dallas group 
also formed a security group, similar to that in Portland, Oregon, and called them 
427 jbpnw, “Occupy Dallas Protesters Arrested,” video post, October 26, 2011, Live Leak, 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=421_1319650332; Heinz, “23 Arrested After Occupy Dallas Protest.” 
428 Ibid. 
429 Heinz, “23 Arrested After Occupy Dallas Protest.” Texas Penal Code Section 12.22 (1-3) A Class 
B misdemeanor is punishable by a fine of up to $2,000, confinement in jail for up to 180 days, or both. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Selena Hernandez, “Police Investigating Possible Sexual Assault of Teen at Occupy Dallas” CBS 
Dallas / Fort Worth, October 24, 2011, http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/10/24/accusations-of-teen-runaway-
sexual-activity-at-occupy-dallas/. 
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 “Firewatch.”432  Reportedly, they would patrol the camp in groups of four in an effort to 
maintain security, although how the group could have stopped a sexual assault of the 
manner that had occurredin a tent with consenting participants and no loud 
confrontation between involved partieswas also not articulated.433  Additionally, Child 
Protective Services workers responding to tips from inside the camp, later seized custody 
of a 9-month old baby boy who was living with his homeless parents in the Occupy 
Dallas camp.434   
Another protester told reporters that stories about the sexual assault and the 
increase in the number of homeless living in the camp detracted from the message of the 
Occupy Movement.435  “If the law-abiders in the group will disassociate themselves from 
the law-breakers, we’ll be happy to work with the law-abiders,” Dallas’s First Assistant 
City Attorney told the Dallas Observer, “And if they don’t, our chances of continuing to 
work with the Occupy Dallas movement certainly diminish greatly.”436  This is similar to 
Portland’s warning to Occupy Portland that a small number of activists refusing to 
comply with the police would risk the loss of the city’s support. 
On November 5, there was an incident captured on video, which went viral on the 
web, involving an off-duty officer shoving a protester off an elevated concrete planter. 
This incident and the accompanying viral video increased tensions enough to prompt 
Dallas police to reassign Dallas Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) operators to 
432 Steve Stoler, “Video: Security Questioned at Occupy Dallas Protest,” ABC News, November 2, 
2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/video/security-questioned-at-occupy-dallas-protest-14867633. 
433 Note: Juveniles in Texas cannot consent to sex and therefore in spite of the victim’s willingness to 
participate with the suspect, this still constituted a crime. Hernandez, “Police Investigating Possible.” 
434 Bud Gilett and Jack Fink, “CPS Seizes Baby from ‘Occupy Dallas’ Site,” CBS Dallas / Fort 
Worth, November 4, 2011, http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/11/04/cps-seizes-baby-from-occupy-dallas-site/. 
435 Anna Merlan, “Occupy Dallas Addresses Need to Keep a Clean, Safe Camp Amidst Sexual 




                                                        
 monitor and attend to the Occupy Dallas activists.437  According to sources who wished 
to remain anonymous, the decision was based on the belief that the SWAT operators 
were more disciplined and accustomed to following very specific direction and therefore 
less likely to be drawn into a confrontation. 
In response to indications by the city that they were posturing to evict the 
activists, attorneys for Occupy Dallas sued the City of Dallas, seeking an injunction to 
enforce the settlement agreement. The group was granted a hearing on November 11. An 
Assistant City Attorney along with police, fire and code enforcement personnel inspected 
the camp.438 In a letter to protesters, among the violations in the camp that city attorneys 
asserted had occurred, they cited a “pattern of criminal conduct associated with Occupy 
Dallas.”439   
By the middle of the week, Mayor Mike Rawlings declared, “We’re giving them 
the right to stay there,” and added that safety trumped the concerns of First Amendment 
rights. He proclaimed that the Occupy Dallas camp was unsafe saying, “They need to be 
safe. There are kids in that camp; that’s not safe.”440  He went on to add, “When police 
get hurt, that’s not safe. When citizens potentially get hurt, that’s not safe. So, safety first; 
freedom of speech second.”441  Rawlings later told reporters, “The minute we start to be 
437 Scott Goldstein, “New YouTube Video Appears to Show Dallas Police Officer Shove Protester off 
Planter before His Arrest Saturday,” Crime Blog, November 11, 2011, 
http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2011/11/new-youtube-video-appears-to-s.html/; “Occupy Dallas: Officer 
Jay Hollis Assaults Union Worker,” YouTube video, posted by OccupyOps, November 5, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxcTCMwFcBA&feature=youtube_gdata_player; “Occupy Dallas: 
Officer Hollis Confronted,” YouTube video, posted by OccupyOps, November 6, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VL9mqiyPCo&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
438 Ken Kalthoff, “Occupy Dallas Hearing Set for Friday,” NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth, November 11, 
2011, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Occupy-Dallas-Responds-to-Few-of-Citys-Claims-
133561418.html. 
439 Chris Bowers, “Letter to Jonathan Winocour RE: Occupy Dallas,” NBC Bay Area, November 8, 
2011, media.nbcbayarea.com/documents/Dallas-letter-to-Occupy-Dallas.pdf. 
440 Rebecca Lopez, “Dallas Mayor to Occupy Dallas: ‘Safety First; Freedom of Speech Second,’” 




                                                        
 unsafe, we’re not going to tolerate it. And when we decide to do it, it will be done 
overnight, and it will be done quickly.”442 
As part of the agreement, Occupy protesters were not allowed to use the 
restrooms inside City Hall and were prohibited from erecting “semi-permanent” signs on 
the property. The city did agree to collect trash from the outside of the camp as long as 
protesters collected it from within the camp and deposited it in receptacles. The city also 
altered the schedule of the automatic sprinklers.443   
B. POLICE RESPONSE 
The Dallas Police Department trains its officers in “Mobile Field Force” tactics 
that incorporate both the Miami style of crowd control and a mobile tactics component 
from Southern California law enforcement.444  As previously described, the Mobile Field 
Force concept is a squad-based group tasked with crowd management. The mobile tactics 
from southern California integrate vehicles and a more rapid deployment model also 
based on squad concepts involving a sergeant and seven officers.445  In addition to field 
force movements, formations, and arrest postures, officers are trained on nomenclature 
and various types of crowds and crowd mentalities. Dallas PD officers are trained, when 
dealing with a protest scenario, to identify and make contact with leaders or organizers of 
protest groups to discuss their intentions and goals for the protests. Using negotiated 
management-facilitated police efforts to minimize violent confrontations and to promote 
cooperation and trust between police and protesters. 
The policing of Occupy Dallas was shaped by the success of policing efforts 
during the 1994 FIFA World Cup events held in the city of Dallas. The city moved to put 
senior staff level officers out in front to deal with protest leadership when possible and to 
442 Kalthoff, “Occupy Dallas Hearing Set for Friday.” 
443 Winocour, “Settlement Agreement 10-15-2011.” 
444 The Miami style or model is understood to have come out of the Miami Police Department’s 
handling of the 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) characterized by enacting and enforcing 
laws designed to maintain strict order. 
445 Dallas Police Department, Mobile Field Force Training Manual (Dallas, TX: Dallas Police 
Department, 2010). 
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 work to “cultivate a respectful relationship.”446  An important goal of city leaders all 
along was for police to exercise restraint when dealing with the Occupy Group. Tied to 
this was using the police department’s fusion center to monitor the discussions and 
information being exchanged online in public forums and social media. Finally, the city 
of Dallas never “put a face” on the story and relied on the primary public information 
office to dispense information to the media; they granted “no on-camera interviews” and 
provided only “written statements.”447   The city of Oakland also employed this approach 
with limited success.  
Central Business District officers routinely handle about 200 protests per year in 
downtown Dallas. Although in several media reports, some protesters would identify as 
Occupy Dallas organizers, police found it difficult to identify specific leaders with whom 
to negotiate. Through the first week of the occupation officers found the protesters to be 
compliant and cooperative. That cooperation would slowly degrade, as Dallas appeared 
to experience a shift in who remained in the encampment and how transgressive the 
protests became.  
Once Dallas SWAT replaced the Central Business District (CBD) officers, 
commanders began moving the officers farther and farther back from the Occupy Dallas 
camp. A deputy chief and a lieutenant began to be the primary means of communicating 
between the police and the protest group. As a result, the tensions between officers and 
activists appeared to diminish significantly.448 
C. SPATIAL CONTROL 
On the first Occupy Dallas march on October 6, 2011, Dallas police did relatively 
nothing to restrict the protesters other than to erect temporary barricades along the edge 
of the curb outside the Federal Reserve. This was to keep protesters from spilling out into 
the street. When protesters first began erecting tents in Pioneer Plaza, a police sergeant 
warned them that if they stayed past 11:00 p.m. they would be subject to arrest. City 




                                                        
 leaders chose instead to allow the encampment to continue because, according to City 
Manager Mary Suhm, they wanted to seek a balance between the protesters First 
Amendment rights and the responsibility to protect the protesters, the public and public 
property.449 Perhaps as a means to accomplish this, the city of Dallas opted to negotiate 
with the protesters and offer an alternate camping sight behind City Hall, rather than evict 
them from Pioneer Plaza outright. 
By the morning of Monday, October 17, all the occupiers had transitioned to the 
horseshoe area behind City Hall and there had been no arrests, although some had 
reportedly threatened to remain in the plaza.450  Not all the protesters had been content 
with moving to the new sight. One activist told local PBS station KERA that although he 
voted to approve the move, he did not like it.451 Because the city allocated an area large 
enough to house all the Occupy protesters, there were no issues with protesters branching 
out to other parks as had occurred in Oakland, California. 
The city had a vested interest in moving the Occupy camp from Pioneer Plaza. 
The sculpture in the plaza was a tourist attraction and its close proximity to the Dallas 
Convention center made it a draw for tourists. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the 
city wanting to move the activists was the scheduled opening of the multi-million dollar 
Omni convention center hotel—at Pioneer Plaza, the activists would have been a block 
away. Furthermore, during their stay at the plaza, some of the protesters had taken to 
washing their clothes in the stream that makes up part of the sculpture, playing their 
drums throughout the night, and disrupting the enjoyment of the plaza for tourists.452 
Throughout the first couple of weeks, CBD officers monitored the protesters 
closely and routinely blocked streets for them and directed traffic around them. During 
449 Ibid. 
450 Natalie Posgate, “Occupy Dallas Protesters Settle in Outside City Hall after Meeting Deadline 
with No Arrests,” Dallas Morning News, October 17, 2011, sec. Community, 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/downtown-dallas/headlines/20111017-occupy-dallas-
protesters-settle-in-outside-city-hall-after-meeting-deadline-with-no-arrests.ece. 
451 BJ Austin, “Occupy Dallas to Move This Weekend,” Kera News, October 14, 2011, 
http://keranews.org/post/occupy-dallas-move-weekend.  
452 Suhm, “OCCUPY: The Dallas Experience;” Coakley and Villda, “Occupy Dallas Moving 
Sunday.” 
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 their daily marches through downtown, Dallas police also refrained from restricting their 
movements, opting to assist them instead in their marching. In one video, posted on 
YouTube, of a march from police headquarters to City Hall, a group of about 40 
protesters was escorted by one squad car, a pair of bicycle officers, a paddy wagon and 
one officer on a T3 Patroller. 453  Unlike New York, which used portable temporary 
fencing to kettle or corral protesters, Dallas police took on more of an observer role 
during the group’s activities. Most every march by Occupy Dallas was spontaneous and 
with little advanced notice.  
D. SOCIAL MEDIA 
Occupy Dallas protesters, like other Occupy contingents, utilized social media to 
spread their messages. During the Occupy Dallas movement, Dallas police used a 
program called “Tweetdeck” to gather information from Occupy protesters. According to 
the program’s website, Tweetdeck is a dashboard type application that allows users to 
view and categorize multiple users’ posts in both Twitter and Facebook. 454   This 
flexibility allows police to monitor multiple hashtags. 455  The program allowed the 
department to monitor publically available information on multiple Twitter users. Fusion 
detectives would then sift through the posts and assemble the usable information into a 
report for commanders. Occupy Dallas used social media to their advantage by posting 
videos of group marches and eventual clashes with police.  
Occupy Dallas opened their own website, occupydallas.org, (since discontinued) 
on which they posted information related to their activities and current events. Occupy 
Dallas protesters also quickly created their own Facebook page and Twitter account.456 
In addition, like other Occupy camps, they opened “livestream” and “ustream” pages 
453 The “T3 Patroller” is a three-wheeled electric vehicle. It is discussed later in the section on 
“Technology.” 
454 Available at www.facebook.com 
455 A hashtag is akin to a key word that is used by Twitterers to “tweet” or post information on a 
particular topic. It uses the pound sign “#” followed by the keyword such as “#OccupyDallas for tweets 
related to the Occupy Dallas movement. 
456 Located on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/OccupyDallas and Twitter at 
https://twitter.com/OccupyDallas. 
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 from which they broadcast the General Assembly meetings and other activities live from 
camp. 457  The social media presence was something that city leadership recognized, 
respected and in some cases feared; the group’s social media capabilities were taken into 
consideration when eviction plans were conceived.458  
What Dallas, and some other cities did not take advantage of was its ability to 
broadcast its message via its own social media accounts. At the time, Dallas was in the 
process of expanding its own social media footprint. The Media Relations office of the 
police department had a dedicated “social media” officer designated to post Facebook 
updates, “tweet” information over its Twitter account, and broadcast other useful 
information via a Nixle account.459  
E. POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
On a smaller scale but in similar fashion to New York, Dallas police used wireless 
closed circuit television cameras to gather intelligence and monitor protester activity in 
the downtown area. The city of Dallas had at least 119 CCTV cameras disbursed 
throughout the downtown, uptown, and Jubilee Park areas of the city.460  Dallas police 
used the cameras to monitor Occupy members as they marched through the city streets in 
the CBD. The police department also mounted a video camera on the backside of City 
Hall in order to monitor the camp itself. This camera fed directly to the department’s 
fusion center and was available 24 hours a day. The Dallas police helicopter is also 
outfitted with television broadcast capabilities via a microwave transmitter. Commanders 
in the field could be provided with a wireless receiver/video monitor to view the images 
broadcast by the helicopter. This was used on occasion during some of the Occupy 
marches.  
457 Located at http://www.livestream.com/occupydallas and http://www.ustream.tv/channel/occupy-
dallas 
458 Suhm, “OCCUPY: The Dallas Experience.” 
459 According the service’s website, “Nixle connects public safety agencies to their residents via text, 
web and email so residents can be informed of important notifications.” “Nixle,” accessed on November 9, 
2013, http://www.nixle.com/nixle_connect.html.  
460 Scott Goldstein and Tanya Eiserer, “Dallas Police Chief Rolling Out High-tech Plans to Cut Crime 
in Hot Spots,” Dallas News, April 3, 2012, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/headlines/20120403-
dallas-police-chief-rolling-out-high-tech-plans-to-cut-crime-in-hot-spots.ece. 
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 Officers assigned to CBD had been using bicycles for over two decades. A more 
recent addition to their modes of transportation is the “T3 Patroller” electric stand-up 
vehicle (ESV). The department purchased four of the vehicles in 2009 exclusively for use 
downtown. According to the manufacturer’s website specifications for the vehicles, they 
elevate the rider nine inches off the ground for better visibility, and they have has a low 
center of gravity, a “zero-degree turning radius,” a speed of up to 20mph, and a range of 
up to 25 miles.461  Officers used these to patrol around the encampment behind City Hall 
as well as to monitor and escort the various marches through downtown. As the group 
would march down the sidewalks, Dallas police would drive or ride along side in the lane 
of traffic closest to the sidewalk blocking that lane. This allowed the protesters to spill off 
the sidewalks and into that lane further disrupting traffic and drawing attention. In 
addition to round the clock monitoring by CBD officers, Dallas police detectives 
assigned to the intelligence and fusion units monitored social media for intelligence 
information on the groups planned activities. 
Like New York and Oakland, the Dallas police department utilized one of two 
small long-range acoustic (LRAD) devices for “loud hailing” and broadcasting 
information to the group as a whole during the eviction on November 17, 2011. In 
contrast to Oakland, Dallas police did not utilize officers outfitted in riot gear or utilize 
mass dispersed chemical agents to respond to protester gatherings. The first time Dallas 
officers donned helmets and other protective equipment was during the November 17 
eviction. However, officers did utilize their oleoresin-capsicum (OC) spray on more than 
one occasion during arrest situations involving Occupy protesters.462   
F. THE EVICTION 
A substantial number of homeless had moved into the camp, possibly enticed by 
the agreement not to enforce the ordinance against sleeping in public and the donations of 
food and clothing that came on an almost daily basis.463  The protesters had already been 
461 See www.t3motion.com for more information. 
462 OC spray as it is commonly called refers to oleoresin capsicum spray, which causes lachrymation, 
an intense burning sensation and involuntary closing of the eyes. 
463 Gilett and Fink, “CPS Seizes Baby from ‘Occupy Dallas’ Site.” 
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 given notice by the city that if they did not clean up the camp and remove semi-
permanent structures, like their kitchen for example, the city would end their signed 
agreement.464  Shortly after the city sent them that warning, the police department began 
making plans for the eviction.  
In a presentation to a law enforcement ethics training class following the protests, 
the Dallas city manager acknowledged that it was out of concern for the potential of 
Occupy Dallas to use social media and technology to rapidly solicit and receive large 
numbers of supporters in very short order, that secrecy of the eviction plans was 
paramount.465 So secret were the plans that according to an anonymous source within the 
police department, police management changed the hours of the SWAT operators 
multiple times in the days leading up to the operation in order to make it less likely that 
someone could anticipate the eviction and leak the information to the media. At some 
time around 11:45 p.m. on Wednesday, November 16, 2011, City Manager Mary Suhm 
sent the Dallas City Council a letter indicating that police were in the process of evicting 
the Occupy Protesters.466  No other advanced warning was given.   
Following a very secret briefing and shortly after midnight on November 17, 
2011, a collection of between 250 and 350 Dallas police officers from various units 
established a perimeter and blocked off streets surrounding City Hall. A contingent of 
mounted officers on horseback cordoned off the City Hall side of the encampment. Dallas 
SWAT operators, supported by mounted officers, then moved into place around the 
camp. The plan called for multiple warnings to be given, ample opportunity for protesters 
to comply, and eventual physical removal by officers, if necessary, using approximately 
three officers for every protester—not including traffic and support officers.467  
464 Bowers, “Letter to Jonathan Winocour RE: Occupy Dallas.” 
465 Suhm, “OCCUPY: The Dallas Experience.” 
466 Mary Suhm, “Memo to Dallas Mayor and Dallas City Council,” NBC Bay Area, November 8, 
2011, media.nbcbayarea.com/documents/Dallas-letter-to-Occupy-Dallas.pdf. 
467 “WFAA—as It Happened: Police Raid Occupy Dallas—Time to Go Home,” YouTube video, 
posted by spydat3k0, November 17, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2swuOehg20&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
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 Dallas police began warning protesters using an LRAD system and continued 
broadcasting for over 45 minutes that the protesters were to leave the park and take their 
belongings. Any belongings left behind, they were told, would be seized and placed in 
the police property room. Police also gave them a 10-minute warning (which was actually 
15 minutes) and then a 5-minute warning (which actually ended up being 10 minutes). 
Police took a hard stance with the media and advised them that if they were in the park 
with the protesters they would be arrested right along with them. They then established a 
media staging or free press area across the street from City Hall. All the media elected to 
congregate in the area indicated by police.468 
In roughly the center of the camp, 18 protesters opted to stay and be arrested.469  
The group had formed as the officers surrounded the camp and as they waited for police, 
they professed their commitment to the Occupy cause. Shortly thereafter, Dallas police 
utilized a new tactic for them, and had a deputy chief and a lieutenant led the entry into 
the camp.470  Following after, SWAT operators wearing helmets, raid jackets and their 
BDU’s began slowly and systematically moving through the camp.471   
Dallas Police Chief David Brown would later tout this technique as a “best 
practice” he had become aware of (via the conference calls), and a tactic that they would 
use in the future.472  A councilmember, who had been critical of the eviction at the time, 
later praised both the Occupy Dallas protesters and the police department for their 
conduct during the eviction.473  According to police, camp conditions were filthy and 
468 Ibid. 
469 “Occupy Dallas,” YouTube video, posted by OccupyOps, November 17, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpxbLt9MQ7E&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
470 Suhm, “Memo to Dallas Mayor and Dallas City Council.” 
471 Dallas Police Department. “Incident Timeline,” November 17, 2011. 
472 Kent Chapline, “Dallas Police Chief Explains Move to Evict Occupy Dallas Protesters,” CBS 
Dallas / Fort Worth, November 17, 2011, http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/11/17/dallas-police-chief-explains-
move-to-evict-occupy-dallas-protesters/. 
473 Steve Thompson, “Angela Hunt Praises Occupy Dallas Protesters and Police, but Not City 
Manager,” City Hall Blog, November 17, 2011, http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2011/11/angela-hunt-
praises-occupy-dal.html/.  
 107 
                                                        
 justified the eviction.474  In spite of comments about a resurgence of Occupy Dallas, the 
camp was removed and protesters did not return to re-occupy the land again.  
Dallas was the fourth and final case examined for this thesis. Dallas provides an 
example where city and police leadership recognized the novel and emergent nature of 
the Occupy movement and made adjustments to how they normally responded to 
demonstrations. The Occupy movement was certainly not the largest protest movement in 
the history of Dallas, but it was likely one of the longest continuous protest 
demonstrations.475  Their response incorporated elements of common strategies, such as 
negotiating with protesters for an amicable resolution, coupled with novel solutions, such 
as allowing overnight camping on public property. Dallas did, as I noted, exercise 
methods of spatial control and there was conflict, occasionally violent, with activists. On 
the whole, however, Dallas, like Portland, exhibited emergent strategies of response in a 
complex adaptive environment and is a case from which some helpful conclusions can be 
drawn.  
474 Kent Chapline, “Dallas Police Chief Explains Move to Evict Occupy Dallas Protesters - CBS 
Dallas / Fort Worth,” November 17, 2011, http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/11/17/dallas-police-chief-
explains-move-to-evict-occupy-dallas-protesters/. 
475 Dallas experienced demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people marching for 
immigration reform in recent years. Monika Diaz, “Thousands March in Dallas for Immigration Reform,” 
WFAA, May 5, 2013, http://www.wfaa.com/news/politics/LIVE-BLOG-Dallas-MegaMarch-
206195111.html.  
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 VII. ANALYSIS 
In this analysis chapter, using the case study method, I identify and then compare 
and contrast eight recurring themes from the case studies. In addition, I will present the 
themes from the data in tables, which provide a visual comparison of the cities’ responses 
beside one another. In doing so, I will draw conclusions based on these comparisons and 
culminate with recommendations for police and city leaders going forward 
The goal of this research was to use the case study method to identify common 
themes in the methods of policing protest employed during the Occupy Movement in the 
fall of 2011. The circumstances of the Occupy Movement presented a unique opportunity 
to examine four large police departments and their individual responses to a protest 
movement that was alike in relative size, protest methodology and duration. National 
movements are rare, and often scholars are forced to study consecutive events (such as 
political conventions or G8 Summit meetings) to examine policing protest with similar 
circumstances. In those situations, the city leaders and police hosting the later event have 
the benefit of consultation and preparation time to adjust to new tactics or methods. With 
the Occupy Movement, city and police leaders had to do real-time communicating if they 
hoped to learn from their contemporaries—they learned lessons on justifying their actions 
from having held those calls as well.  
Unlike earlier protest movements, the Occupy Movement made use of social 
media technology in new and varied ways. Much of this remains online and accessible to 
this day. This research utilized relevant available social media—specifically YouTube 
videos from police, protesters, and third parties—in ways that had not been done 
previously. Social media video analysis (SMVA), as it is called here, provides candid 
views of protester interactions, and when juxtaposed with video recorded by police, news 
footage or other sources, it can help to more thoroughly illustrate the dynamic 
interactions occurring in that moment. It is not a replacement for standard scholarly 
research, structured interviews of involved parties, or other typical research methods. 
However, it is an interesting and disruptive technology in the aspect of social movement 
research. I say “disruptive” here to indicate that the technology has disrupted human 
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 behavior or changed it. For example, activists and police alike now often focus efforts on 
capturing events with cell phone or other cameras, and in many instances, posting those 
recordings to various social media sites.  
In order to account for the potential for inadvertent or malicious editing of video 
presented on social media, any elements that were relied upon for analysis were 
confirmed through multiple sources. For example, in comparing a clip from a particular 
protest event, I confirmed the event and other pertinent details through sources such as 
media reports of the event, video captured by multiple disconnected sources indicating 
the same thing, or official publications indicating that the social media video was in 
keeping with what occurred. 
Identified issues that emerged from the research: 
1. Lack of traditional negotiated management:  Negotiated management is a 
cooperative process by which police negotiate with protesters in an effort 
to reach agreement to achieve desired outcomes. Of note, police in all four 
cases seldom used this protest-policing method. 
2. Presence or absence of cohesive government leadership:  Cohesive 
leadership implies that leadership of the major participants/departments is 
in agreement on how to respond to the protest. In the New York, Portland, 
and Dallas cases, cohesive leadership was evident andin Dallas and 
Portlandseemed to improve the police response. In the Oakland cases, it 
was noticeably absent and contributed to significant problems with police 
response. 
3. Timing of evictions: Issues were raised on whether or not the timing of the 
evictions of the various Occupy camps occurred as part of a coordinated 
effort on the part of the government to end the Occupy movement at once. 
At this point, however, there is insufficient evidence to conclude 
definitively one way or the other. 
4. Universal degradation of camp conditions / violence in camp: Media and 
governmental leaders remarked on how the conditions in the camps 
became increasingly unhealthy and concerning. This likely shaped public 
perceptions about the movement, and in some instances, the government 
contributed to the degrading conditions by refusing to allow toilets, among 
other things.  
5. Control of space by the government: Issues regarding how the government 
dictates rules and enforces laws related to the general public’s access to 
“public spaces” is a recurring concern as it relates to public expression of 
dissent.  
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 6. Police militarization and tactics: Police militarization was evident in the 
Oakland case. The research was insufficient to adequately determine 
whether there were more entrenched militarization effects occurring such 
as long-term effects on police culture related to hiring officers with 
military experience. More study in this area is warranted. 
7. Social media use: Both police and activists used social media sites in new 
and disruptive ways. Research found that activists were most often ahead 
of police in this area and used it more to their advantage. Police monitored 
varying amounts of social media and neglected opportunities to better 
distribute their “message” to the public.  
8. “Emergent practice” in complex adaptive system: As a “sense-making” 
model, the Cynefin framework provides an excellent means of analyzing 
and understanding how decisions are made when dealing with the fluidity 
and dynamic nature of large protest movements. By applying this 
framework to the responses, patterns are visible that gives an indication as 
to how strategic decisions were made and how they can be improved in 
the future.  
Police and protester alike have goals in mind when they engage in or respond to 
protest. For protesters, the goal may be to engage in civil disobedience to the point of 
being arrested as to generate attention for their cause. For police, the desired result is 
most often that there will be a voluntary compliance with the law and order is maintained. 
In cases where protesters want to be arrested and are willing to negotiate with police, the 
police are generally willing to accommodate their request. Similar to Seattle in 1999, 
however, when protesters refuse to engage in negotiated management or where in New 
York during the Occupy Movement, the police often refused to engage in negotiations, 
other avenues of enforcement and protest emerge. Much of the challenge in responding to 
these kinds of protests is that predicting an outcome for an input of control is difficult at 
best. Following my analysis of the data in the cases, in Chapter VIII, I will illustrate how 
using the Cynefin framework can be useful is developing and implementing a strategy for 
large and small departments alike. 
A. IDENTIFIED THEMES 
Each of the studied cities’ leadership had a vision of a “desired outcome” when 
the Occupy Movement began, with perhaps the exception of Oakland, California. Each 
city expressed the same general sentiment that their goal was to facilitate both the 
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 expression of the protesters’ First Amendment rights while maintaining order and safety 
of the public at large. This suggests that at least at the beginning of the movement, the 
four studied cities subscribed, at least, to the values of the negotiated management 
philosophy. McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy hold that negotiated management is 
structured around the tenant of the rights to free speech and the act of cooperative 
negotiation with police to avoid conflict.476 What played out in their interactions tended 
to support the conclusion that some departments abandoned the idea of negotiating a 
peaceful demonstration. 
The longer the protests and encampments continued, the more the police 
departments began downplayed First Amendment issues and instead began to stress the 
safety aspect of the ongoing movement. For example, recall that Dallas initially 
negotiated with protesters and agreed to cease enforcement of certain ordinances, such as 
sleeping in public and the park closure hours specifically for the Occupy protesters. The 
evolution of each city’s message was very similar. Ultimately, in Dallas, this culminated 
with Mayor Mike Rawlings publically stating that safety came before the Constitutional 
rights of the citizens just before the Dallas police evicted the protesters.477  In New York, 
Mayor Bloomberg also cited safety concerns prior to the eviction of protesters from 
Zuccotti Park. In fact, all of the cities studied expressed concerns regarding the 
conditions of their respective encampments, which, according to police necessitated the 
protesters be removed. Also in each city this resulted in a use of force above the level of 
verbal direction and resulted in the arrest of a varying number of protesters.  
B. IDENTIFIED ISSUES 
1. Lack of Traditional Negotiated Management 
At the start of the Occupy Movement, each of the cities studied had policies in 
place that tended toward a negotiated management philosophy. For example, Dallas 
police were able to conduct limited negotiations with attorneys who worked pro bono for 
476 Clark McPhail, David Schweingruber, and John McCarthy, “Policing Protest in the United 
States:1960-1995,” in Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, ed. 
Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 49–69 
477 Lopez, “Dallas Mayor to Occupy Dallas.” 
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 the Occupy protesters. This was carried out in a legal forum and not at all like typical 
“negotiated management” of protests.478  When Dallas tried to employ the negotiated 
management techniques, they found that the group had little cohesive leadership with 
which to negotiate. There were various individuals who vied to speak for the group but 
no universally recognized leader or organizer that a majority would follow. Police actions 
toward negotiated management are (at least) two-fold, according to della Porta and 
others.479  They assert that negotiated management would provide police with the ability 
to “minimize public disorder” and also provide police with some degree of 
“predictability” as to the actions of the protesters.480 
As noted in Table 1, none of the departments utilized a traditional negotiated 
management philosophy when dealing with the Occupy protesters. As discussed below, 
Dallas, Oakland, and Portland utilized a hybrid form of response. By “hybrid,” I am 
referring to either attempting negotiations unsuccessfully or negotiating in rare instances 
but ultimately taking direct action that was in keeping with a negotiated outcome. In what 
I what I describe as a chaotic response, Oakland had times where city leaders attempted 
to negotiate with members of the movement but were unsuccessful.481 In New York City, 
police utilized the tactics of strategic incapacitation as evidenced when they exercised 
arbitrary control over marches by dictating instead of negotiating and closing streets or 
sidewalks with no notice. Dallas and Portland both attempted negotiations and, in the 
case of Dallas, entered into a negotiated settlement. Dallas however also, some could 
478 Typical negotiated management takes place on site at the protest and is between police leaders and 
protest leaders.  Rarely in my experience does the negotiation take place as part of a legal proceeding or 
culminate in a settlement agreement.  
479 Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations 
in Western Democracies (University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis, MN and London, 1998); P.A.J. 
Waddington, “Controlling Protest in Contemporary Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Policing 
Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, ed. Donatella della Porta and 
Herbert Reiter (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); McPhail, Schweingruber, and 
McCarthy, “Policing Protest in the United States:1960–1995.” 
480 Ibid. 
481 Terry Collins, “Oakland Mayor Jean Quan Renews Appeals To Occupy Movement,” Huffington 
Post, November 9, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/09/oakland-mayor-jean-quan-occupy-
protesters_n_1084545.html; Shoshana Walter, “Quan Chased from Occupy Oakland Rally: Mayor Takes 
Refuge in City Hall after Attempting to Speak; New Tent City Begins to Take Shape,” The Bay Citizen, 
October 28, 2011, https://www.baycitizen.org/news/occupy-movement/quan-shouted-down-occupy-
oakland/?page=2.  
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 argue, used elements of strategic incapacitation insomuch as they utilized surveillance 
technologies to monitor the group camped behind City Hall. For these reasons, I have 
characterized their approach more in keeping with a hybrid of techniques. Likewise, 
Portland used elements of negotiated management and some components of escalated 
force when refusing to allow the expansion to Jamison Square. Because of their “softer” 
approach and use of community policing strategies, Portland’s management approach 
differs significantly from that of Oakland and New York.  
 
Table 1.   Management Approaches 
 
 
In spite of the recurring general assembly meetings held in each city, these groups 
were ineffectual for the police agenda of negotiations. Their direct-democracy would 
grind to a halt. In Portland for example, tangential issues often derailed any hope of a 
discussion with any continuity.482  When engaging in negotiated management of protests, 
police rely on a central figure or cadre who commands some sort of allegiance from the 
larger group and who can influence the group’s action consistent with the negotiated 
agreement. A group, such as the General Assembly, logistically had no way of 
negotiating anything in the kind of real-time that police needed.   While Portland did have 
some limited success in establishing relationships with some of the individuals in camp 
and on the protesters’ volunteer in-camp security, any negotiations for the whole group 
were impossible because no one or two people could speak with any authority for the 
482 “2011-10-12 P1080016 Occupy Portland General Assembly,” YouTube video, posted by 
PDXSquared, October 14, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tQ6jNkSLmEE&feature=youtube_gdata_player.  
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 group. Interviews of protesters in videos on YouTube tend to confirm this with no 
references to any protest leaders or organizers, yet repeated discussions of a group 
consensus.  
As could be seen in the October 1 protest on the Brooklyn Bridge, a number of 
NYPD supervisors were present at the edge of the bridge and gave warnings to protesters 
that marching on the bridge would not be permitted. Although there was a cluster of 
protesters front and center, no one appeared to be leading the group of protesters.483  An 
additional example of the NYPD refusing to negotiate and instead dictate orders to the 
activists occurred when in at least one instance at Washington Square Park, New York 
police refused to negotiate with protesters or observers. 484  Vitale contends that this 
refusal to negotiate stems from the department’s movement to a “broken windows” 
approach to policing. 485   He points to the department’s unwillingness to tolerate 
disruption of normalcy by protesters as directly related to the idea of the “broken 
windows” theory of policing and police intolerance of minor infractions. I agree that 
there are similarities in that minor violations are addressed in broken windows styles of 
policing and that the NYPD has shown evidence of intolerance of disruptive protest. 
However, I believe that this more closely stems from the NYPD’s response to terrorist 
attacks and is in keeping with a unilateral approach to protecting New York that is 
indifferent to critics and, in some instances, its very citizens.   
Consider the creation of the International Liaison Unit that sends NYPD 
detectives overseas to deal directly with foreign agencies for the purpose of intelligence 
collection. John G. Comiskey pointed out that the upper echelon of the NYPD knew the 
creation would “irritate CIA, FBI and the Department of State in one fell swoop.”486  
483 Unknown, March on Brooklyn Bridge—10/1/2011. 
484 MacLean, Glenn, and Knuckey, “Supressing Protest.” 
485 “Broken windows” refers to a theory posited by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in their 
article of the same name. The theory is that small damage, and allowed to go unrepaired, will engender 
greater and more detrimental damage. “Damage” is also interchanged with crime, meaning that if police 
allow minor violations to go unaddressed then more serious crimes will follow. Vitale, “From Negotiated 
Management to Command and Control,” 296. 
486 John Grattan Comiskey, “Effective State, Local, and Tribal Police Intelligence the New York City 
Police Department’s Intelligence Enterprise-a Smart Practice” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 15.  
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 More recently the long practice of “stop and frisk” was deemed unconstitutional, yet 
Police Commissioner Ray Kelly denounced critics of the policy as “full of sh--.”487  This 
has been the pattern of New York since the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993. 
Oakland’s attempts at negotiation were also not in keeping with traditional 
negotiated management. In spite of two councilmembers joining the occupation for two 
days, there was no true negotiation occurring during the encampment. Each department 
studied expressed difficulty in identifying leaders with whom to negotiate. Later during 
the occupation, Mayor Quan and other councilmembers were shouted down when they 
tried to present ideas to Occupy Oakland. In many instances, the Occupy Oakland group 
themselves dictated to police, by their actions, what was going to occur. Consider when 
Occupy Oakland expanded their camp to nearby Snow Park. Police made no attempts to 
negotiate with the protesters and instead made threats, threats to evict on which police 
never followed up until they forcibly evicted all occupiers (for the first time) on October 
25. Even then, there was no negotiation, only a brief warning before officers moved on 
the camp in force.  
Negotiation with the Occupy group was difficult for even those associated with 
them. The attorney for Occupy Dallas had challenges dealing with the group because it 
had no central leadership. He also recognized that police, likewise, had trouble 
identifying any one central leadership individual or cadre with whom to negotiate. Dallas 
did have success in reaching an agreement to move the Occupy Dallas group from its 
original encampment in Pioneer Plaza to the area behind City Hall. This was not 
insignificant for the city of Dallas, given that Pioneer Plaza is immediately adjacent to the 
convention center and a popular tourist attraction for people visiting downtown Dallas. 
Consider also that the city of Dallas was in the final stages of completing construction on 
the Omni Hotel also immediately adjacent to the Dallas Convention Center and a block 
from Pioneer Plaza. The grand opening event was scheduled for early November and city 
leaders were faced with a national protest movement camped in a prominent park with 
487 Hamilton Nolan, “Ray Kelly: Stop-and-Frisk Critics ‘Absolutely’ Full of Shit,” Playboy, 
November 22, 2013, http://playboysfw.kinja.com/ray-kelly-on-stop-and-frisk-fighting-crime-and-combati-
1469161348/1469716157/@hamilton_nolan.  
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 their dirty laundry hanging on bronze sculptures around the corner from a brand new 
multi-million dollar hotel. They made no mention of this and local media did not report 
on any motivation tied to the grand opening on the part of the city. Discussion within the 
police department, however, made it clear that this reason was among the most important 
for moving the protesters. Advantages to the city for this move translated directly to the 
issue of control of space by the government. Protesters also later declined to negotiate 
during the incident at the Chase Bank where the protesters blockaded the entrance to the 
bank. Although 23 protesters had been intent on being arrested, there was no negotiation 
with police to accommodate their wishes.  
Portland Police Bureau had perhaps the closest thing to a traditional negotiated 
management approach than any of the cities involved. With their handpicked officers 
building relationships with protesters, they were able to work with protester volunteers 
acting as internal security. When protesters attempted to expand their camp to Jamison 
Square on October 30, 2011, there was no negotiation, in spite of officers warning 
protesters that to attempt this expansion would risk the city’s cooperation and permission 
to occupy Chapman and Lownsdale squares.  
The issue of negotiation is not one-sided, and any discussion must address the 
willingness of both government and protester to engage in negotiation. Della Porta points 
out in her studies of protest that “underlying [differences in various protests] was a family 
resemblance between protester and police behavior…” meaning that what one group did, 
affected the other; she calls this “interactive diffusion.” 488   Police cannot hope to 
abandon negotiation and expect to reach a cooperative or empowering relationship with 
protesters any more than protesters can expect the police to tolerate a refusal of protesters 
to obey the law and utilize force when necessary. 
Just as protester tactics are adopted and abandoned, perhaps even more quickly 
with the infusion of social media, so too are police tactics “diffused” from one generation 
of officers to another and one department to another. During the Occupy Movement, a 
number of cities took part in the Police Executive Research Forum’s-sponsored 
488 della Porta and Tarrow, “Interactive Diffusion,” 122. 
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 conference calls. The calls themselves were not without controversy. As a result, there 
were multiple follow up stories that involved PERF and various jurisdictions defending 
their communications and denouncing them as collusion or conspiracy.489  This diffusion 
of tactics is only increased or made more rapid with the advent of social media and 
technology.   
2. Presence or Absence of Cohesive Governmental Leadership 
Cohesive governmental leadership is not indicative of complete agreement by all 
parties involved. Cohesive governmental leadership indicates that a relatively consistent 
message came from the primary departments and divisions within a respective city 
relating to its response to the Occupy movement.  
Table 2 provides a visual comparison of the identified theme of the presence or 
lack of cohesive leadership. Only in the Oakland case was there multiple indicators that a 
lack of cohesive city leadership existed. In the cases of Dallas, Portland, and New York, 
the respective leaders of both the police departments and city government were in synch 
on the response to the Occupy Movement.  
 
Table 2.   Leadership Dynamic 
489 Mark Stout. “The Uproar over PERF: Occupy Controlling the Information Environment,” 
November 21, 2011, On War and Words, acchttp://onwarandwords.wordpress.com/2011/11/21/the-uproar-
over-perf-occupy-controlling-the-information-environment/; Khadijah Britton, “A PERF-Ect Storm,” The 
Phoenix, November 26, 2011, http://thephoenix.com/Boston/news/130305-perf-ect-storm/.  
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 Analysis of the New York response to the Occupy Movement indicated that there 
was at least the appearance of cohesion and unity of philosophy between police and the 
mayor’s office. The NYPD consistently applied the tactics of strategic incapacitation 
throughout the Occupy Movement; however, statements to the public espoused the 
support of the activists’ First Amendment rights. This appeared duplicitous in light of the 
tactics employed by the NYPD.490 
Similar to New York, in terms of cohesion only, the city of Dallas presented a 
unified front throughout the occupation. Chief David Brown met regularly with Mary 
Suhm, the Dallas City Manager, to discuss the direction of both the city of Dallas and the 
police department relative to the Occupy protesters. The city manager opted not to “put a 
face” on the city’s response and gave no on-camera interviews regarding their handling 
of the protest. Instead, she empowered the main city of Dallas Public Information Officer 
(PIO) to handle all media statements regarding the city and Occupy Dallas. This 
coincided with the city’s typical policy of having the PIO handle regular city information 
and media requests. In addition, the police department relied on its own media relations 
office (MRO) to speak specifically for police department issues. Both the PIO and the 
MRO worked cooperatively and only provided written responses to media inquiries, 
avoiding potential problems related to making public statements on camera. According to 
Suhm, this was a strategic move.491  
Additional evidence of the Chief of Police and Dallas city manager working 
together was clear in the planning leading up to the eviction. The city manager told no 
one on the City Council of the plans to evict the Occupy contingent until about 15 
minutes before the planned operation. As noted in Chapter VI, not even the SWAT 
operators tasked with the eviction knew what was coming that week as their schedule had 
been manipulated unlike any time previously. A graphic from the Dallas city manager’s 
after-action presentation illustrates that the City Manager’s Office and the police 
490 Raymond Vasvari, “Occupying the First Amendment,” Slate, November 15, 2011, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/occupy_wall_street_police_raid_w
hat_zuccotti_park_teaches_us_about_public_spaces_and_citizen_protest.html. 
491 Suhm, “OCCUPY: The Dallas Experience.” 
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 department were at the center of a citywide organization set on responding to the protests 
(see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10.  City of Dallas Unified Command 
Occupy Portland, similar to the response from the city of Dallas, was relatively 
consistent and cohesive throughout the occupation.492  Initially, the police bureau advised 
the mayor and council against allowing the protesters to maintain their growing 
encampment in Chapman and Lownsdale parks. Mayor Adams told protesters from the 
start that they would not be allowed to expand their camp and held to this on October 30, 
2011 at an attempted expansion at Jamison Square. Portland Police again held firm on the 
prohibition on expansion on November 1, 2011 when, at the request of the Federal 
Protective Service, they arrested 10 protesters were trying to expand their encampment to 
Terry Schrunk Plaza.  
As in at least one use of force incident in Dallas, the transgressive acts cited by 
the city included one that was promulgated by an off-duty officer using inappropriate 
492 It should be noted that this research stopped at the initial eviction of Occupy Portland.  Protesters 
continued to protest in the city of Portland in the following weeks and months including some activity as of 
the writing of this thesis. 
City Manager's Office / Dallas Police Department 
Dallas Fire Rescue City Attorney's Office 
Code Compliance 
Sanitation Convention & Event Services 
Public Information Office 
Streets 
DPD Crisis Intervention 
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 force against a protester.493  This action set off a chain reaction, culminating in arrests of 
multiple persons. This, coupled with protesters obstructing the entry to the Chase Bank 
on October 24, was cited by the city as a reason for the eviction of protesters. These 
conflicting accounts and motives give rise to Kelman’s discussion of legitimacy and 
apply to how citizens view the legitimacy of their respective police department. Kelman 
points out that the “influence in authority situations,” in this case the police being the 
authority “falls into the domain of obligation: people accept influence insofar as they see 
the influencing agent as having the right to make certain demands.”494  
The success of these “demands” that Kellman alludes to, as they related to 
protester behavior, is at least in part dependent upon the perceived legitimacy of the 
authority of the police. As their legitimacy is compromised, with the inappropriate act of 
the off-duty officer, the legitimacy of the protesters is increased. Kelman also notes, 
“Legitimization and deligitimization processes generally operate in tandem.” 495  The 
sooner the police acknowledge the wrongdoing and take appropriate disciplinary action, 
the sooner they begin to repair the damage. Dallas’s response appears to have been timely 
in that there was not an overwhelming public outcry. In Oakland, however, police evicted 
protesters only to have Mayor Quan allow them to return as before. This countermanding 
of the police, coupled with the violent and excessive force used by officers during follow-
up protests, arguably served to reduce the perceived legitimacy of the Oakland officers 
even further.   
In Dallas, the city initially imposed acquiring a $1,000,000 dollar insurance policy 
as a condition of allowing Occupy Dallas to remain encamped. As a result, it normalized 
an additional requirement to the expression of free speech while at the same time 
positioning the activists to be delegitimized if they failed to obtain the insurance. 
Additionally, the city attached the potential for criminalizing the activists’ rights to free 
speech. 
493 Goldstein, “New YouTube Video Appears to Show Dallas.” 
494 Kelman, “Reflections on Social and Psychological Processes,”54. 
495 Ibid. 
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 Statements released, tweeted, and posted to the department’s Facebook page were 
in keeping with the city’s message of tolerance of protest without expansion or violence. 
Another affirmation that Mayor Adams was ultimately directing operations and that the 
police bureau was responsive was during the October 1 action in Jamison Park. Adams 
was clearly visible circling the park and indicated through a tweet that he was there to 
“keep the peace.”496  He made it clear that the decision to enforce park hours was his. 
Police Chief Mike Reece expressed his “[disappointment that] officers had to make 
arrests, he said his department would continue to use the same strategy in monitoring the 
protest.497  Like Dallas, Portland police held regular meetings with both the mayor and 
the city council to brief them on the protest.  
Where cohesion and a unity of purpose seemed to be consistent in the other cities, 
the same cannot be said of the Oakland response to the Occupy movement. 
Understanding that the Occupy Wall Street encampment had been going on for about a 
month when the Occupy Oakland group first marched is important. According to internal 
emails, obtained by Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted by Daniel 
Willis and Thomas Peale of the Bay Area News Group, Oakland officials had about a 
week’s notice of a planned Occupy Oakland protest in which to address “what if…” 
scenarios.498  In fact, as mentioned, when protesters marched and began to set up camp, 
Oakland police officers took no action and would later voice their confusion with Mayor 
Quan’s approach to the Occupy Movement.499  Further confusing to police would have 
been the inclusion of two standing city councilmembers into the number of protesters 
occupying the square.500  This would have put any officer taking enforcement action on 
them in an unenviable position and would have almost certainly resulted in a newsworthy 
496 Hoffman and Mesh, “Pearl District Occupation Ends.” 
497 Kate Mather, “Occupy Portland: City Won’t Change Its Approach; Protesters Intend to Keep up 
Their Cause,” The Oregonian—Oregon Live, October 30, 2011, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2011/10/occupy_portland_city_wont_chan.html 
498 Willis and Peele, “In Their Own Words;” Christopher Bolton (Oakland Police Department), “Ally 
Rasmussen from KTVU Calling Re How Long We Are Going to Allow Protesters to Stay in the Plaza,” 
email to Susan Piper (City of Oakland) and Karen Boyd (City of Oakland), October 12, 2011.  
499 Raja, “Open Letter from OPA.” 
500 Maher, “Rats and Drugs Mar Occupy Oakland.” 
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 or high profile incident. Like Dallas, Oakland attempted to refrain from “putting a face” 
on the city’s response so as “not to make the story bigger or more attractive to air.”501  
To accomplish this, city leaders discussed not providing voice or on-camera 
statements.502 
The Oakland Police Department’s Chief of Staff, Christopher Bolton, in an email 
to the mayor’s and the city’s communications managers among others, was nonspecific 
about how the police department intended to handle the protesters saying, “We will 
continue to weigh the need to cite citizens for minor infractions against their overall need 
and right to assemble peacefully in a public place.”503  This gave protesters no assurances 
that they would be allowed to stay and conceivably contributed to any anxiety felt by 
protesters in dealing with the police. This all compounded with the recent protests 
surrounding Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) response to protests over the officer-
involved shootings wherein they shut down cellular telephone service at one of its 
stations to prevent protesters from communicating and coordinating their movements.504  
The disharmony at the upper echelons of the City of Oakland regarding the 
Occupy protesters was further exacerbated when Chief Howard Jordan elected to evict 
the protesters on October 25, 2011, while Mayor Quan was unaware and out of town. 
Even if Mayor Quan was unaware of the planned eviction, it appears that the Occupy 
group was more informed. According to an email from Harry Hamilton of the 
Community and Economic Development Agency with the City of Oakland to Karen 
Boyd and Susan Piper, Communications Director and Manager respectively of the city of 
Oakland, on October 24, 2011, the Occupy Oakland website had an alert saying: 
A police raid of Oscar Grant Plaza is very likely this week. Text 
‘bayaction’ to 41411 to get on the emergency text alert system of 
501 Willis and Peele, “In Their Own Words;” Bolton, “Ally Rasmussen from KTVU Calling.” 
502 Ibid. 
503 Willis and Peele, “In Their Own Words.” Advisory on city of Oakland letterhead attached to an 
email from Communications Director Karen Boyd with city of Oakland to “Announcements.” 
504 Rachel Lackert, “BART Cell Phone Service Shutdown: Time for a Virtual Forum,” Fed. Comm. 
LJ 64 (2011): 577. 
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 #occupyoakland. In the event of an attempted police eviction, please alert 
all your friends and swarm downtown Oakland ASAP!505 
In a prepared statement to be released to the media from the mayor’s office 
following the raid, Mayor Quan praised the work of police and cited sanitary conditions 
and ongoing vandalism as contributing to the decision to evict the protesters.506  Within 
two days of the eviction, Mayor Quan was denounced as “pulling a 180” by calling for a 
“minimum police presence” and allowing “nonviolent protesters to re-occupy Frank 
Ogawa Plaza.”507  In the wake of the indecision and contradictions, members of the 
mayor’s staff resigned—a clear indication that not everyone with the city was supportive 
of the decisions being made. The city of Oakland was unique among the cases studied in 
the resignation of executives in protest to methods used in response to the Occupy 
protesters.  
Other than the resultant violent encounters between police and activists following 
the first eviction, the resignation of staff in this manner was perhaps the clearest example 
of disjointed leadership in the Oakland case. City staffers occasionally resign, but to have 
multiple staffers resign during a protest is unprecedented and a significant indicator that 
leadership in the city of Oakland was sufficiently fractured to the point of being incapable 
of constructively responding to the ongoing protest. In none of the other cases was there 
resignation in protest, let alone multiple resignations.  
The change in staffing coupled with the lack of cohesion can be argued to have 
exacerbated the potential for violent interactions. As della Porta noted, “shifts in the 
policing of protest—or techniques of repression—have often been traced to changes in 
the makeup of the government.”508 
505 Willis and Peele, “In Their Own Words.” Email from Harry Hamilton (City of Oakland) to Karen 
Boyd and Susan Piper (City of Oakland). 
506 Quan. “Statement for Media Regarding Occupy Oakland Eviction.” 
507 Shoshana Walter, “Quan under Attack, Changes Course on Occupy Oakland,” The Bay Citizen, 
October 27, 2011, https://www.baycitizen.org/news/occupy-movement/quan-shunned-reverses-occupy-ban/ 
508 Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative 
Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 74. 
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 3. Timing of Evictions 
In Figure 11, I’ve illustrated the timing of eviction events in the four studied 
cities. This infographic displays the relative short period of time that it took for all four 
cities to evict their Occupy activists relative to each other. The graphic also illustrates the 
relative time lapse between the PERF conference calls and the final eviction of the 
encampments. 
 
Figure 11.  Occupy Eviction Events Calendar 
The four cities studied evicted their respective Occupy contingents within a three-
day time period beginning on November 14, 2011. Oakland Mayor Jean Quan was one of 
the first credited with the revelation that various (18 according to her) cities had 
participated in a conference call regarding Occupy protest management.509 The NYPD 
did postpone a planned cleanup on October 14, 2011, which was to come one day after 
509 “After Ouster, Occupy Oakland Protesters Return” (interview with Jean Quan), The Take Away, 
November 15, 2011, http://www.thetakeaway.org/2011/nov/15/after-ouster-occupy-oakland-protesters-
return/?utm_source=sharedUrl&utm_media=metatag&utm_campaign=sharedUrl.  
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 the first U.S. Conference of Mayors call. There were no direct indications that this 
postponement was in response to the call and, in fact, Bloomberg’s spokesperson denied 
his involvement in any of the calls.510  Portland Police Chief Michael Reese contacted 
Wexler and requested that they facilitate a second conference call, which was held 
November 4, 2011. Dallas, Portland, and an undetermined number of cities took part.   
Media accounts of the timing of the Occupy Wall Street eviction gave little to no 
mention of any kind of coordination between NYPD and other agencies—local or 
federal. Reasoning surrounded a reported increase in illness and medical issues with 
protesters in camp.511  Coupled with this was the idea of perception of strength and as 
with Dallas, legitimacy of the mayor’s office in the timing. The New York post cites 
increasing concern of Mayor Bloomberg being perceived as weak in the wake of the 
second Occupy Oakland eviction on November 14.512  The post article also suggests that 
there was pressure from the financial centers of the city to evict the protesters especially 
in light of a report that they were going to march on the financial district.513   
Analysis of the timing seems to indicate that while there may have been no direct 
coordination of the timing of the evictions, the evictions all occurred within a very few 
days following the calls. Given that the cities studied claimed to be experiencing many of 
the same group dynamics and camp conditions, it is possible that the conference calls 
provided the final impetus for the respective city leaders to decide to act. It is also 
possible that there was a contagion of effort that occurred. As city and police leaders saw 
other cities evicting their Occupy activists, they may have felt inclined to allow police to 
move ahead with eviction plans of their own. 
Once Oakland had its violent eviction in late October, this was a catalyst for other 
cities to move to evict their groups. Considering the rapid transmission of information via 
510 Johnson, “Build Up To A Raid.” 
511 Michelle Miller, “NYC Police Clear ‘Occupy Wall St’ Camp,” CBS News, November 15, 2011, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nyc-police-clear-occupy-wall-st-camp/; Bloomberg, “Bloomberg Statement 
on Occupy Eviction.” 




                                                        
 social media and the amount of media attention that Oakland garnered with its violent 
confrontations, other cities likely wanted to act to remove the potential of their 
encampments from becoming more fortified and learning from the others on how best to 
resist police. One should not discount the opportunity for the cities’ leadership to take 
advantage of the distraction provided by multiple evictions being carried out at about the 
same general time. Instead of being the national focus as the one city to evict its 
encampment, now there were multiple evictions occurring at approximately the same 
time and the a potential herd mentality seems likely.  
Each of the studied cities reportedly dealt with unsanitary conditions in camp, an 
increase in the homeless population in camp and violence in or immediately around the 
encampment. Analysis of New York did not indicate a noticeable increase in 
transgressive actions by protesters. In the other studied cities, there was a reported 
increase in transgressive acts committed by the protesters, generally by a reported refusal 
to abide by police instructions and commission of illegal acts. 
An email sent to representatives in various Federal Protective Service regions 
from Chief Intelligence Branch of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, instructing 
the divisions to all report on the state of the Occupy Movement protests in their regions, 
indicated that the “director” (unclear whether this was the DHS Director Janet Napolitano 
or the FPS Director L. Eric Patterson) was “very interested in the Movement and how it 
may affect Federal facilities.” 514   The official message being pushed out from 
Washington was one of supporting local agencies in protecting federal locations and 
assets.515 
Based on the speed of the dissemination of information on mainstream and social 
media, there at least appears to be something coordinated about the timing of the eviction 
of the Occupy encampments. That is not to say that there was a conscious effort or 
conscious coordination on the part of any of the involved cities to do so. To attempt to 
514 Partnership for Civil Justice Fund. “The Crackdown on the Occupy Movement,” 9, accessed 
December 16, 2013, http://www.justiceonline.org/docs/dhs-occupy-documents-4-pt1.pdf. 
515 This is in keeping with the message often heard by local and state law enforcement from their 
federal counterparts excepting in cases where federal laws are the most often enforced (i.e., money 
laundering, bank robbery, immigration violations etc…)   
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 come closer to any reliable explanation or give cause for the timing will require further 
study. 
4. Universal Degradation of Camp Conditions / Violence in Camp 
Another issue identified in this research was the universal consistency in which 
municipalities studied here and the media portrayed the camps as health and safety 
hazards. Furthermore, in some cases, municipalities engaged in actions that exacerbated 
health and safety concerns. Since these encampments were in major metropolitan areas 
there had never been an expectation on the part of the cities that a substantial group 
would ever camp overnight. In fact, all of the cities had some form of ordinance 
governing camping or sleeping in public places. Given that camping was an unintended 
activity on the part of architects and designers, the rigors of camping behavior on the 
public spaces took their toll. 
Table 3 illustrates that each of the studied cities, at one time or another, cited 
sanitation issues, problem with an increase in the homeless populations in their Occupy 
encampments, and incidents of violence in the camps. These issues were repeated by city 
leaders as reasons for evicting the activists as well in each of the cases.  
 
Table 3.   Degradation of Camp Conditions 
Most of the camps examined had either very limited or no access to toilet 
facilities. Even in Dallas, where they were directly behind City Hall and its public 
restrooms, city leaders had insisted on and got the protesters to agree to a prohibition on 
the use of the restroom facilities in the building. Another ambiguity on which protesters 
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 tried to capitalize through later legal appeal was identification of individuals as being part 
of the movement (as opposed to the general public) and therefore prohibited from using 
the restrooms. There was no mechanism in place by the city to differentiate between a 
citizen not “occupying” City Hall property and one who was. Waste collection was 
agreed upon between the Occupy Dallas contingent and the City of Dallas. However, the 
trash needed to be placed in the receptacles, which were off the property and were 
required to be provided by the Occupy contingent, or the city would refuse to pick it up. 
Multiple news outlets reported (and video from inside the various camps indicated) less 
than sanitary conditions, and as mentioned previously, coughing could be heard in the 
camps at nighttime.516   
It is certainly possible that with the discussion of evictions and the degrading 
conditions being experienced in camp, the various city and police leaders felt a greater 
impetus for taking action to evict their respective Occupy contingent. The competing idea 
to that theory is that the cities in some ways contributed to the degradation of conditions. 
In Oakland, for example, recall that when the Oakland General Assembly voted to 
withdraw a resolution where they had agreed to remain peaceful, the city of Oakland, in 
response, cut off a source of water and both streetlights in the camp.517 
Of all the reasons cited for moving on the camps when they did, degrading camp 
conditions appears to be the most strenuously pushed by the cities themselves in 
justifying the risks of violence inherent to the evictions. New York Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg noted an “outbreak of scabies, lice and lung ailments among protesters…” 
although the New York Post goes on to assert that “most importantly” the eviction 
516 Associated Press “Oakland Cops Eye Occupy Camp after Ore. Arrests,” CBS News, November 14, 
2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oakland-cops-eye-occupy-camp-after-ore-arrests/; Gilett and Fink, 
“CPS Seizes Baby From ‘Occupy Dallas’ Site;” Jonathan Cooper and Terrence Petty, “Occupy Portland: 
Police Move in on Portland Park, Some Protesters Remain,” Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 
2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1113/Occupy-Portland-Police-move-in-
on-Portland-park-some-protesters-remain; Colleen Long and Verena Dobnik, “Police Clear ‘Unsanitary’ 
Zuccotti Park, Arrest Dozens of Stubborn Protesters,” CNS News, August 20, 2013, 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/police-clear-unsanitary-zuccotti-park-arrest-dozens-stubborn-protesters; 
Portland Police Bureau, “Portland SitReps,” November 4, 2011 (internal document, Portland Police 
Bureau, Portland, OR). 
517 “Shots Fired near ‘Occupy Oakland,’ One Dead,” ABC Local, November 10, 2011, 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=8427634. 
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 occurred when it did because of falling approval ratings.518  Although the city of New 
York appeared to support the rights of the protesters to camp in Zuccotti Park, an 
argument can be made through analysis of the city’s actions that its seizure of supplies, 
prohibition on the use of generators and heaters, and failure to allow activists to bring 
portable toilets onsite made the camp untenable.519 
Most media reports cited either the police or city leaders as the sources of the 
information on the degrading conditions in the camps, as opposed to reporting the 
conditions themselves. The Occupy Portland protesters did, however, post a video on 
November 14, 2011 that addressed the conditions in camp. Protesters can be seen picking 
up trash, and one unnamed protester comments on the group’s willingness to clean up the 
parks.520 
5. Spatial Control 
A repertoire that the police have the availability in most instances is the ability to 
control public space. Municipalities enact ordinances that govern public spaces relative to 
times of permitted access or prohibited activities (e.g., sleeping in public). In each of the 
cases, the cities exercised some method of spatial control whether it was restricting the 
encampment to one location, dictating when or when activists could march on public 
property or merely erecting temporary devices designed to limit or restrict movement.   
In Table 4, I present the data relative to spatial control that was exhibited in each 
city. Both Oakland and New York kettled activists during protest marches or 
demonstrations. Every city studied utilized temporary barricades in some way. Dallas 
used stationary plastic fencing to demarcate the grassy areas around city hall that where 
camping was not permitted in accordance with the settlement agreement. New York used 
temporary plastic fencing to kettle activists and metal barricades to close off streets, 
monuments and sidewalks. Oakland employed temporary metal barricades and then 
failed to secure them, allowing transgressive activists to take them from a storage 
518 Margolin, “Inside Story of Why Mike Finally Had to Act.” 
519 Kelley, “Occupy Updates.” 
520 “Inside Occupied Portland—Restoring Our Park,” YouTube video. 
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 location near City Hall.521  All of the studied cities restricted or limited the public space 
that was accessible to the activists. Oakland was perhaps the least restrictive, allowing 
protesters to occupy an additional park that was separate from the original camp. Oakland 
did eventually restrict one activist from occupying the historic tree in Frank Ogawa Plaza. 
New York closed streets and actively directed activists who marched, often without 
warning or providing reasoning.522  
 
Table 4.   Spatial Control 
In keeping with issues of spatial control, in my literature review I identified where 
Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham outlined certain tactics as “having become central to the 
policing of protest.”523 Each of the police tactics in that list, with the exception of pre-
emptive arrests, was used in the cases I examine in this thesis.  “Urban space is the 
playing field for protest and dissent,” argues Nemeth in his article about common spaces 
in America.524  In each of the studied cities, the governments (federal, state and/or local) 
controlled public and, in some instances, private spaces in an effort to contain the 
protesters within certain limitations. In the cases studied, the protesters purposefully 
chose highly visible locations: Zuccotti Park, Pioneer Plaza, Frank Ogawa Plaza, and 
Chapman and Lownsdale plazas from which to broadcast their message of dissent. This is 
consistent with what Noakes Klocke, and Gillham have pointed out saying, “symbolically 
important spaces, such as monuments or historically significant locales, become the site 
521 Oakland Police Department, Oakland After-Action Report, 14. 
522 MacLean, Glenn, and Knuckey, “Supressing Protest.” 
523 Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham, “Whose Streets?” 
524 Németh, “Controlling the Commons: How Public Is Public Space?,” 812. 
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 of intense contention…”525 Police and city leaders, in opposition to the “re-framing” of 
the space as something symbolic other than its original meaning, worked to either limit 
the change or stop it all together.526 
Dallas leaders realized this on both the symbolic level and the economic level as 
was demonstrated in their negotiating the protesters away from Pioneer Plaza where, as 
mentioned, clothes were hung on sculptures to dry, around the corner from a new multi-
million dollar hotel. New York police showed recognition of this by erecting temporary 
barricades around the symbolic bull sculpture on Wall Street and preventing access to 
more of the financial district. Portland demonstrated this is the restriction of the 
occupation to only Chapman and Lownsdale squares and preventing expansion (although 
this was likely not the only reason for preventing expansion). Oakland appeared to 
struggle with this concept internally, and this was indicated by the public announcement 
that expansion to Snow Park was prohibited but no timely action followed.  
Portland attempted to influence the behavior of the Occupy protesters by 
brokering the cooperation of the city, contingent upon the lawful behavior of some. When 
25 protesters attempted to expand the encampment to Jamison Square, they were warned 
that the city would potentially end its cooperation if they continued with their planned 
civil disobedience.527 
The NYPD was by far the most confrontational in its control of space. The NYPD 
had the resources to mobilize multiple officers and barricades to cordon off sections to 
prevent protester access. It also employed flexible fencing to kettle protesters and used 
police scooter squads to herd protesters during marches, occasionally opting to close off 
entire streets with no explanation given to protesters.528  Perhaps the most visible of this 
was the arrest of over 700 protesters on the Brooklyn Bridge.529  The bridge was closed 
525 Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham, “Whose Streets?” 
526 Ibid. 
527 Hoffman and Mesh, “Pearl District Occupation Ends.” 
528 Knuckey, Glenn, and MacLean, Suppressing Protest, 111. 
529 Unknown, March on Brooklyn Bridge; “Brooklyn Bridge Video: Police Arrest Occupy Wall Street 
Protesters,” YouTube video; Long, “700 Wall Street Protesters Arrested on Brooklyn Bridge.” 
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 as a result of the march and remained closed as protesters were arrested. Table 5 
illustrates the outcome of those 732 arrests as reported by the New York Times in October 
of 2013:530 The table is significant because it represents a paradox. One side will view 
the arrest and release of hundreds of people without subsequent prosecution as wasteful 
and an expression of “New York exceptionalism,” wherein the NYPD employed tactics 
of strategic incapacitation. Others will view this in the context of the NYPD making the 
statement to the activists that they will not be allowed to shut down a major thoroughfare 
in New York City without proper permitting and approval.   
Result Number* Cases dismissed at request of prosecutor 195 Cases dismissed by court 40 Dismissed with 6-month condition of no re-arrest 445 DA declined to prosecute 21 Acquitted at trial 2 Resolved with plea in unrelated case 1 Warrants issued for failing to show up to court 17 TOTAL NUMBER OF DISMISSALS OR ACQUITTALS  680 Pleaded guilty to Disorderly Conduct (6) Convicted at trial (5) TOTAL CONVICTIONS (11) = 1.5% *Convictions indicated by parentheses. 
Table 5.   Outcome of Brooklyn Bridge Arrests in Numbers 
The city of Dallas tied this restriction of space into the negotiated settlement, and, 
some could argue, criminalized the group’s later non-adherence to those restrictions. For 
example, City Manager Mary Suhm cited the group’s violation of the agreement as one 
of the reasons on which the city leaders based their decision to evict the protesters, which 
then made their occupation of public property after midnight a criminal act. 531   As 
Graham and others point out, by “prioritizing security” or securitizing space and “private 
interests,” civil liberties are diminished and diminish diversity in those public spaces.532 
530 Moynihan, “Last Scheduled Case of Brooklyn Bridge Arrests.” 
531 Suhm, “Memo to Dallas Mayor and Dallas City Council.” 
532 Stephen Graham, Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism (London: Verso Books, 2011); 
Németh, “Controlling the Commons: How Public Is Public Space?.” 
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 Private interests were involved in New York with Zuccotti Park. This park is a 
creation of semi-public space through zoning concessions. Simply put, developers are 
allowed to deviate from certain zoning restrictions on capacity for occupancy in exchange 
for creating public spaces, although not always parks in the traditional sense. Zuccotti 
Park is one such park controlled by Brookfield Office Properties and under the terms of 
its development was required to be accessible to the public 24 hours per day. This was in 
contrast to New York’s and the other cities’ parks, which had curfew, or closure hours 
that prohibited occupation or use during certain periods of the day (usually overnight). 
These restrictions on space as exhibited by the cities are in keeping with trends 
across the country with the establishment of “free speech zones” or designated protest 
areas among others.533  For example, take Boston’s collaboration with the American 
Civil Liberties Union before designating a “protest zone” for the Democratic National 
Convention in 2004—the underlying basis of which likely comes back to the desire for 
predictability and order maintenance by the police.534  The argument can be made that 
although the Occupy protest for the studied cities was not a planned event like a 
convention, the restriction of the occupiers to a specific place and not allowing 
expansion, is another way of establishing a “free speech zone” or an area where protest is 
allowed.  
The control of public space was central to the criticisms of the police by protesters 
and were around which many of the violent encounters centered. Because of the nature of 
public expression of dissent, this issue will continue to be a factor that must be 
considered by police and civic leaders. In some instances, as in New York, there may be 
“no-win” situations considering that most major cities can ill afford to have main 
thoroughfares closed with little or no warning. Leaders must strive to balance that control 
in a strategic fashion that recognizes the importance of activists’ First Amendment rights. 
533 Németh, “Controlling the Commons;” Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation;” 
Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation.” 
534 Narr, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations, 17. 
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 6. Police Militarization and Tactics 
An increase in the militarization of the police culture has grown in recent years as 
topic of discussion among police leaders across the country. With the removal of troops 
from Iraq and reductions in force in Afghanistan in recent years, those former soldiers are 
entering the domestic job market. Many choose police work. In fact, military.com lists 
the job of police officer as one of “5 Hot Jobs” for former soldiers.535  Table 6 shows that 
based on analysis of the data in the cases, the effect of militarization was prevalent in 
only the Oakland response.   
 
Table 6.   Militarization 
Evidence of this militarization was prevalent in the response by the Oakland 
Police Department’s follow up to the eviction of protesters. Within five days of the start 
of Occupy Oakland protests, Oakland police donned riot gear with helmets, face shields 
and gas masks; molded body armor to protect from blunt objects; knee, shoulder and 
elbow pads; gloves and shin guards—all black and likely intimidating to those who might 
stand against them. The tactic of “holding” and defending ground and the establishment 
of a “line in the sand” so to speak, which culminated with the shooting of Scott Campbell 
on November 3, 2011. This tactic of outfitting officers with riot gear may be too often 
overlooked as a contributing factor to instances of violence. The challenge in evaluating 




                                                        
 the level of militarization and its influence was due to these events being relatively short 
in duration.  
Zimbardo articulates how this can actually contribute to officers taking actions 
more violent in nature than they normally would. 536  He describes “bad barrels” or 
situations that are made to exist where there is a greater propensity for more violent 
treatment. 537   He contrasts the individual versus the situational characteristics. The 
Oakland police leadership created a situation that increased the likelihood of violence on 
the part of the police. Oakland officers were deindividuated with their riot gear and made 
to look virtually indistinguishable from one another. 538  Add to that, the aggressive 
position communicated by the supervisors on the scene advising officers of the point at 
which, upon crossing, any protester would be shot (with less-lethal rounds). This 
removed the possibility of any measured or proportional response while decreasing the 
likelihood that the officers would respond as individuals. Instead, this was more in 
keeping with the behavior of an occupying force than a police force. Supervisors 
arguably should have been advising those both above and below on ways of deescalating 
the use of force. This was made all the more unlikely as lower level supervisors 
deindividuated themselves by wearing the very same gear. This is not to suggest that in 
situations where officers are likely to face violent resistance that they should not wear 
appropriate protective gear. It is important, however, to recognize that doing so will 
contribute to the likelihood of a violent interaction based on something other than the 
protesters’ reaction to the officers. 
The above incident and the shooting of the Iraqi war veteran by Oakland police 
were arguably “transformative events” in the Occupy Movement. It was transformative in 
the sense that the news of Olsen’s injury spread remarkably quickly because of both 
social and conventional media. In all of the other cities studied, activists recognized the 
536 Philip G Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: 
Random House, 2007). 
537 Ibid. 
538 Deindividuation in social psychology refers to the idea of losing one’s own identity or self-
awareness in a particular group setting or situation—sometimes a crowd or mob mentality. 
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 violence occurring in Oakland and some protested against Oakland’s use of force.539 
Images of Olsen’s bloody face were broadcast across the country and depicted the 
activists more clearly as victims than perhaps they ever had been. Hess and Martin 
contend that “transformative events [are] crucial turning point[s] for a social 
movement.”540  Olsen’s injury at the hands of the Oakland police may ultimately be more 
transformative for police and the repertoires they employ then it was transformative for 
the activists’ cause. 
In spite of the NYPD not using officers outfitted in riot gear until the final 
eviction of protesters from Zuccotti Park, some of their authoritarian tactics can be 
attributed to a frame of increased militarism. Vitale refers to their approach of policing 
protest as “command and control” meaning that they afford protesters little or no 
opportunity to negotiate an amicable outcome.541 In fairness, a lack of cohesive central 
leadership on the part of the various Occupy contingents made negotiations difficult and 
highly unlikely at best. In all, however, NYPD’s response was more akin to what one 
might call “New York exceptionalism” than militaristic.   
I characterize “New York exceptionalism” as fueled by the NYPD’s ability to 
deal with its citizenry in ways that other, less robustly staffed and equipped cannot. One 
example is the ability of the NYPD to divert hundreds of officers from other precincts to 
handle the Occupy Movement. Other departments studied here did not have the same 
capability and therefore had to make operational decisions accordingly. This 
“exceptionalism” was also displayed in their destruction of the activists’ property 
following the eviction of Zuccotti Park.542   
539 Jesse Mckinley and Malia Wollan, “Outrage Grows over Scott Olsen, Veteran Wounded at 
Occupy Oakland Protest,” New York Times, October 27, 2011, sec. U.S, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/us/veterans-injury-at-occupy-protest-prompts-outrage.html. 
540 David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11, no. 2 (2006): 249–267. 
541 Vitale, “From Negotiated Management to Command and Control.” 
542 Jonathan Allen, “Occupy Wall Street Lawsuits: NYC Agrees to Pay Protesters for Destroying 
Library, Property,” Huffington Post, April 9, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/occupy-
wall-street-lawsuits-nyc-library-property_n_3048772.html. 
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 Earl and Soule note that with regard to disorder, “many within policing see this as 
a loss of control” and thus a “mark of failure.” 543  This would tend to support the 
NYPD’s tendency toward more command and control styled tactics. This exceptionalism 
also seems driven by events beginning with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 
Center, the 9/11 attacks and is in keeping with Gillham’s assertion of a move on its part 
toward strategic incapacitation.544   Earl also notes that at least with relation to releasing 
information on its operations, the NYPD’s justifications rely on the idea that because the 
nation is involved in a war on terror and because New York has been targeted, for 
secrecy and security purposes, they are not obliged to release the information.545 
The cities of Dallas and Portland engaged in less militaristic responses and in fact 
focused more on community policing aspects, especially in the case of Portland. As noted 
in the case study, the Portland Police Bureau picked officers that could be expected to 
develop a rapport with the protesters and work to foster a cooperative relationship 
between police and protesters. Dallas also tried to establish rapport by initially assigning 
its Central Business District (CBD) officers to police the protests. The decision to do so 
placed officers familiar with the CBD and more trained in community oriented policing 
and problem solving policing rather than reassigning officers from other patrol divisions. 
Balko notes that in the history of some police departments, their reactive nature to crime, 
as opposed to a preventative one, encouraged an adversarial nature between police and 
citizenry.546 This confrontational attitude is observed in the clashes at the Bank One 
building in Dallas, indicating that the DPD at times shifted to a more militaristic 
response. Following this incident where (off duty) Officer Hollis pushed the protester off 
the raised planter, SWAT officers were called in to manage the protesters. The idea that 
SWAT operators are believed to be more disciplined and therefore likely to follow 
specific directions was likely the impetus for the change in assignments. Interestingly, 
Dallas police called upon SWAT, arguably a more militaristic unit than patrol, and 
543 Earl and Soule, “Seeing Blue,” 148. 
544 Gillham, Edwards, and Noakes, “Strategic Incapacitation.” 
545 Earl, “Information Access and Protest Policing,” 45. 
546 Radley Balko and Laura Odato, “Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police 
Forces” (2013). 
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 utilized it to achieve more peaceful results. Commanders appear to have relied on their 
discipline as opposed to their tactical capabilities.   
Analysis of my case studies indicates that more study in the effects of militarism 
on civilian policing is called for. Giving due consideration to the influx of military 
trained personnel into the ranks of police departments across the country will be 
imperative for police leaders in the immediate future. If scholars can, in some way, 
identify and summarily quantify the effects of this increase police leadership will be 
better positioned to account for those effects and develop long-term hiring goals 
accordingly. 
7. Social Media Use by Police 
All of the studied cities, to varying degrees, were using social media during the 
Occupy Movement. All were at least monitoring what was made available publically by 
the protesters themselves. The decision to do so highlights shifts in how police gather 
intelligence about protest groups. The need to gather intelligence on criminal groups is 
juxtaposed with the desire of police leadership not to infringe on the civil liberties of its 
citizenry. While police are legally justified in monitoring information published 
publically on social media sites, in most instances, widespread reporting on “monitoring” 
of public activities could arguably tend to increase the feeling of mistrust between police 
and the general public. There are also legitimate concerns of undercover police 
infiltrating legal groups for the purpose of collecting intelligence. New York continues to 
deal with complaints regarding the monitoring of various political and religious groups 
not involved in criminal activity.547  
In Table 7, I outline that all of the studied cities were actively posting, in one form 
or another, on social media. Only the two cities that employed the tenants of community 
oriented policing however, actively posted items of an informative nature to their social 
media accounts related to the Occupy Movement. Additionally, in each case, the studied 
cities monitored social media for intelligence purposes (with varying degrees of success). 
547 Associated Press, “NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All over Northeast,” USAToday, February 
18, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-18/NYPD-Intelligence/53143776/1.  
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 For example, Portland, as mentioned, monitored the 24-hour-a-day feed from the 
camp. The NYPD monitored social media through their intelligence centers. Dallas 
police used commercial software available through Twitter called “Tweetdeck” to 
monitor multiple hashtags and postings in its fusion center.  
 
Table 7.   Use of Social Media during Occupy Movement 
Portland took very limited advantage of its social media footprint and posted 
relevant arrests from the Occupy camp. Likewise, Dallas police posted a clip of a press 
conference related to the alleged sexual assault of a juvenile in the Occupy camp. Any 
one of the cities had the availability to post photographs of the unsanitary camp 
conditions, videos of protesters violating the law, or any of a host of other newsworthy or 
noteworthy conditions that police were privy to given their role and proximity to the 
events or conditions. The NYPD and Portland were already recording video of the 
protesters with department equipment for evidentiary purposes. Had they released some 
of this video, it could have served multiple purposes. For instance, by providing video or 
pictures available to police based on their level of access, they would be releasing 
exclusive content that few or no media outlet would have. This would tend to drive more 
people to their social media sights and increase their following and thus their ability to 
reach the communities they serve.  
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 Social media was relied on heavily in all of the Occupy Movement cities. It 
affected how police leaders made decisions and will continue to be a factor for law 
enforcement in general to not only understand its evolving capabilities with but also 
maximize its use for their benefit. For example, during the next Boston-style bombing, 
police can utilize social media to broadcast pertinent information from the field.548  As 
noted by Bill Braniff, Executive Director of the National Consortium for the study of 
Terrorism and Response, “one of the first places people go in events like this is to social 
media, to see what the crowd is saying about what to do next.”549  How and to what 
extent social media affected positive or negative outcomes for police is a potential for 
future study. With technologies adapting and changing rapidly, police leaders can ill 
afford to consider social media something for the citizens only and neglect their officers. 
Occupy provided a glimpse into what is possible for police and the broadcast of ideas and 
information. By increasing the frequency and the substance of communication with the 
public they serve, police can leverage social media to increase their legitimacy. Coupling 
this with a robust community policing philosophy and the police likely reduce the 
likelihood of being perceived as an occupying force and more likely to be viewed as 
members of the community they serve.  
8.  “Emergent Practice” in a Complex Adaptive System 
Public protest, as was outlined in every case studied here, is a fluid, dynamic and 
complex environment in which to make decisions.  “How” or “if” police understand the 
nature of the interactions between their officers and the public, dictate the legitimacy and 
efficacy of their orders. Disconnected leadership or leadership that focuses too much on 
the tactical and not on the value of strategic planning and decision making will likely find 
chaotic results—as was exhibited in Oakland. 
548 “Boston-style” refers to the bombings of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013 where social 
media was used extensively during the aftermath.  
549 Dan Gilgoff and Jane J. Lee, “Social Media Shapes Boston Bombings Response,” National 
Geographic, April 15, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130415-boston-marathon-
bombings-terrorism-social-media-twitter-facebook/. 
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 Analyzing the actions taken by the various departments within the Cynefin 
framework (a “sense-making device”) illustrates that when dealing with protest 
situations, police are dealing with a complex adaptive system. 550   As described by 
Snowden, the Cynefin framework is a model for conceptualizing the decision making 
process. 551   Snowden articulates that as opposed to a categorization model where a 
“framework precedesdecision-makingdata,” the sense-making model allows for 
“thedecision-makingdata to precede the framework.”552  This is consistent with real-
world protests and that evolve and change based on the input of both police and activists 
resulting in a complex adaptive environment. Snowden articulates “categorization models 
are… poor during periods of change.”553  The example of the Occupy Movement was 
thousands of individual protesters to some unknown degree interacting with police. Those 
individual protesters were likewise dealing with and reacting to members of their own 
group—thousands upon thousands of interactions affecting the ability of police to 
generalize some predictability. Additionally, a crowd that negotiates and follows 
directions might be reasonably likely to continue to follow police direction—all other 
things being stable/equal.   
Analysis of emergent practice of the response to the protests by the departments is 
outlined in Table 8. New York is shown to have used a “simple” response, Oakland a 
“chaotic” response, and Portland and Dallas are depicted as having used a “complex” 
response to their Occupy activists. The departments’ responses are based on how they 
conformed to normal practice and policy versus use of adaptive and proportioned 
responses based upon the emergent nature of the Occupy Movement. New York applied a 
“simple” response to the Occupy Movement protests based on the Cynefin framework.   
 
550 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 462. 





                                                        
 For example, take the response of the NYPD to the march on the Brooklyn 
Bridge. Kurtz and Snowden point out that in the simple or ordered domain, “single-point 
forecasting, field manuals, and operational procedures are legitimate and effective 
practices.”554 Consider that if one person walks in the street, in most if not all large cities, 
that would constitute a criminal offense of pedestrian in the roadway or some other such 
title. The simple response from police would be arrest or citing of the individual. 
Thousands of protesters marching in the street disrupting traffic for hours is a much 
different scenario calling for a complex response. Protesters marched in the street, police 
held the stance that marching in the street was against the law and the law would be 
enforced. Overall, the NYPD response to the Occupy Movement was simple in that it was 
primarily in keeping with strategic management in nature and possessing an inherent 
rigidity. Table 8 presents the categorization of the cities’ strategic responses based my 




Table 8.   Strategic Response Based on Cynefin Framework 
554 Ibid., 468. 
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Figure 12.  Cynefin Framework Diagram555 
The cities of Dallas and Portland generally engaged in complex responses to the 
Occupy Movement. Leadership held multiple meetings with the various department 
heads to formulate a strategy and put forth a response to a protest movement that was 
unlike others the cities had dealt with. For example, recall the protest at Chase Bank 
where some of the protesters chose to block the entrance to the bank and other protesters 
stood by as observers. Dallas police leadership evaluated the situation and opted to arrest 
only those protesters who were obstructing a passageway, but it allowed the rest to 
continue protesting in a lawful manner.   
 As illustrated in Figure 9, simple decision-making environments are at the lower 
right quadrant and are characterized by decision makers sensing the environment, 
deciding on a course of action and then responding. Complicated environments generally 
require the input of experts for decision making and involve sensing the environment, 
555 “Cynefin Framework” [image], Wageningen University & Research Center, accessed February 18, 
2014, http://www.wageningenportals.nl/msp/tool/cynefin-framework. 
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 analyzing the results, and then responding. Complex environments are depicted in the 
upper left quadrant and call for leaders to probe the environment because cause and effect 
are not known. Assembling a group of experts to assist in the deciding how to probe the 
environment and then alter or “dampen” results of probing is recommended here.556  
Chaotic environments are depicted in the lower left quadrant; in those situations, leaders 
must act first to restore some sort of order before identifying more strategic options of 
response. The area in the middle labeled “Disorder” is where, Snowden contends we 
spend most of our time before identifying what quadrant applies to our particular 
situation.557 
At times, Oakland exhibited elements of complicated response. Overall though, 
Oakland was influenced by the lack of cohesive leadership and exhibited a chaotic 
response to its Occupy contingent. Oakland police planned for a conventional eviction of 
protesters with the assistance of outside agencies. This consultation might well be 
considered a “best practice.” However, it follows old paradigms. Often when looking at 
this through the Cynefin framework, “applying best practice is probably what precipitated 
chaos” in Oakland.558 Following the October 25 eviction, Oakland experienced rioting 
and violence after inadequately planning for a second operational period. Oakland 
advised its Occupy contingent that expansion of the camp would be prohibited, then 
failed to take action to substantiate that claim. Oakland was forced to evict its contingent 
twice.   
Oakland police leadership was content use “best practice” with little consideration 
for the very different style of protest the city was experiencing. Police officers used riot 
gear assumedly to provide protection to their officers with inappropriate consideration as 
to the second and third order consequences for this and other decisions. This is a prime 
illustration of how following “best practices” can be the catalyst for moving into chaos. 
This overreliance on the “tactical” and under reliance on the strategic planning aspect of 
556 “The Cynefin Framework,” YouTube video. 
557 Complete description of the Cynefin framework can be found in the following articles: Kurtz and 
Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy;” David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s 
Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007): 68. 
558 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 469. 
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 Oakland’s response, exacerbated not only the risk of injury to police and citizens but also 
with all the accompanying consequences. Ultimately, considering the chaotic state of the 
leadership during this protest, a more appropriate response to the protesters was unlikely. 
There was no plan to account for any failure. Police leadership, in stacking its first 
operational period of the October 25 eviction with the majority of experienced 
commanders and with predominantly Oakland officers, doomed the subsequent 
operational periods to an increased risk of failure.   
Police and city leaders must understand the complex nature of public protest and 
perhaps more importantly, understand that traditional reliance on “best practices” may 
result in increased confrontations or unintended results. Two examples of this are 
Seattle’s experience at the 1999 WTO demonstrations, where negotiated management 
was unsuccessful, and now Oakland’s similar response to the Occupy Movement.559  
There are also consequences in the form of a loss of legitimacy for misunderstanding the 
nature of interactions between police and activists in public demonstrations. Application 
of the Cynefin framework can help in these situations 
Analysis of the data in each of the four cases revealed themes that were common 
in most, if not all of the studied cities. Lack of traditional management in spite of efforts 
by police and other was clear in most cases. While the leaderless structure can be cited by 
police as contributing to the difficulties they experienced in trying negotiation, success or 
failure in the ability to negotiate remains something for which the police should plan. The 
data revealed instances where city and police leaders failed to come together and provide 
stable cohesive leadership to the detriment of both police and activists. How the police 
timed their eventual evictions, how they controlled public space and how they allowed or 
contributed to degradation of camp conditions were issues that they all faced. Moving 
forward, the issues of social media use, the effects of civilian police forces with more 
559 When some activists refused to negotiate at the WTO protests, Seattle reverted to escalated force 
tactics and utilized massive amounts of tear gas and other less-lethal ammunition. Seattle Police 
Department, The Seattle Police Department After Action Report: World Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference Seattle, Washington November 29–December 3, 1999, 
www.seattle.gov/police/publications/WTO/WTO_AAR.PDF; Patrick F. Gillham and John A. Noakes, 
“More than a March in a Circle: Transgressive Protests and the Limits of Negotiated Management,” 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly 12, no. 4 (December 2007): 341–357. 
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 members having had military and combat experience, and how police and city leaders 
deal with the emergent nature of public demonstration are widely applicable issues. 
Police and city leaders have the opportunity now to address each of them and develop a 
strategic plan for how they will do that. 
In the concluding chapter, I provide conclusions and recommendations for doing 
just that. I draw a roadmap for leadership to prepare now for the activists, protests, and 
demonstrations in the future that will employ new and emerging strategies and tactics. 
Police do not have to know, and likely cannot predict, what new and emergent tactics or 
technologies the activists will employ, but they can strategically plan for how to respond 
to what I have identified as a complex adaptive environment using proven methods.    
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 VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this concluding chapter, I outline strategy and not tactics. Tactics or 
specifically “what” to do has limited applicability and often is not universally 
transferrable. Strategic response that I present here is however applicable across the 
spectrum of cities and police agencies regardless of size or location. These strategic 
principles and practices will help leadership identify where they are lacking and need to 
improve and then identify how best to approach the challenges of twenty-first century 
protests and demonstrations  
Since the 1960s, policing protest in America has been in evolution from a strong 
reliance on use of force in an escalated force model by police. Consider Birmingham, 
Alabama and the iconic images of police turning fire hoses and dogs loose on protesters. 
This evolution has been to a more communicative one in a negotiated management 
style.560  The nature of response continues to evolve and change as technology and the 
public’s priorities change. In recent decades, terror attacks have placed a focus on safety 
and security in mass gatherings, and consequently, police and city leaders have had to 
adjust their responses. Some scholars contend that civilian police are posturing toward a 
reduction in the allowance for civil liberties and placing an emphasis on the “order 
maintenance” and securitization aspects of response to dissent. 561   Now, two years 
removed from major activities of the Occupy Movement, we are better able to see what 
patterns emerged from those protests and gauge how police responded to a novel way of 
expressing dissent. Ahead of the next evolution of protest, city and police leaders need to 
assess where they are in relationship to what the twenty-first century protests will look 
like. 
The Occupy Movement illustrated that the interconnectedness of modern protest 
necessitates a change in the very way that police leaders should conceive of a response to 
future protests. Tactics are not the issue; strategic planning—and even before that—
560 della Porta and Reiter, Policing Protest. 
561 Gillham, “Securitizing America: Strategic Incapacitation”; Vitale, “From Negotiated Management 
to Command and Control.” 
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 strategic thinking and framing are what need to be addressed. As technology evolves and 
our daily lives and attendant expectations are changed by the adoption and evolution of 
that technology, police leadership cannot afford to look at past incidents as indicators of 
future ways to respond. Leadership needs to “break out of old ways of thinking and to 
consider intractable problems in new ways.” 562   Using the Cynefin framework as a 
“sense-making” framework provides a strategic option for policing twenty-first century 
protest. Table 9 on the next page is a “leader’s framework for policing protest.” 
 
562 Kurtz and Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy,” 468. 
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 A Leader’s Framework for Policing Protest 
 
 THE CONTEXT’S CHARACTERISTICS 
THE LEADER’S 








Protests are small and limited to few 
people  
Willing to negotiate and follow 
direction 
Known knowns 
Fact- based management 
Notifications may be of occurrence 
only  
Sense, categorize, respond 
Ensure that standard 
response / Best Practices 
are in place 
Delegate responsibilities 
Officers adhere to basics of 
training 
Discretion of enforcement is 
at lowest level 
Complacency and comfort 
Desire to make problems 
simple – “This is the same 
protest group from last time.” 
Neglected analysis of 
protesters 
Overreliance on best practices 
if context shifts 
Create communication – reach out to 
supervisors, troops and protesters 
and channel orthodoxy 
Stay connected – avoid 
micromanaging 
Don’t assume this is “just a simple 
protest”  
Recognize both the value and 









 Larger or more prolonged protest 
with different tactics - greater power 
for generating media attention 
Cause-and-effect relationships 
discoverable but not immediately 
Input of control not likely to result in 
predictability of outcome 
Known unknowns 
Fact-based management 
Sense, analyze, respond 
Create panels of experts 
Listen to conflicting advice 
Be prepared to alter from 
standard procedures or 
general orders 
Discretion of enforcement 
raised to on-scene 
commander 
Experts overconfident in their 
own solutions or in the efficacy 
of past solutions or responses 
to protest groups 
“Analysis paralysis” – Experts 
freeze or cannot reach a 
decision 
Viewpoints of non-experts 
excluded 
Encourage external and internal 
stakeholders to challenge expert 
opinions to combat entrained thinking 
Use experiments, table-top exercises, 
and scenario- based analysis to force 
people to think critically and in 









Flux and unpredictability 
Protesters utilizing unconventional 
tactics or methods – extended 
operations far beyond normal 
No right answers; emergent 
instructive patterns 
Unknown unknowns – what will the 
focus be 
Many competing ideas 
Need for creative and innovative 
approaches 
Pattern-based leadership – 
conferences to determine patterns 
Probe, sense, respond 
Try different tactics and be 
prepared for them not to 
work and be ready to switch 
Create environments and 
experiments that allow 
patterns to emerge 
Increase levels of interaction 
and communication 
Use methods that can help 
generate ideas; Open up 
discussion (as through large 
group methods); set barriers; 
stimulate attractors; 
encourage dissent and 
diversity amongst your team; 
manage starting conditions 
and monitor for emergence 
Discretion of enforcement 
pushed to strategic level for 
discussion 
Temptation to fall back into 
habitual, command-and-control 
mode 
Tendency toward authoritarian 
response model when not 
called for.  
Exercising arbitrary modes of 
control that will exacerbate 
problems (kettling or herding 
when unnecessary) 
Temptation to look for facts 
rather than allowing patterns to 
emerge 
Desire for accelerated 
resolution of problems or 
exploitation of opportunities 
Be patient and allow time for reflection 
Use approaches that encourage 
interaction so patterns can emerge 
Understand that every protest action 








High turbulence, civil unrest 
RIOTING 
No clear cause-and-effect 
relationships, so no point in looking 
for right answers 
Many decisions to make and no 
time to think 
Pattern-based leadership 
Act, sense, respond 
Look for what works instead 
of seeking right answers 
Take immediate action to 
preserve life and property 
Enact emergency plans / 
mutual aid / mass arrest 
Provide clear, direct 
communication to officers, 
protesters and media alike 
Applying a command-and-
control approach longer than 
needed 
“Cult of the Leader” – leader 
cannot be challenged with 
critical thought 
Missed opportunity for 
innovation 
Chaos unabated  
Set up mechanisms (such as parallel 
teams) to take advantage of 
opportunities afforded by a chaotic 
environment  
Right time for innovative groups 
Encourage your command staff to 
challenge your point of view once the 
crisis has abated. 
Work to shift the context from chaotic 
to complex and to re-normalize 
operations  
Table 9.   A Leader’s Framework for Policing Protest 
Police and city leadership must be cohesive, engaged, and free to interact with 
one another. The Occupy Movement showed what could happen if there are significant 
differences that remain unresolved between the various heads of departments. Oakland 
floundered under the confusion created when city and police leadership had competing 
agendas and were unclear on directives to both the protesters and the police department. 
New York leaders displayed a solid cohesiveness and were clearly in sync with their 
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 approach and how they wanted to respond to the Occupy protesters. However, what New 
York did was apply “best practice” that evolved from protests that were unlike the 
Occupy Movement with respect to its lack of central leadership yet strong, technologic 
interconnectedness, and national footprint. These “best practices” are a misnomer in this 
example because while New York was able to reassign large numbers of officers and 
make massive arrests and afford not to negotiate or consider conciliatory options, there 
were negative consequences associated with this use of “best practice.”  The key here is 
that to be labeled a “best practice,” the tactic produced some solution that leaders thought 
desirable. It is easy to consider one positive aspect in the application of a “best practice,” 
such as clearing of a street or eviction of activists. It is more difficult, however, to 
envision the second and third order effects on society and the willingness of citizens to 
publically express dissent after employing such tactics. This staunch refusal to alter their 
methodology in the face of a growing movement could be characterized as in keeping 
with New York exceptionalism that is displayed in how the NYPD polices its community 
in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, the September 11, 2001, attacks 
and other plots targeting that city. Dallas and Portland stand as examples of both a 
community policing approach, and as examples of embracing emergent practice in their 
response to their Occupy contingents.   
Going forward, city leaders should consider what the benefits are for applying 
simple solutions to emerging situations. Furthermore, they should address the areas 
where they find that they are not in agreement in advance of the next protest. Now is the 
time to have the “what if…” discussion and to “red team” their current standard operating 
procedures for those “un-standard” situations.563     
Many departments have policies advocating for a negotiated management 
approach to dealing with protesters. As the Occupy Movement and others (especially 
Seattle 1999) indicated, a lack of a cohesive central leadership on the part of the 
protesters or unwillingness on their part to engage in negotiated management will quickly 
invalidate that method as a strategy for dealing with them. City and police leaders should 
563 Red-teaming refers to taking an opposing position to one’s own and trying to identify weaknesses 
or problems with that position or approach, sometimes called “playing devil’s advocate.”  
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 already have a strategic plan in place to deal with that eventuality. Whether that plan calls 
for an authoritarian response or a response that involves concessions and compromise and 
to what degree is all-dependent upon leadership agreement.  
In those leadership discussions, as well as in the zoning and planning meetings, 
leadership should consider the impact of decisions about access to public space. Dallas 
Mayor Mike Rawlings addressed the issue of safety and first amendment rights of 
protesters ahead of the eviction of the Occupy Dallas camp. Absent court rulings 
specifically addressing this issue, city and police leadership should have discussions 
about how they will address concerns about this issue. Ahead of the protest is the time to 
discuss what metrics will be involved in reaching the decision of when to intervene in an 
ongoing display of dissent. Some decisions will be easy and others will likely involve 
more critical thought.  
Occupy showed that laws governing the occupation of certain spaces were 
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce given available resources. How will municipal 
leaders prioritize those decisions and which factors does the community at large see as 
most important?  As Dallas and Portland experienced, the decision to forego the 
enforcement of certain laws governing the occupation of certain public areas made 
responding to the on-going protests more manageable in some regards. It is not important 
and would likely be counterproductive to decide now or in advance of a city’s next big 
protest, exactly what concessions will be made. More important is defining how the 
leadership will reach that decision when the situation emerges.  
City leaders should also consider carefully the second- and third-order effects of 
enacting laws to prevent the recurrence of an “Occupy-style” movement. Analysis 
seemed to indicate that in having an overall tolerance for the unconventional method of 
expressing dissent used in the Occupy protests, cities like Portland and Dallas, were able 
to avoid more violent opposition and situations. The fundamental right to peaceably 
assemble and redress the government with their grievances will be central to any 
argument against such legislation. More study in this area is called for with respect to 
how the cities studied here and others responded in the wake of the Occupy Movement 
and what, if any, new laws were enacted in response.   
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 The Occupy Movement put on display varying tactics and responses to the 
expression of dissent across the country. What is difficult to measure by looking at only a 
two-or three-month time span is the effect of long-term changes. More comprehensive 
study into the changes in military experience of recruit officers hired is called for. By 
examining the evolving statistics related to military experience among civilian law 
enforcers, we might better be able to assess the influence on strategy and tactics for 
policing protest.   
The factors addressed by Zimbardo and others regarding the use of force and the 
tendency toward deindividuation of officers in crowd control and riot response are 
critical. Leadership needs to be keenly aware of how orders are altered in the minds of 
the officers on the front lines when their self-perception is altered. Zimbardo addresses 
this “bad barrel” situational approach and suggests how to “resist” them and “celebrate 
heroism.” 564   Coupled with what Kelman and Hamilton point out in Crimes of 
Obedience, supervisors are in position to “influence” officers’ “prestige or status” in 
stressful or high profile incidents, such as these, and thus what the supervisor or 
“influencing agent says or does may have considerable relevance to that person’s 
(officer’s) goal achievement.”565  Therefore, with the tendency toward less restrained 
“deindividuated behavior,” leadership must consider what message is communicated and 
what kind of supervision is occurring and make deployment decisions accordingly.   
Specific study on the factors influencing police behavior during riots and 
especially in the time and interactions after donning riot gear is called for. Comparing 
that information with the breakdown of prior military experience might give leadership a 
better idea of what influences police in these situations. City and police leaders also need 
to be able to answer the unasked question about what effects the on-going state of war in 
America has on how it polices its populationespecially considering the highly 
publicized nature of protest.  
564 Zimbardo, “The Lucifer Effect,” 444. 
565 Herbert C Kelman, Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and 
Responsibility (Binghamton, NY: Yale University Press, 1989), 83. 
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 Arguably the most rapidly changing topic surrounding twenty-first century protest 
policing is that of technology. Advances observed during the Occupy Movement have 
already evolved to their next generations. The ubiquity of mobile devices, including the 
capability of capturing, recording, and broadcasting, is forever changing the protest 
landscape. Individual officers engaged in the business of enforcement are increasingly the 
subjects of video posted to social media but in support of and against the actions directed 
by police and city leadership. How departments are prepared to address those actions is 
critical to how they will be portrayed in the media and beyond.   
During the Occupy Movement, of the departments studied, only Dallas and 
Portland posted content to social media sites regarding their actions related to Occupy. 
This amounted to a lost opportunity for the other cities to highlight the good work of their 
officers and other city employees working in concert with police to respond to the 
protesters. In the future, departments and/or cities will need to provide their messages to 
the public. Avoiding the intermediary (i.e., the media) will be a step to insure that the 
department’s desired message is more accurately conveyed. 
City and police leaders should likewise consider the implications for adoption of 
technologies that make surveillance easier, collection of large amounts of information 
and the aggregation of such information faster. If those in positions of influence and 
policy development are not looking to the future to address this evolving technology, then 
they will find themselves completely reactionary to a situation that will likely quickly 
move outside their sphere of influence. 
As was the case with the Occupy protests, those police departments that applied a 
“probe—sense—respond” framework method tended to be able to dampen the negative 
effects of tactics that did not work and amplify the success of those that did. Therefore, 
based on the analysis of this research, I have developed the below checklist of things that 
leaders should take into account facing the next evolution of protest that is coming. 
Police and city leaders around the world continue to face protests and 
demonstrations where activists utilized repertoires and tactics on display during the 
Occupy Movement. Those repertoires likewise continue to evolve and police must be 
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 prepared to respond in appropriate ways that balance the rights of the activists to protest 
and exercise their rights to publically demonstrate. The studies of these four major U.S. 
cities have provided timely and relevant data from which to learn those lessons. The 
successes and failures on the part of New York, Oakland, Portland, and Dallas during 
their respective Occupy protests have provided a unique opportunity for such study. In 
this thesis, I have endeavored to capitalize on both my extensive experience in 
responding to and training those to deal with public protest and demonstration. I have 
provided insight and perspective of police while considering the rights and 
responsibilities of those engaged in the protest. Ultimately, I identified central 
overarching themes and issues related to these cases and articulated real strategies that 
are universally applicable. Using the “preliminary protest planning matrix” on the 
following page is the first step for city and police leaders to evaluate their current 
readiness for strategically dealing with protest. The “leaders framework for policing 
protest” that I present here is a strategic roadmap for police and city leaders to respond to 
the protests and public demonstrations that utilize new and emergent tactics not seen 
before. The application of lessons learned from this thesis will help those future leaders 
plan for and respond to twenty-first century protest in ways that serve to protect not only 
the safety and rights of the activists and the general public, but also the safety, legitimacy, 
and respect of the police themselves. 
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 APPENDIX. PRELIMINARY PROTEST PLANNING MATRIX 
 
Preliminary Protest Planning Matrix Performed 
Examine your relationship and levels of communication with your 
core leadership both above and below. Are you and your 
chief/mayor/council on the same page when it comes to acceptance 
of protest?  Do you already know that you have differing 
expectations of what should be allowed and what should not within 
the scope of policing protest? How will you resolve these 
differences?  If you’re in agreement, what will the consequence of 
your agreement be? Where will you turn for dissenting opinions? 
☐ 
Do you have plans in place for mutual aid or for what you will do 
in the event that your resources are taxed beyond capacity?  Have 
you made arrangements or entered agreements for payment for 
those services?  If not, now is the time. 
☐ 
If the protesters adopt tactics that you have not trained for 
specifically how will your officers/employees respond?  Have you 
trained for integrated operations with your fire personnel? 
☐ 
How will your jurisdiction respond to a protest that is prolonged in 
nature?  Even if you have the resources to respond and arrest or 
remove the protesters, will that be the most appropriate method of 
dealing with them? What will your citizens expect of you, and how 
will they react when you do whatever it is you decide?   
☐ 
How aggressively do you currently respond to protest? Do you 
routinely take a hard line stance on enforcement?  Are your 
officers more apt to arrest a protester for a minor violation than 
they are to engage in negotiated management techniques?  Are 
your officers more likely to respect the civil liberties of protesters 
or those being protested against? 
☐ 
What are the laws of your community, and how are they aligned to 
either support the First Amendment rights of protesters or to 
inhibit them?  Do your accommodations act as a covert mechanism 
of deterrence? For example not allowing for trash collection at a 
prolonged protest, thereby exacerbating deteriorating site 
conditions. 
☐ 
Are you in the habit of communicating with your citizens via social 
media?  Do they expect to receive important information from 
your city/department already?  If not have you considered the 
☐ 
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 limitations you will experience if you wait until you need to push a 
message to a large audience? Are you accustomed to presenting the 
message of your city/department?  
Who are your applicants and what is their background?  What is 
the percentage of officers with military and especially military 
combat experience in your organization?  How does that compare 
with the history of your department and has behavior of this 
culture of officers changed over that period?  If so how? 
☐ 
Where do you and your command group stand on the argument of 
rights versus safety? Some argue that in many circumstances the 
rights of the people to express dissent outweigh the immediate and 
(in their view) lesser consideration for minor safety concerns. 
What is the prevailing view? How far are you prepared to go to 
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